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ABSTRACT 
The most popular way environmental economists have quantified the worth we hold for 
wildlife has been through calculating a value for conservation or preservation practices.  
These typically focus upon endangered or charismatic species, and to an existence or non-
use value which somebody holds for the creature in question. 
This thesis recognises that our value for wildlife may be more diverse than this.  Indeed, it is 
highly feasible that people can derive an important yet cognitively disparate benefit from the 
animals and plants which they experience every day and which reside within close proximity 
to their homes. 
Using a combination of inter-disciplinary theories and techniques, this doctorate seeks to 
explore how mankind receives ‘nature connectivity’ value from local wildlife.  This work 
implies that by undertaking a ‘warden-style’ role when interacting with the flora and fauna 
which resides upon our doorsteps, humans can satisfy a separate and distinct aspect of their 
subjective well-being from that which they establish through classic conservation 
mechanisms.  Furthermore, this satisfaction may act as a substitute for other local social 
activities which are dwindling in modern UK society, including the participation in 
community or religious groups.   
The potential impact of these findings are that we may want to rethink the ways we 
approach the natural world if people are to maximise the participation in and welfare 
derived from their engagement with it.  This includes attending to the behavioural and social 
infrastructure which can facilitate the opportunities for people to express and enjoy a 
connection with nature.  
More generally, the conjectures made here indicate the importance of understanding not 
only if values exist for environmental entities, but comprehending when these will be 
dampened or elevated.  Until this can be done successfully, environmental economists will 
forever be fighting a losing battle to retain natural resources at socially optimum thresholds.   
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Researchers have typically sought to value the environment for one of two reasons.  
On the one hand, a worth has been derived through a recognition that natural resources 
hold pecuniary value and can enable financial prosperity through their extraction or 
utilisation.  In what many environmental economists now term ‘Payment for Ecosystem 
Services’ (PES), these quantifications recognise the economic benefit of ‘useable’ natural 
assets (Miller & Hobbs, 2002; Louv, 2008; Farmer et al, 2013; Gibbons et al, 2014; Clucas et 
al, 2014;).  The alternative focus has been to value the environment with regards to its 
existence or conservation value, and has looked to establish the worth people attribute to 
the preservation or enhancement of rare, charismatic or aesthetic environmental features 
under circumstances where they will have little or no future contact with these (Loomis & 
White, 1996; White et al, 1997; Dunn et al, 2006; Morse-Jones et al, 2012).  It must be 
appreciated that few environmental attributes sit at one extreme or the other, and 
existence and use values are indeed “seldom separable” (Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009 p.139).  
For example, recreational values hold characteristics attributable to both of these fields.  
Although these two schools might attend to different styles of environmental worth, a 
common theme is that the valuation attempts to reflect the benefits people gain from the 
natural world and its resources.   
However, it is important to recognise that the prosperity which can be established 
through environmental retention or improvement can occur on a variety of levels.  Indeed, 
it seems feasible that a small-scale interaction with the natural world could contribute as 
heavily to the individual and/or wider society to which they belong as large-scale action.  A 
good example of this arises if we assess the benefits which humans can extract from their 
engagement with nature.  This relationship takes a wide variety of forms and happens in an 
array of different situations.  ‘Engagement with nature’ ranges from visiting farms and 
country parks (Perino et al, 2014) to the undertaking of safari holidays and zoological 
experiences (Navrud & Mungatana, 1994; Kontoleon & Swanson, 2003) to gardening and 
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tending to the flora and fauna which reside upon our doorsteps (Rappe, 2005; Cameron et 
al, 2012).  Even this variety of activities pertain to a narrow form of nature, namely wildlife, 
and the list is considerably expanded when we imagine the activities which individuals 
pursue that involve  environmental landscapes, settings and ecosystems.  Not only are these 
types of interaction vast, but there is ever increasing evidence to show how widely 
proliferated the channels of benefit are for mankind from immersing themselves within the 
environment.  Indeed, connecting with the natural world has been described to have a 
plethora of advantages.  Whilst some of these could involve pecuniary gains, for example 
farming and fruit harvesting, the spectrum of internal benefits which humans can extract 
from nature is also considerable.  These range from improving our psychological well-being, 
our health and ability to recover and recuperate from stress, and physicality in the form of 
exercise and access to clean environments (De Vries et al, 2003). 
Given the inference that natural assets are able to enhance our utility and therefore 
serve as an instrument to improve our happiness, environmental economists are presented 
with the challenge of finding ways to accurately quantify these benefits.  Many natural 
resources “do not show up in market prices of financial returns” (Hanley et al, 2003 p.123), 
meaning the ascertainment of their worth becomes less easy.  This in itself is not critical and 
in many circumstances it would actually be unnecessary or even illogical to derive an exact 
‘price’ for an asset which give humans satisfaction.  However, because economic prosperity 
can so often be achieved at the expense or sacrifice of environmental entities, it becomes 
clear that inventing sound methods to calculate this worth is essential if the natural world is 
to receive an appropriate and adequate weighting in the policy or decision-making 
processes which involve their potential destruction or degradation.  A good analogy is that 
which ensures that those who prosper are not those who simply ‘shout loudest’.  In this 
case, we should not forsake or forget the benefits which the environment can bequeath to 
us simply because the quantification of these advantages are less visible than the market-
based prices which GDP calculations can issue through the (ex-post) over-extraction or 
utilisation of natural capital. 
The most common environmental valuation techniques fall into two main categories; 
revealed preference and stated preference methods.  A comprehensive overview of these 
methods and early examples of each can be found in Carson et al (1996).  The former 
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involves measuring the direct monetary costs which are incurred by people through the 
actions they undertake to enjoy improvements in environmental goods and services.  These 
can then be used as a lower bound in representing their willingness to pay for the good in 
question.  Classic examples involve hedonic assessments, investigating how market prices 
adjust in the presence of none other than environmental improvement, travel cost 
measures, calculating the time and/or monetary impositions people endure so as to receive 
more of a particular natural asset and production function methods, assessing the 
contribution of an environmental amenity when it is used to create commodities.  Stated 
preference techniques are a less subtle form of value derivation, and typically involve asking 
people for their values regarding an environmental entity under hypothetical circumstances.  
Given that policies are often looking to adjust the provision of the commodity, these studies 
typically seek to elicit people’s marginal willingness to pay for an improvement in the 
resource, or their willingness to accept a level of compensation for its loss or reduction.  
Whilst an overview of the various techniques can be found in Bateman et al (2002), the two 
most famous forms of stated preference methods remain that of Contingent Valuation, 
which directly asks whether a given respondent would be prepared to pay or accept 
particular sums of money for environmental alterations, and choice experimentation, which 
instead present candidates with a range of possible options and asks them to indicate the 
one which they most prefer. 
Whilst disagreement exists as to which set of methods produce the most reliable 
results in determining environmental value, it is generally appreciated that economists are 
more trusting of revealed preference studies.  The reason for this is because these methods 
tend to involve the use of factual market data and are therefore devoid of biases which can 
occur when people are being asked to provide preferences in a hypothetical arena.  In this 
sense, hedonic analyses and travel estimations are not susceptible to exaggeration or 
inflation because they are based upon events which have actually occurred.  We therefore 
might expect the individual in question to be more greatly informed and rational as they 
make their choice to undertake these corresponding actions.  Even if such rationality is to be 
believed, the range of environmental resources where valuations can be uncovered via 
revealed preferences are exhaustive, and many such entities exist where no handy 
economic instrument is present to neatly illustrate the extent to which society values it.  
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When these conditions arise, environmental economists and researchers must become 
more inventive and use a method of stated preference which can reliably predict the value 
of an asset, but at the same time do so through a means which retains credibility and 
realism in the mind of those being interviewed.  This ensures that they issue honest answers 
from which monetary calculations of worth can be found. 
Wildlife is a good example of an environmental asset where hedonic approaches are 
not always readily available as a tool to estimate human value.  Whilst admissions to 
zoological parks and museums or donations to wildlife charities can issue a researcher with 
some direct monetary values for the species that these payments relate to, the animals 
which are encapsulated by this system of payment reflects only a small fraction of the total 
biodiversity which humans interact and extract benefit from.  The consequence of this is 
that if one were to concentrate exclusively on this measure for ascertaining the value for 
‘wildlife’, we would see a bias in favour of creatures either where conservation and 
preservation is needed, or towards the type of ‘charismatic species’ which Jacobsen et al 
(2008) refer to, where the public feel a particular affiliation towards and so to which 
environmental charities revolve their fund-raising campaigns around.  Whilst studies have 
explored the valuation differences which may arise between creatures perceived as 
common versus those deemed rare (for example Christie et al, 2006), one consequence of 
this bias would be that too little attention is paid to ‘everyday’ species, or to key organisms 
within an endangered habitat which do not stimulate the interest of mankind due to their 
less striking or bold appearance and habits but without whom the whole ecosystem, 
including those classified as charismatic, would fail to exist. 
This thesis will illustrate a range of ways in which we can show that humans not only 
hold a positive value for this type of ‘overlooked’ creature, but entertain the notion that this 
worth may actually satisfy a different element of human well-being than that which is 
ignited by the standard valuation methods mentioned above.  The reason proposed for this 
is that payments for zoo admissions or donations to conservation charities typically refer 
more to preservation or existence values.  Although we receive a level of contentment from 
contributing to these causes, there is often a distinct lack of opportunity to physically 
interact with the animals to whom this payment involves.  Let us instead contrast this 
against the type of accentuated benefits one might receive from engaging with local or 
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common wildlife.  The natural world around us provides a direct use value, enabling us to 
care for the animals and plants on our doorstep in a role akin to that of a carer or ‘warden’.  
This relationship, which we term our connectivity with nature, is more comparable to the 
utility-enhancement we can receive from our local community, family and other social 
groups (Dutcher et al, 2007; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008).  It creates an opportunity for us 
to interact with a wider network and therefore deliver us a satisfaction from our belief that 
we form part of something bigger, issuing a stability and safety which we value highly.  
Moreover, our deployment as a warden within the local environment could mean that we 
can derive pleasure from a combination of the responsibility and purpose that this provides, 
alongside the repetition which comes with partaking in a routine interaction with everyday 
nature. 
In the first of the three papers set out in this dissertation, we use choice experiments 
to elicit the value that people hold for garden birds.  We focus upon this group of creatures 
for two main reasons.  The first is that they are a good example of animals from which 
humans can potentially receive warden-type utility.  Through actions such as dispensing bird 
food or erecting nest-boxes, there are clear opportunities for us to engage in a direct and 
repeated interaction with garden birds.  Moreover, these species emit a sense of 
vulnerability which, through the action of feeding, can allow humans to fulfil the chance to 
act as a protector.  The activity of feeding birds itself gives rise to our second major reason 
for concentrating upon these species.  Given that bird feeding is an extensive social practice 
in the UK (our country of focus), this paper utilises a rather unique chance to explore the 
values people hold for local and common wildlife through the use of a payment vehicle 
which retains a strong credibility and degree of familiarity with participants of the study.  
Whilst the main survey was conducted through the stated preference format of choice 
experiments, this style of payment also gave an opportunity to test the findings via an 
external validity check.  This mapped real seed purchase data to the inter-species values 
which had been elicited from respondents in the initial survey.  The results of this paper 
provide evidence which suggest the idea of nature connectivity could exist, and potentially 
informs us of a new and distinct channel through which people can derive happiness from 
the natural world around them.   
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One intriguing aspect of this study was realising the interplay between the private 
enjoyment that people report to obtain from seeing birds feed in their private garden and 
their realisation that undertaking this act holds benefits for others.  These ‘others’ might 
refer to birds and the survival of them and their species or one’s neighbours through the 
public benefits which accrue from elevated wildlife populations in the local area.  The logical 
question to ask from this is whether such private and competitive motivations (like that of 
attracting birds to your garden) might constitute a realistic catalyst to deliver an otherwise 
under-provided public good. As such, the second paper delves more deeply into the 
theoretical underpinnings of our value for local environmental amenities.         
This second study builds upon the findings of the first paper by constructing a model 
motivated by the example of neighbours choosing to decide how much seed to dispense 
(which represents the effort they must employ) in order to attract wild birds to their garden.  
Consequently, this piece builds a world which describes how humans vie for an 
environmental impure public good.  It thus seeks to compare how one’s tendency to free-
ride upon the contributions of others might adjust when the setting under which private use 
values are obtained hold competitive properties.  Crucially, we combine these economic 
theories of public goods and contests with that of Ideal Free Distribution.  This describes 
how, by employing Nash Equilibrium strategies, creatures adjust to changes in food 
concentration so as to maximise their survival chances.  The model’s corresponding analyses 
indicate that classic free-riding can be offset by the human desire to over-dissipate effort in 
light of a competitive atmosphere.  The extent to which this offsetting creates an under- or 
over-exertion of effort relative to the first-best outcome is determined by the relative 
returns to scale which can be realised in response to seed placement.  When applied to our 
motivating example of garden bird populations, this result is quite insightful and such scalar 
returns could represent the impact of reproductive success in a dynamic model.  This may 
imply that people would exert a greater degree of effort when they feel that their role as a 
warden delivers visible benefits to the animal and/or its local population.  Equally, returns to 
scale might suggest that the type of bird and their associated feeding habits are a critical 
component in determining the subsequent value which humans place upon them.   
Through our analyses in both the first and second papers, we use an example, bird 
feeding, where warden tendencies constitute an action which by and large complements 
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wider environmental objectives.  In this case, the ‘carer’ satisfies their personal desire to 
view birds thriving in their garden by dispensing bird feed or erecting bird boxes.  These 
same actions also enable the avian populations to be sustained and hence mitigate against 
other human processes which are detrimental to the species’ numbers (for example 
brownfield urban construction).  Within environmental economics, this vital role of personal 
action and behavioural motivation is not exclusive to wildlife interaction.  For example, the 
cognitively-fuelled stimuli to recycle or act in a ‘green’ way not only satisfy the individual 
through social, financial and/or moral ways, but also help achieve wider environmental 
efforts to prevent costly damage to the natural world.  However, there are circumstances 
where nature connectivity does not so neatly coincide with such broader aims.  The third 
paper, which explores the human attitude to culling, defines an intriguing example where 
warden-type emotions might actually present a barrier to achieving other desirable 
environmental objectives.      
This final paper of the thesis returns to choice experimentation. In this case, we ask 
people to indicate their preferences over deer population control when told this is 
necessary in order to provide high quality and sustainable woodland in the UK.   Whilst 
revolving around a completely different set of creatures, this paper still focusses upon 
establishing our value for wildlife which resides within close proximity to us.  By conducting 
the choice experiment under these conditions, we can test how respondents ‘construct 
their preferences’ regarding the management of an environmental habitat in the knowledge 
that culling and other forms of population control typically evoke strong emotional and 
ethical responses.  The term ‘preference construction’ is regularly used in economics, yet 
here the term is of particular interest because this study wanted to investigate whether 
people have pre-defined or ‘sacred’ views regarding ethical topics.  This would imply that in 
fact their choices are not produced through some form of learning or education.  By 
contrast, it seems quite plausible that for topics such as those in environmental economics 
where people’s understanding is based on partial or uncertain foundations, they could quite 
conceivably ‘build’ upon their stance for issues such as culling and therefore construct a set 
of preferences as new information is presented to and processed by them.  
The prior belief here was that individuals would care much more about the 
procedure by which deer numbers were going to be reduced to as opposed to their choices 
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being driven by either population reduction or habitat quality outcomes per se.  As such, 
two alternative theories were tested alongside rational choice theory as a means to assess 
which would most closely resemble the stated choice preferences from our sampled 
population.  These two rival theories were intentions-based reasoning, aligned with 
hypotheses of procedural fairness in behavioural economics, and the philosophically-
founded Doctrine of Double Effect.  Whilst little evidence was found to support the latter of 
these, the study does suggest that including behavioural elements such as intention can 
improve our understanding of how individuals make decisions.  This being said, no one 
theory could successfully explain the elicited preferences of our sample.  One of the most 
logical explanations for this returns to our belief that humans feel a warden-style sense of 
obligation to protect creatures in their local environment.  In this setting, participants 
become highly preoccupied by the way in which an individual deer’s welfare is impacted 
upon.  This would lead to them prioritising how ‘kind’ the method by which deer die seems 
above the well-intended long term environmental objectives which their death would allow.  
If such reasoning is true, this would suggest that a failure to assemble or convey a policy 
thoughtfully will create public opposition to animal control regimes which could form a 
major obstacle for sustainable woodland management.   
This work takes tentative first steps to show how ‘everyday wildlife’ can provide 
people with a real and tangible level of well-being.  The contribution and impact of these 
studies transfer nicely into the policy arena, where recognising and embracing this new 
school of thought could prove highly beneficial for relevant decision-makers.  If the 
conjectures presented here prove robust, authoritative bodies should respond by giving the 
nature which resides at our doorsteps a sufficient and appropriate weighting within any 
proposal where the interconnectivity between human communities and their local 
environment are projected to be impacted upon.                           
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SECTION 2:  
 
A COMMON BIRD IN YOUR GARDEN IS WORTH TWO RARE ONES IN THE 
WOODS: 
 
CONSUMPTION AND ENGAGEMENT VALUES OF LOCAL WILDLIFE 
 
 
 
2.1:  INTRODUCTION 
Engagement with the natural environmental holds the potential to substantially 
enhance human well-being in numerous ways. Many of these benefits depend on active 
exposure to if not direct interaction with the natural environment.  This study focuses on 
this ‘intimacy’ and concentrates on the values associated with our engagement with 
‘backyard wildlife’ in the form of common garden birds.  This is in contrast to valuation 
studies which instead focus on rare or endangered species or sites with special 
characteristics. Not only eliciting the values people held for different species, this study also 
includes attributes which attempt to disentangle elements of use and existence value and 
their associated weight in motivating an individual to engage with nature, an aspect which 
may significantly differ when people consider an interaction with local as opposed to 
endangered species of wildlife. Capturing these values explore some of the intricacies of the 
human relationship with nature, and a major motivation for this research is to gain an 
understanding not just of whether valuation occurs per se, but also why it might exist and 
differ, both across species and between individuals.   
Engagement with the natural world exhibits many of the qualities identified as 
beneficial to lasting life satisfaction within the literature on Subjective Wellbeing (SWB).  
Many studies within the literature have cited the ‘interconnectedness’ one receives from 
building a relationship with their local environment as a crucial component to achieve this 
(Miller & Hobbs, 2002; Dunn et al, 2006) and this attribute is common to many SWB 
enhancing actions, including involvement with religion (Frey & Stutzer, 2010), community 
(Dutcher et al, 2007) and wider society.  Furthermore, the repetition associated with 
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‘everyday wildlife’ interactions potentially induce positive feelings of responsibility (Rappe, 
2005; Jacobssen et al, 2008), routine (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008) and achievement of 
success under uncertainty (Dolan et al, 2008).  Exploring our behavioural motivations for 
interacting with the natural world serves to help assess how ‘nature connectivity’ (Dutcher 
et al, 2007) might contribute physically, emotionally and/or psychologically towards our 
wellbeing (Cameron et al, 2012).  Other studies have suggested local nature can have 
economic and social benefits.  These include increased property prices (Farmer et al, 2013) 
or the preservation of landscapes for future generations (Miller & Hobbs, 2002).   The 
implications of this work may be of substantial interest in areas such as planning policy.  The 
current UK procedure prioritises ‘brownfield’ and urban in-fill development ahead of that on 
‘greenfield’ or rural sites, yet such a stance might be inefficient if people value ‘backyard 
and everyday’ wildlife more heavily than that which is endangered or located in habitats 
further afield. Capturing this local worth would complement existing work which 
investigates the values of English nature (Gibbons et al, 2014), UK domestic gardens 
(Cameron et al, 2012) and Urban Greenspace (Perino et al, 2014). 
 This study also holds the potential to generate findings that are applicable to other 
areas in economics.  One of the greatest puzzles for behavioural economists is to 
understand our human desire to contribute to public goods.  This often defies standard 
‘rationality’ because, by contributing to a common cause, individuals choose a strategy 
which seemingly fails to maximise their private utility.  One suggested explanation proposes 
that individuals make a contribution when the good is ‘impure’.  By this, it is proposed that 
through the act of contributing people can derive a private benefit.  This could take many 
forms, including material or monetary advantage, adhering to a social norm, through 
perceived reciprocity or via psychological means such as ‘warm-glow’ altruism.  Although an 
intense research field, surprisingly few impure public goods studies are applied to an 
environmental setting, although Kotchen (2005; 2009) does provide two papers in this area.  
Feeding garden birds is an environmental action which can be readily described through an 
impure public good structure.  It contains a privately attainable benefit, namely the 
enjoyment from feeding and viewing birds, and a public goods externality, directed either 
towards the neighbourhood through the raised bird populations it creates (and thus to 
those neighbours who value the presence of garden birds) or through inter-species altruism 
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(Andreoni, 1989; 1990).  We include attributes of nutritional value of the seed, visibility of 
the birds fed and donation opportunities for endangered species in order to separate these 
various influences and thus investigate the reasoning underlying a person’s decision to feed 
birds.  Furthermore, by studying these facets, we may begin to establish how the private 
and public aspects of utility interact.  For example, whilst people may willingly contribute to 
a public good through feeding birds, there may remain a need to retain some private 
benefits in doing so. The notion of ‘nature connectivity’ described above, and the way we 
extract utility from such engagement may be inherent to this. 
A range of both revealed and stated preference techniques have been used to elicit 
both general wildlife and individual species’ valuations.  Examples include the estimated 
worth of US mega-fauna (Loomis & White, 1996), the role of flagship or keystone species in 
Africa (Navrud & Mungatana, 1994; Morse-Jones et al, 2012), Asia (Kontoleon & Swanson, 
2003) and Europe (White et al, 1997) and the importance of familiarity in establishing 
valuation for species (Christie et al, 2006; Dunn et al, 2006; Jacobsen et al, 2008). 
Many of the aforementioned studies use a choice modelling format and 
demonstrate the ability of this methodology to extract the human worth for individual or 
groups of species.  Yet, a recurring obstacle persists when trying to calculate such value.  A 
crucial component when extracting monetary quantifications from choice experimentation 
is to include a credible payment vehicle.  Akin to many environmental entities, wildlife can 
rarely be presented as a marketed good and it can be difficult to find a realistic and credible 
payment mechanism.  Many studies are able to overcome this problem by using either 
charitable donations or taxation as the method by which respondents should assume they 
pay. 
Whilst the adoption of choice experiments to species valuation has been fairly 
prevalent over the past decade, a major impact of this constraint is the inability for 
researchers to elicit the value of the many species where credible payment mechanisms are 
scarce.  By using bird seeds that differ in their ability to attract wild birds to people’s 
gardens, we believe that this paper exploits a unique and intuitive payment vehicle to elicit 
valuation for ‘everyday wildlife’.  Clucas et al (2014) have recently published the results of a 
study with a very similar focus to ours.  As with our research, they use the responses from 
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the public to elicit the value people hold for native urban songbirds.  However, we note a 
number of differences regarding both the methodology and aims between our paper and 
theirs.  Regarding results, their study seeks to compare two species of garden bird in order 
to derive an estimation of the aggregated benefits local songbirds may provide society.  By 
contrast, our study wishes to discover how values differ between species of garden bird and 
suggest why this might be so.   Furthermore, we use a hedonic approach which explores 
actual purchase decisions using a secondary dataset from a seed wholesaler. In the Clucas 
study, stated responses from the sample are used in order to calculate revealed values.  
Whilst these clear differences appear between the papers, we are encouraged that such 
studies exist, strengthening our belief that uncovering our worth for local nature holds a 
clear and necessary function.     
The flexibility contained within choice modelling is highly beneficial for researchers.  
Firstly, it permits the testing of multiple research questions simultaneously.  For us, we can 
use nutritional, donation and avian attributes to extract the value respondents attach to 
motivations of pure altruism, philanthropy and self-interest, alongside that of species 
diversity.  Secondly, the repetitive nature of choice experimentation assures respondents of 
multiple opportunities to indicate their true preferences.  Compared to a ‘one-shot’ 
valuation study, some instances of ethical objection can be removed because the researcher 
offers each respondent multiple opportunities and settings from which they can express 
their environmental preference.  With this particular choice experiment, we are afforded 
the chance to test these hypothetical responses by comparing the valuations we derive here 
with those established from the analysis of bird seed sales data.  This enables us to conduct 
an external validity check on our results which (broadly) confirm the findings of the DCM.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2.2 outlines the survey 
itself, before Section 2.3 describes the corresponding attributes in greater depth.  Section 
2.4 presents the model and associated econometric procedure.  Section 2.5 presents the 
results and explores socio-demographic variation within our findings.  Section 2.6 discusses 
these findings, whilst Section 2.7 contains a revealed preferences external validity test to 
complement the work contained here.  Section 2.8 concludes and suggests some directions 
for future research. 
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2.2:  THE SURVEY 
The Survey Structure  
The survey contained three sections; the choice modelling exercise, an ornithological 
quiz testing each respondent’s avian knowledge and a questionnaire to collect socio-
demographic information and to elicit respondents’ attitudes to bird-feeding. 
An ‘efficient’ choice model seeks to “maximise the amount of information… to 
identify the estimates of vector β” (Scarpa & Rose, 2008, p.257), where “β” measures and 
weights the characteristics which a person values in their utility function. When designing a 
choice experiment of this nature, consideration must be given to ensure that a survey holds 
both ‘statistical’ and ‘behavioural’ efficiency (Scarpa & Rose, 2008).  For the former, 
achieving pure statistical efficiency had to be partially compromised in our model because 
of the constraints which ornithological habit presented regarding credibility and realism.  
Such instances, such as Robin territoriality, are described in more detail through Section 2.3.  
Despite these complicating factors, several possible designs were devised through a 
‘column-based’ structure, achieving an orthogonal and fully balanced choice exercise. 
Once these designs had been produced, each were tested in Microsoft Excel.  Here, 
we follow recommendations from the literature (see Scarpa & Rose, 2008 p.265-266) and 
apply a utility function which estimated attribute values under a priori beliefs on their 
relative worth.   These ‘simulated responses’ were then run through a conditional logit 
model, the purpose of which was to test and compare how well each of our designs could 
replicate the assumed utility function by providing robust coefficients and valuations. 
The two strongest of these designs were then presented to independent focus 
groups, providing a pilot test that could examine the second element of successful design – 
behavioural efficiency.  Here, all aspects of the survey were combined in order to assess the 
duration and ease with which respondents could complete the task.  ‘Respondent Efficiency’ 
also required an assessment of how often clarity was sought and, following existing 
literature, considering whether any ‘unrealistic’ cases arose which may confuse or perplex 
members of the focus group (Scarp & Rose, 2008; Colombo et al, 2013).  Whilst neither 
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survey seemed to create any major instances of uncertainty, the chosen design was selected 
based upon a slightly faster and more positive response from its pilot group. 
1. The Choice Experiment  
Constituting the main part of the survey, this section offered each respondent 16 
bird-feeding ‘cases’.  Shown in Figure 2.1, each such case presented two bird food 
alternatives and a constant baseline not to feed.  Presenting three-alternative sets in this 
way is believed to improve model robustness (Bennett & Rolfe, 2009) and because people 
were asked to express both their first and second preferences, a complete ranking was 
established for every choice set. 
      
 
Figure 2.1:  A Sample Choice Set 
 
A description of the baseline (shown in Figure 2.2) was given at the instructions 
stage, and a copy was available on each respondent’s desk for them to review if necessary.  
The Baseline always showed one blackbird and one sparrow, and for simplicity a feeding 
alternative never issued these species at a lesser frequency than occurred in this no-feeding 
scenario.  
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Figure 2.2:  The Baseline Option 
 
 Whilst answer sheets were paper-based, the instructions and survey were 
presented on computer screens.  A researcher read the tutorial-style instructions aloud to 
subjects in order to overcome any issues of illiteracy or ambiguity.  A laminated copy of the 
tutorial was also available on a respondent’s desk for later reference if required. 
2. The Ornithological Quiz 
 This tested each respondent’s knowledge of garden birds.  It was a short exercise 
where the six bird species were labelled A-F.  Given in Appendix 2.3, participants were asked 
to try and match the letters to the correct bird names from a list of 16 possible options.1   
The identification quiz sought to test whether any relationship existed between knowledge 
and valuation.  Previous studies (Metrick & Weitzman, 1994; Lundhede et al, 2014) have 
proposed that knowledge is a key determinant of value, although for ‘everyday wildlife’ this 
assertion is less obvious given that here people have first-hand experiences with the 
species.  It is worth noting at this stage that a respondent’s knowledge of bird names may 
                                                          
1 Although actually asking respondents to write the birds’ names would have overcome any confounding issues 
of blindly guessing, the chosen format did not unnecessarily extend the survey completion time, and also 
avoided any ambiguity from misspelling or illegible answers. 
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not necessarily align to their level of experience.  Indeed, it is quite plausible that the role of 
‘recognition’ is more crucial here, as individuals can interact with and experience local 
wildlife without having any environmental or scientific knowledge of the creatures 
themselves (Czajkowski & Hanley, 2009).  
3. Socio-demographic and Behavioural Questionnaire 
 Contained in Appendix 2.4, this comprised a standard tick-box survey to discover 
both people’s attitudes to bird-feeding and socio-demographic data.  The behavioural 
section enquired as to the type and regularity of feeding individuals undertook, and whether 
they contributed to environmental charities.  Understanding why people engage in bird 
feeding is crucial to exploring the exact relationship which is established through nature 
connectivity (Jones, 2011) and so this section also enquired about an individual’s bird-
feeding motivation.  This asked them to rate a range of plausible reasons for engaging in the 
action on a 1 - 5 Likert scale. Socio-demographic questioning established each respondent’s 
gender, age and post-tax household income.  Individuals were assured this data would 
remain both anonymous and complicit with data protection laws. 
Conduct and Execution of the Survey           
    The optimal number of cases to present participants with is widely debated and 
considerably different stances exist within the field (Swait & Adamowicz, 1997; Adamowicz 
et al, 1998; Brazall & Louviere, 1998; Scheufele & Bennett, 2012).  This survey issued 
respondents with 16 choices.  Whilst at the upper bound of the recommended range, the 
familiarity that participants hold with the topic suggests a dampened effect of such 
cognitive burden.  The experiment was also praised by focus groups as being simple and 
easy to follow, and such an interface-friendly dimension is another factor which can enable 
more cases to be presented in a given survey (Colombo et al, 2013).  
 Through a combination of the voluntary nature of survey completion and the desire 
to have a sample experienced in both household budgeting and outdoor activities, it is 
appreciated that the valuations that would be derived from the survey could not be used to 
fully represent those of the entire East Anglian or indeed UK population.  Surveys were 
conducted at a Norwich garden centre in mid-July 2012.  In this location, it was reasonable 
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to assume the sample base would hold an interest in garden-related issues and therefore 
were well positioned to partake in the experiment.   To ensure that any potential 
respondent felt they could decline participation, a garden centre location also formed a 
sensible non-obligatory environment in which to conduct the survey.  Whilst conducting 
surveys in multiple locations or indeed multiple garden centres may have increased the 
ability to extend the transferability of WTP values, it was felt that conducting the survey 
through this format would allow for the most efficient use of research funds and time.    
 
 
2.3:  THE ATTRIBUTES 
The Bird Species 
Figure 2.3 displays the six bird types which were selected.  Selection was based upon 
the 2012 RSPB’s Big Garden Bird Watch (BGBW) Survey.  This is the largest wildlife data 
collection scheme in the UK based on public participation.  Annually, it invites the public to 
log both the diversity and frequency of bird species witnessed in their gardens for one hour 
over a pre-determined weekend in January.  Our survey was conducted in the city of 
Norwich, and data from its associated county (Norfolk) could be isolated from the main 
RSPB database thanks to the survey’s geographical species mapping. 
“Rank” relates to frequency estimations as calculated by the BGBW data collection, 
with five species achieving a rank associated with the most common Norfolk garden birds in 
2012.  Respondents were expected to be familiar with these species and, if interested, could 
potentially watch and interact with these regularly.  By contrast, the bullfinch ranked a lowly 
32nd.  Norfolk residents were about sixty (twenty-three) times more likely to encounter 
blackbirds (robins) in their gardens than bullfinches. This disparity was deliberately used to 
test if a characteristic of rarity induced a heightened valuation, as has been supposed by 
other stated preference studies (Hanley et al, 1998b).   
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Figure 2.3:  The Bird Species and their Rank based on Observed Occurrences in Norfolk 
Gardens (RSPB 2012). 
   
Aesthetic judgements were another dimension used to try and discover the worth 
respondents held for the birds, and whether a species is visually pleasing is another 
previously supposed indicator for valuation enhancement (Metrik & Weitzman, 1994).  The 
three birds on the right-hand side of Figure 2.3 possess a greater degree of vibrancy in their 
plumage, which we use as a proxy for more aesthetically pleasing options.  Woodpigeons 
are widely perceived as a pest species among gardening and agricultural communities, and 
so it seemed worthwhile to include this ‘undesirable’ bird. 
In line with recommendations from the literature (Kontoleon & Swanson, 2003; 
Bateman et al, 2009), alternatives were displayed through visual images. Using coloured 
pictures of the birds gave each choice set a more realistic ambience, facilitating participants 
to visualise these bundles in their own gardens.  Furthermore, the use of imagery did not 
exclude or restrict participants whose lesser knowledge would otherwise have inhibited an 
ability to express well-informed preferences.  Overall, an image-based design was seen to 
broaden the experiment’s accessibility.   
Figure 2.4 describes how bird numbers were represented in the experiment 
(Appendix 2.2 gives full experimental instructions).  Another ornithological consideration 
was to ensure that choices only showed birds at levels concurrent with their social 
behaviour.  For instance, robins are highly territorial and so constructing a choice set which 
included more than a single bird might have been seen as contradictory to this element of 
their behaviour. 
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Figure 2.4: Bird Frequencies and their Visual Representation in the Experiment. 
  
 The survey was also designed to investigate the extent to which people’s values 
were derived from watching birds feed. To achieve this, individuals were told that 
sometimes birds may be fed but not seen.  This deprives them of the personal visual 
benefits accrued through bird-feeding, which may constitute a sizeable portion of their 
private incentive to engage in the practice.  However, such a description conveys that birds 
still benefit from their action.  Another possible explanation is that feeding these birds still 
enables other parties, such as neighbours, to benefit from the increased bird populations 
drawn to the vicinity.  Thus, this characteristic could assess if somebody contributes to bird-
feeding through impure public goods motivation.  Here they would be expressing value for 
their aiding of wildlife and/or the wider community even if they receive little or no private 
utility. 
 There was an added importance in including this variable.  It can be directly 
compared to more traditional existence values that people hold for more remote 
environmental assets, as described through the ‘donation’ attribute.  This contrast is 
potentially quite insightful, and may feed back into our notion that an existence value is 
accentuated when people feel a greater connection or obligation to creatures living in close 
proximity to them.  Of course, use values are not always distinct and separable from 
existence values and the way in which these may enter an individual’s utility function may in 
reality be far more complex than described here.  However, the inclusion of this attribute 
Rating Description
This species will not come to your 
garden
Expect 1 bird of this species to come to 
your garden
Expect an average of between 2 and 5 
birds of this species to come to your 
garden
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does allow us to grasp some concept of the relative weight which a direct use values holds 
in a person’s decision to feed. 
 
 
Figure 2.5:  Instructions Regarding Visibility and Local Existence Value 
 
Instructions stated that the presence of a ‘faded’ bird implied a “feed but not see” 
situation.  Figure 2.5 reinforced this message, highlighting the difference between images in 
full and faded colour.  For simplicity, we restricted the number of birds subjected to this 
treatment to just two: - woodpigeon and bullfinch.  These display starkly different 
characteristics, the former a common, pest and plain species with the latter possessing a 
priori positive qualities of colourfulness and rarity. 
Nutrition 
 The role of our nutrition attribute was to discover whether respondents were willing 
to spend money on a characteristic of the seed for which they would not appear to be the 
primary beneficiaries.  To explore the relationship between humans and nature, the 
construction of such an attribute, suggestive of inter-species altruistic behaviour, seemed 
pertinent2.   
  Each alternative contained a ‘nutritional star rating’, ranging from basic nutrition 
(one star) up to very nutritious (three star) levels.  A positive coefficient on high ratings 
implies, ceteris paribus, a willingness to purchase nutritious seeds without witnessing 
                                                          
2Classic economic literature on altruism identifies a range of plausible motivations, including reciprocity 
(Sugden, 1982), moral satisfaction (Kahnemann & Knetch, 1992) and warm glow (Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 
1990). However, the extent to which we can identify an act as ‘purely altruistic’ (Hardin, 1977) is, 
psychologically, indeterminable.   This is because even if your intended action is to aid another, there is no 
guarantee that, even inadvertently, you do not simultaneously assume increments in your own utility.  This 
psychological debate regarding pure altruism is not within this paper’s focus, yet remains an important 
consideration whenever the term ‘altruism’ is used.   
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greater volumes of birdlife.  Put another way, the private gains from seeing the birds remain 
unchanged, meaning a willingness-to-pay for seed with a higher nutritional value must be 
driven by alternative motivations.  This could be an altruistic gesture aimed at the avian 
wildlife, or could raise one’s private utility through other means, be it public goods 
contribution or caring attitudes. 
 It seems important to highlight the individual contribution of this attribute above 
that for our ‘feed but not see’ birds.  One additional use is that people are much more 
familiar with nutritional quality as a credible measure of regarding product differentiation, 
and high quality seed is an aspect which is highly marketed.  For our purposes, another 
important distinction is that whilst for the faded birds respondents have the opportunity to 
discriminate in their decision of which birds to feed, a seed which is ‘high quality’ will be 
nourishing to any of the birds which are shown to feed on a choice option, regardless of 
whether people value all of these birds equally, or indeed at all.     
Price and Donations 
 Including a cost attribute is essential for any stated preference study. It allows for a 
trade-off between desirable attributes and the consumption of other goods, thereby 
enabling the computation of willingness-to-pay measures (Colombo et al, 2013).  As 
previously mentioned, many wildlife valuation studies have done this through expressing 
payment via donations or a tax levy. 
These forms of payment vehicle are perfectly sensible to apply within environmental 
settings, and can often lead to respondents taking on a more social perspective when 
deriving value (Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009) or, in the right setting, enable more honest 
answers to be elicited (Vossler et al, 2012).  However, two potential drawbacks can occur 
using these standard measures.  The first involves the constraints placed on the types of 
wildlife which can be credibly valued through either taxation or donation systems.  Because 
a researcher needs to defend why the levy or donation used is required to respondents, 
wildlife valuation studies tend to concentrate upon species which are perceived to require 
conservation or preservation.  Be it on local, regional, national or international scales, this is 
generally recognised as one of the more justifiable reasons for a government to intervene 
via a taxation system or for a charitable organisation to actively seek donations. 
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 Secondly, taxation holds the potential to impact detrimentally on participants’ 
responses.  For some, the mandatory nature of taxation causes a disassociation from the 
research topic (Rosen & Small; 1979), whilst for others the complexity of the taxation 
system prevents them from appropriately estimating the budgetary implications of their 
decisions.  Other issues may arise concerning respondents who feel their existing taxation is 
already too high, or those who have concerns over the distribution of tax contributors.  This 
being said, the use of taxation as a cost parameter is both a perfectly legitimate and widely 
applied tool in non-market valuation, and many of the concerns detailed above can be 
offset by ensuring that survey design, instruction and testing is thorough. 
Nevertheless, by using bird seed as a payment vehicle, this study is able to simply 
express cost in terms of the market price which must be paid to acquire a given bag of bird 
food.  In line with current market products, typical prices in the experiment ranged from 
£0.99 to £4.49 per one kilogram bag.  Prices were spread across this spectrum in £0.50 
increments.  
 The final characteristic was the donation.  Respondents were informed that 
sometimes the price of an alternative included a contribution to a wildlife charity.  This 
would seek to restore wetland habitats in East Anglia, the region where the experiment was 
conducted.  The endeavour of such work would be to raise bittern populations.  This species 
was chosen for its regional recognition as a flagship species for conservation and tourism.  
Furthermore, individuals were reminded that the bittern is a rare and elusive species, 
meaning that their contribution would be unlikely to reward them with a greater chance of 
actually seeing bitterns in future years.   
 This attribute aimed to gauge whether respondents possessed a more stereotypical 
existence value.  Furthermore, this offered the opportunity to compare and contrast this 
form of non-use value with the local one, given by Figure 2.5.  This could provide an 
assessment of the priorities people hold for wildlife and create first thoughts on how this 
might resonate with policy areas such as planning and conservation. 
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2.4:  THE MODEL 
Based on Lancaster’s Characteristics Approach (Lancaster, 1966), discrete choice 
experiments assume that a good’s value can be established through its constitutive 
attributes.  The value of each characteristic is assumed to be independent of how they are 
collectively bundled.  In our case, the ‘attributes’ are the species and number of birds 
attracted by a particular bird seed, whether the birds fed are observed by the person 
feeding, the seed’s nutritional value, the price of the seed and donations made to the 
conservation of a regionally occurring endangered bird species. 
 
Variable  Description 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in choosing an option 
because the ‘two blackbirds’ picture appears instead of the baseline one blackbird scenario.  The 
associated valuation is weighted on the assumption there is an equal chance that 2, 3, 4 or 5 birds are 
seen instead of the one. 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because one Bullfinch appears on the choice alternative.   
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in choosing an option 
because one Bullfinch appears on the choice alternative, yet this appears in a faded version to reflect 
the fact that this bird is fed but not seen by the feeder.   
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . Holding all other attributes constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an option 
because one Robin appears on the choice alternative.   
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because the ‘two sparrows’ picture appears instead of the baseline one bird scenario.  The 
associated valuation is weighted on the assumption there is an equal chance that 2, 3, 4 or 5 birds are 
seen instead of the one. 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because one Blue Tit appears on the choice alternative.   
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because the ‘two blue tits’ picture appears.  The associated valuation subtracts the probability 
associated with ‘Tit’ from this number, and then is weighted on the assumption there is an equal 
chance that 2, 3, 4 or 5 birds are seen instead of the one. 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because one Woodpigeon appears on the choice alternative.   
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 
. 
With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because one Woodpigeon appears on the choice alternative, yet this appears in a faded version 
to reflect the fact that this bird is fed but not seen by the feeder.   
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because that option has a one-star more nutritious rating.  
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because the donation associated with that bag of feed has increased by one penny (£0.01).  
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent chooses 
more nutritious seed given that the number of birds benefitting from that feed is changing. 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in a respondent choosing an 
option because the cost of obtaining that bad of bird seed has risen by one penny (£0.01). 
 
Table 2.1:  A Description of the Coefficients 
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Characteristics were presented across alternatives in a way which ensured choice-set 
orthogonality.  Table 2.1 confirms that many bird species did not appear in the choice 
experiment at all of the frequency levels stated in Figure 2.4.  Because of their presence in 
the Baseline option of not feeding, the coefficients for sparrows and blackbirds only enter 
the regression at the highest (‘two bird’) tier.  Variable ‘Nutnum’ involves an interaction 
term, multiplying the nutritional content of an alternative by the number of birds which 
would be seen.  This is estimated using the frequency key of Figure 2.4.  Whilst other 
interaction terms were examined through the analysis stage, many failed to register any 
statistical significance within the model and so were omitted from the final regression. 
 
The Empirical Model 
The data is analysed using a conditional logit model3.  Algebraically, this means that 
the utility person 𝑛 derives from alternative 𝑗 is assumed to take the form characterised by 
(1.1). 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗 +  𝜀𝑛𝑗  (1.1) 
Here, 𝑥𝑛𝑗 constitutes the variables which are observed by a participant for any given 
choice option and which are pre-determined by the researcher through the survey’s design. 
𝛽𝑛 then relates this to the person  𝑛’s personal preferences over the attributes at these 
particular levels. These models apply a Gumbel distribution to the random element of 
people’s utility (𝜀𝑛𝑗), which is deemed appropriate when included, as above, as an additive 
element to the utility function (McFadden, 1974; Louviere et al, 2000; Hoyos, 2010).  
Consequently, it is possible to establish the projected probability change for a participant’s 
selection of a given alternative 𝑖  based upon the rule that person 𝑛  will only select option 
𝑖  if that derives them the greatest utility relative to any other option (𝑗) available to them in 
a given and fixed choice set. The formula demonstrating this is shown below: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑛𝑖) =  ∫ (
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛽
′𝑥𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝛽′𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝑗
)  (1.2) 
                                                          
3 Our econometric specification does not deviate from that which is used widely in the literature, yet much of 
the notation and descriptions are adapted from Train (2009).   
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Attribute coefficients thus represent the respondent’s change in probability for 
choosing an option if, ceteris paribus, there is a unit change in that attribute’s level when 
described as a discrete variable, or through its presence relative to a base case for dummy 
(0-1) coded attributes (Bennett & Blamey, 2001).  The coefficient on price (𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 
represents the marginal utility of income, which for such environmental commodities is 
assumed to remain constant and negative (Hanley et al, 1998a). Determining an attribute’s 
marginal valuation then involves taking a ratio of its coefficient against that of price (Hoyos, 
2010).   
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑥 =  
−𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
   (3) 
 Participants were asked to state both their top and second preferences, essentially 
creating a ranking of the three alternatives for each choice set.  Our econometric 
specification is able to appreciate that each individual is making multiple choices and 
therefore can identify any participant-specific patterns in decision-making.  Our regression 
does just this, grouping responses by choice set whilst clustering these over individuals. 
 
2.5:  RESULTS 
 
 200 questionnaires were completed and subsequently prepared for statistical 
analyses.  A paper-based survey did not restrict our sample to those with computer literacy.  
Furthermore, a face-to-face format also enabled participants to engage orally with the 
researcher with respect to the topic.  A response rate of approximately 50% exceeds the 
average for either electronic (Cook et al, 2000) or traditional (Heberlein & Baumgartner, 
1978) surveys, and stated reasons for decline typically related to time constraints as 
opposed to miscomprehension or subject disengagement.  Whilst uptake was roughly 
consistent across genders, 119 (59.5%) of respondents were female.   
 The survey location was selected so as to capture those both responsible for a 
garden area and typically in charge of household budgeting.  Consequently, much of the 
UK’s younger demographic, such as students or financially dependent adults, were not 
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prime survey candidates.   Table 2.2 decomposes our sample’s age profile, and compares 
this to Norfolk population data as derived from the 2011 Census 
(www.norfolkinsight.org.uk).  We reject the null hypothesis that our sample holds the same 
age distribution as the regional population and witness a significant difference between 
these two groups (𝑧 = 4.015, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.0001).  This occurs predominantly through an under-
representation of those from lower age brackets (particularly those aged 26-45) and an 
excessive number of respondents aged above 56 (more than 60%).   
Age Bracket Sample Population (%) Norfolk Representation (%) 
18-25 years 11/200 (5.5%) 52/681 (7.6%) 
26-35 years 15/200 (7.5%) 96/681 (14.1%) 
36-45 years 11/200 (5.5%) 105/681 (15.4%) 
46-55 years 42/200 (21%) 118/681 (17.3%) 
56-65 years 46/200 (23%) 114/681 (16.7%) 
Over 65 years 75/200 (37.5%) 196/681 (28.7%) 
 
Table 2.2: Age Profile Comparison 
 Table 2.3 provides the income profile of the sample.  12% of respondents chose not 
to share this information.  We see a broadly representative (𝑧 = 0.823, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.4108) income 
distribution based against that for Norfolk generally (www.norfolkinsight.org.uk).  The slight 
under-representation of those among the lowest income brackets may potentially 
correspond to the aforementioned low proportion of younger respondents.   
Income Bracket Sample Population 
(%) 
Norfolk Representation (%)* 
Under £20,000 55/200 (27.5%) 39% 
£20,000 - £29,999 48/200 (24%) 21% 
£30,000 - £39,999 25/200 (12.5%) 24% 
£40,000 - £49,999 18/200 (9%)  
£50,000 - £59,999 9/200 (4.5%)  
£60,000 - £69,999 7/200 (3.5%)  
£70,000 - £79,999 3/200 (1.5%) 16% 
£80,000 - £89,999 2/200 (1%)  
Above £90,000 10/200 (5%)  
Preferred not to disclose 24/200 (12%) N/A 
*Data approximations from Norfolk Insight (CACI), 2010 
Table 2.3: Income Profile Comparison 
 
 As mentioned when detailing the survey’s location, we wanted to ensure that our 
sample represented a population who were responsible for household budgeting and who 
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were also familiar with outdoor activities.  As a consequence, the age and income profiles 
above do not appear discordant to this target population. 
The coefficients of Table 2.4 are obtained by running a conditional logit model on the 
responses from the DCM4.  Species of the highest frequency level (see Table 2.1) are 
indicated by the presence of the ‘𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭’ notation in Table 2.4, whilst those with an 
(𝑒)+represent our local existence value birds which were fed but not observed by the 
feeder (refer to Figure 2.5).  Original regression outputs for the four models below can be 
found at Appendix 2.5. 
  Full Sample  
Model (1) 
Give to 
Environmental 
Charity 
Model(2) 
 
Bird Knowledge 
(Model (3)) 
Altruistic Feeders  
(Model (4)) 
 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.398 0.000 0.255 0.112 0.715 0.001 0.601 0.000 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.504 0.000 0.656 0.000 0.404 0.018 0.648 0.000 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.404 0.000 0.418 0.005 0.524 0.031 0.146 0.304 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 0.667 0.000 0.604 0.000 1.083 0.000 0.751 0.000 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.410 0.000 0.352 0.004 0.741 0.000 0.500 0.000 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . 0.364 0.000 0.275 0.001 0.602 0.000 0.353 0.000 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 1.268 0.000 1.413 0.000 1.814 0.000 1.347 0.000 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.126 0.182 -0.318 0.020 -0.117 0.602 -0.214 0.089 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.178 0.060 -0.340 0.019 -0.452 0.037 -0.022 0.859 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 0.575 0.000 0.771 0.000 0.612 0.000 0.669 0.000 
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . -0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.434 -0.003 0.046 -0.001 0.410 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . -0.055 0.000 -0.048 0.005 -0.076 0.001 -0.058 0.001 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.048 -0.001 0.018 
Model Fit (𝜒2) 202.53 0.000 157.97 0.000 158.91 0.000 157.55 0.000 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.1777  0.2460  0.2647  0.2497  
Observations 16000  8800  5040  9920  
Participants (𝑛) 200  110  63  124  
 
Table 2.4:  The Conditional Logit Regressions 
 
Model (1) estimates coefficients for the complete sample.  For each of their cases, a 
respondent was providing a full preference ranking.  Subsequently, each choice gives five 
‘choice observations’; this can be decomposed into the ‘top choice’ where one alternative is 
selected of the initial three, and the ‘second choice’ where one option is chosen of the 
remaining two alternatives.  Whilst 16000 observations are recorded here, an ‘observation’ 
relates to an option as opposed to a separate choice incident.  In fact, for each of their 16 
                                                          
4 Data input and analysis were performed using   𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐴11. 
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cases, each respondent made 2 choices from 5 ‘observations’5 meaning that in reality the 
data in Model (1) is formed from clustering 200 individuals’ 32 separate choice decisions. 
Models (2), (3) and (4) regress the same explanatory variables but from a subgroup of 
respondents who hold particular or distinct characteristics. Model (2) selects those who 
confirmed they had donated to an environmental charity (n = 110).  The intuition is that 
these participants represent those who feel a greater degree of environmental 
responsibility.   Model (3) isolates those who correctly named all six of the species in the 
bird identification quiz (n = 63).  By selecting this group, we explore whether a superior 
avian knowledge has a distinct impact on valuation.  Finally, Model (4) shows the values for 
those who scored highly on motivations which allude to altruism (n = 124).  These referred 
to respondents whose aggregated Likert score for the motives ranked 2nd, 3rdand 4th in Table 
2.6 exceeded 12 (of a possible 15).  Table 1 of Appendix 2.6 shows that whilst some 
statistical differences do exist between the coefficients of these three subsamples and that 
of Model (1), the general pattern with respect to the size and scale of attribute parameters 
seem consistent.  In particular the price attribute retains a constant magnitude, which is key 
when considering the robustness of WTP values. 
Given the results of Table 1 in Appendix 2.6, we proceed to check some further 
specification tests, but this time applying these to Model (1) only.  Whilst there is significant 
evidence that respondents are dissuaded by the status quo (𝜒2 =  −7.43, 𝑝 = 0.000), Table 2 
of Appendix 2.6 confirms that whilst this does seem to reduce the WTP estimates for most 
of the bird attributes, by and large accounting for these Status Quo effects do not appear to 
alter the relative values (i.e. ranking) that people place upon different local wildlife species. 
The model does not pass the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) test (𝜒2 =
 147.33, 𝑝 = 0.000), yet we add two caveats to this result.  The first is that alternatives are 
unlabelled and so our interpretation of omitting an ‘option’ does not hold the usual 
meaning which is applied to the IIA test.  Furthermore, this test is widely seen as 
inappropriate for clustered models like the conditional logit (see McFadden, 1973, p.243).  
Likelihood ratio tests do confirm the joint significance when multiple attributes are omitted 
                                                          
5 This is because each respondent gave a top preference (one choice from three options) and then a second 
preference (which is then one choice from the two alternatives they declined to choose as their top choice). 
36 
 
from the regression6. This is a further reason why alternative models were pursued, with the 
results of these specification tests given later. 
For each model, Table 2.5 gives an implied monetary worth, expressed in pounds 
sterling (£).  Described in Table 2.1, the valuations for the highest frequency (′𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭′) species 
is established by applying a weighting to assume with equal probability that between 2 and 
5 birds would be seen. 
The first finding which we derive from the data relates to the bird valuations 
themselves.  Across all four models, species valuations follow a widely consistent pattern; 
the robin, bullfinch and blue tit evoke the greatest worth, with all three holding a 
significantly elevated value over the next most valued bird of the sparrow7.  By contrast, 
valuations for the woodpigeon are either insignificant or negative. This result is conducive 
with the prior intuition that people could value aspects such as colour or associated 
aesthetics when interacting with wildlife.  With the exception of Model (2), the ‘rarer’ 
bullfinch species fails to evoke a greater worth than either the robin or blue tit8.  This 
‘valuation ladder’ is intriguing.  Appearance apparently plays a critical role in deriving worth, 
yet the aspect of rarity cannot be assumed to enhance this value further still, as we might 
have anticipated.  We shall return to this aspect later. 
 
 
Full Sample  
Model (1) 
Gives to an 
Environmental 
Charity 
Model(2) 
 
Strong Bird 
Knowledge 
(Model (3)) 
Altruistic Feeders  
(Model (4)) 
 
All values are expressed in pounds Sterling (£0.00) 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . *0.08  0.05  *0.12  *0.12   
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . *0.21  *0.25  *0.14  *0.26   
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . *0.16  *0.16  *0.18  0.06   
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . *0.27  *0.23  *0.36  *0.30   
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . *0.09  *0.07  *0.13  *0.10   
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . *0.15  *0.11  *0.20  *0.14   
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . *0.19  *0.23  *0.21  *0.20   
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.05  *-0.12  -0.04  -0.08   
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
  -0.07  *-0.13  *-0.15  -0.01   
        *Significant Coefficient (p<0.05) 
Table 2.5:  WTP Valuations for Bird Species 
                                                          
6 For example, omitting sparrow and tit (𝜒2(2) =  44.95, 𝑝 = 0.000) or robin and woodpigeon (𝜒
2
(2) =
42.07, 𝑝 = 0.000) variables show evidence of joint significances.  
7 Full tests of WTP differences for Model (1) can be found in Appendix 2.6 
8 Insignificant differences for the full sample: Bullfinch ~ Robin ( 𝜒2 = 1.58, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.21) and Tit ( 𝜒2 = 2.35, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.12). 
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 Nutrition retains a consistently high and positive status across models.  Relative to 
the full sample in Model (1), we see a slight (yet insignificant9) elevation among charity 
givers in Model (2).  This result seems fairly surprising as it is plausible that those who 
express an environmental affiliation through some form of donation could attach greater 
value to a characteristic which aids the birds.  Across models, Model (3) derives a 
significantly elevated value for bird species against Model 1 (𝜒2 = 39.9920, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000)10.  
However, beyond its ability to produce birds for them to view, these respondents do not 
seem to value any other aspect of the seed to the same extent.  One potential conclusion to 
be drawn from this is that possessing greater avian knowledge purely yields a heightened 
private value for birds, without fuelling any allied altruistic or publicly spirited aspects.  
 On average, increasing the donation associated with an option creates a negative 
and significant dissuasion from a participant choosing it, ceteris paribus. Whilst at first this 
might appear surprising, this trend was reinforced by anecdotal discussions with 
respondents, who claimed a distaste to engage in such compulsory philanthropy.  Returned 
to in later discussion, it is worth noting that this effect disappears among charity givers in 
Model (2) and the ‘altruistically-motivated’ of Model (4). 
Regressor ’nutnum’ is negative and significant across all models, suggesting that the 
importance of nutrition declines when more birds are attracted and fed by a particular 
option.  Further analysis (not presented here) found that the number of birds fed per se (i.e. 
irrespective of species) plays no significant role in people’s choice-preference and this 
enhances the trust we place upon the negative sign for this ‘nutnum’ variable.  Again, the 
possible importance of this is identified in the following section. 
Preference heterogeneity can often be a complicating factor in deriving sound 
economic valuations (Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009) and subsequent to running the basic 
conditional logit analysis on this data, further exploration involved regressing the same data 
using both a mixed logit regression and latent class model.  The former is an example of a 
random parameters model, which affords the researcher greater flexibility by removing the 
                                                          
9 Confirmed through Mann-Whitney U tests of sample median differences 
10 Confirmed through Mann-Whitney U tests of sample median differences 
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restriction that all respondents will place the same value upon the attributes and their 
levels.  Econometrically, this involves adjusting the utility specification from Equation (1.2): 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑛𝑖) =  ∫ (
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛽
′𝑥𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝛽′𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝑗
) 𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽  (1.2a) 
The Latent Class model is a second way to test preference heterogeneity among 
respondents.  These models seek to calculate the optimal number of groups or ‘classes’ of 
respondent who hold collectively similar valuations.  A more detailed overview of these 
more sophisticated econometric tests is given by Pacifico (2010). 
Full regression results from performing both the mixed logit and Latent Class model 
simulations can be found in Appendix 2.6.  For the latter, the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) method was applied to establish the best class size.  Again, comparisons are made with 
respect to Conditional Logit Model (1).  Confirmed through Table 2.6 below, this comparison 
again shows that significant differences occur between the valuations which these three 
models elicit from our sample11. Once again, likelihood ratio tests hold (results not repeated 
here), and we can confirm that despite its unlabelled alternatives there are significantly 
lessened concerns regarding IIA (𝜒2 =  43.86).   
 
 Conditional Logit 
(Model 1) 
Mixed Logit Latent Class Model 
Class 1 
Share: 0.137 
Class 2 
Share: 0.716 
Class 3 
Share: 0.146 
All values are expressed in pounds Sterling (£0.00) 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.32 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.00 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 0.27 0.25 0.12 0.22 -0.04 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.09 0.06 -0.19 0.04 0.62 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . 0.15 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.39 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.19 0.14 0.25 -0.47 0.02 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.05 -0.01 0.15 1.11 0.63 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.72 5.77 
 
Table 2.6:  A Comparison of WTP Values across Regression Models 
 
                                                          
11 Statistical differences between the conditional logit and mixed logit models can be found in Appendix 2.6 
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This being said, it does appear that even accounting for preference heterogeneity, a 
pattern of values the conditional logit, mixed logit and latent Class 1 (around 32%) 
respondents still emerges, analysis of which will be explored in the next section.  Class 2 
(roughly 56%) respondents by and large comply with this trend, suggesting that the ranking 
by which people value local wildlife seems fairly consistent.  However, it is also noted at this 
juncture that our Latent Class model indicates the relevance of understanding that 
preference differences exist within a population, and acknowledging and embracing these 
are surely essential for any relevant policy-maker if they are to establish the greatest degree 
of support for their respective initiatives. 
Turning to our behavioural section of the survey, question 4 asked whether a 
respondent had given some form of donation to an environmental charity within the last 12 
months.  110 of the 200 questioned (55%) confirmed they had done so.  Whilst this may 
seem somewhat inflated, no specific restrictions were imposed in people’s interpretation of 
this statement.  This means ‘donating’ could represent the undertaking of a range of 
activities, be it direct payment, environmental membership or engagement in conservation 
work.  In contemplation of this broader definition, this percentage does not seem so 
unreasonable. 
 Given an agreement to participate in the survey, it is perhaps unsurprising that 80% 
of respondents agreed that they fed birds at least occasionally.  75% did so through some 
form of purchased sustenance, whilst one third stated they fed leftover food alongside or 
instead of this.  Of the 14 respondents who fed ‘Other’ foodstuffs, descriptions generally 
alluded to the use of fresh fruit, lard or domestically harvested corn and maize. 
 
 Rank Description Score (Average) 
1 Enjoyment from looking at them (ENJOY) 877 (4.39) 
2 Helps Bird Populations (POP) 835 (4.18) 
3 Feel the birds need the food (NEED) 793 (3.97) 
4 Good feeling from helping (FEEL) 709 (3.55) 
5 Throwing food in the bin is a waste (FOOD) 579 (2.90) 
 
Table 2.7:  Motivational Hierarchy for Feeding 
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Conducive with expectations, summer was the season with the lowest level of bird-
feeding - 61.5% fed birds in this period.  Feeding prevalence rose during the other seasons 
to 76% in autumn and spring and 81% over winter months.  One might consider that feeding 
birds in summer reveals a motive which is more anthropocentric in nature.  During this 
season, people spend a greater proportion of time in their garden, affording them a greater 
opportunity to see birds feeding.  Yet, it is unclear whether birds require this food through 
summer months.  The advice from avian charities is ambiguous on this issue; some advocate 
year-round aid whilst others advise that natural food is abundant in this season. 
Question 5 of the survey asked people to rate on a scale of 1 (strong disagreement) 
to 5 (strong agreement) their attitudes on reasons to feed birds and Table 2.7 provides the 
aggregated results of these responses, with the associated average score in brackets.  
Differences between each of these motivations are statistically significant12.  It shows that 
people’s enjoyment from watching birds is the most potent motive for engaging in the 
activity.  Helping bird populations forms the reason rated second highest, whilst fuelling 
nutritional need is a tertiary priority.  These latter motivations fall under a more altruistic 
umbrella than the former reason, and Table 2.8 confirms a significantly positive correlation 
between the two factors.  A reluctance to agree with the proposed fifth motive is also 
enlightening. It illustrates how one well-established environmental concern, namely that of 
escalating landfill rates in the UK cannot be directly addressed by a raised engagement with 
the one we focus on here; the protection and conservation of local wildlife. 
 
  ENJOY NEED POP  FEEL FOOD 
ENJOY 1     
NEED 0.28 1    
POP  0.34* 0.5* 1   
FEEL 0.08 0.24* 0.14 1  
FOOD 0.11 -0.08 0.04 0.22* 1 
                                                                        *Significant Correlation 
Table 2.8: Correlations across Motivations  
 
                                                          
12 ENJOY > POP (𝑡 = 3.36, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.001) > NEED (𝑡 = 3.53, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.001) > FEED (𝑡 = 4.57, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000) > FOOD (𝑡 = 4.81, 
𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000) 
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Table 2.9 provides a full matrix of the bird identification analysis.  In congruence with 
expectation, the robin and blackbird proved easiest for respondents to recognise.  By 
contrast, the house sparrow proved most difficult for people to correctly name.  Upon closer 
inspection, this seemingly relates more to misidentification (37.5%).  65% of these incorrect 
guesses instead claimed the bird was the great tit, tree sparrow or dunnock.  Adjusting for 
such close mismatching, our sample found it most challenging to correctly name our ‘rare’ 
bullfinch species.  Whilst nearly 56% did correctly identify this bird, we see a relatively high 
proportion fail to register any answer. 
Nearly two-thirds of respondents could match at least five of the six birds correctly, 
whilst just one in eight mis-identified three or more birds.  Hence, our sample apparently 
possessed a good level of local avian familiarity.  Even those who expressed a low interest in 
bird-feeding still held a respectable background knowledge, and proclaimed non-feeders 
achieved a mean score of 4.36.  
 
  Blackbird House Sparrow Blue Tit Woodpigeon Robin 
Bullfinc
h 
Chaffinch 0 17 3 0 0 47 
Robin 0 0 0 0 198 0 
Grey Heron 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lesser-Spotted Woodpecker 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Blue Tit 0 2  179 0 0 0 
Woodpigeon 0 0 0  169 0 0 
Blackbird  198 0 0 0 0 0 
Bullfinch 0 6 1 0 0  111 
Song Thrush 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Kestrel 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Collared Dove 0 0 0 26 0 0 
Dunnock 0 6 0 0 0 0 
Mallard 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tree Sparrow 0 24 0 0 0 0 
House Sparrow 0  104 0 0 0 1 
Great Tit 0 19 7 0 0 3 
No Answer 2 21 10 5 2 31 
  200 200 200 200 200 200 
 
Table 2.9:  Identification Quiz Results 
 Overall, the majority of our results adhere to a priori intuitions.  The first aim of this 
paper was to discover if, and to what extent, people held a value for ‘everyday wildlife’.  The 
second wished to explore the underpinnings of any such valuation in the context of 
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Subjective Well-Being. The values attributed to both the bird species and associated 
altruistic elements such as nutrition unequivocally confirm a positive answer to the first of 
these aims.  The next section now searches to contextualise this within the field of 
behavioural economics in order to address the study’s second objective. 
 
2.6:  DISCUSSION 
Given both the study location and non-obligatory conditions for participation, these 
findings cannot be generalised to the (full) UK population.  At the same time, many 
participants claimed they did not actively pursue bird-feeding as a regular activity.  
Therefore, whilst the sample may ineffectively represent the whole population, it appears 
reasonable to assume that it can extend to a significant fraction of UK citizens, particularly 
those who hold interests in outdoor pursuits, horticulture or other assimilated activities. As 
a consequence, a multitude of meaningful avenues for debate are opened from the results 
above. 
Bird Valuations and ‘Nature Connectivity’ 
From an environmental standpoint, the study’s most tangible finding relates to the 
ranking of species based upon the estimated values given in Table 2.5.  This profile 
predominantly complies with both our a priori intuitions and previous researchers who find 
that more aesthetically pleasing species which possess qualities of colourfulness and 
vibrancy invite the greatest human value (Jacobsen et al, 2008).  Equally, undesirable 
attributes of pest-species and plumage blandness draw a lower or even negative response 
(Clucas et al, 2014). Identifying where values differ, and crucially why this seemingly occurs, 
is no doubt insightful for directing policy.  In this case, understanding that species of local 
wildlife can provide people with varying levels of utility could, for example, help decide how 
biodiversity action plans and conservation efforts are actioned and marketed to people in 
order to maximise participation.   
In contrast to these intuitive results, the position of our bullfinch on this ‘valuation 
ranking’ is interesting.  Bullfinches are brightly coloured and reasonably attractive birds, and 
furthermore they are relatively rare in the Norfolk region.  This combination of qualities 
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should, in the eyes of other studies, allow the bullfinch to evoke the greatest valuation of 
our tested species. However, it consistently fails to achieve this status, meaning that our 
bird hierarchy only partially complies with previous thoughts surrounding the factors which 
are perceived to increase one’s value for a species. 
By instead appealing to the literature on Subjective Well-being and the channels by 
which humans are presumed by behavioural theorists to derive utility, we find clues which 
might relate more favourably to our discovered hierarchy and drive the results we obtain.  
As well as promoting aspects of vibrancy and aestheticism as sources of value, this school 
would additionally cite utility-enhancing factors that endow humans with repeated 
interaction and invite the opportunity to exhibit emotions of autonomy, responsibility and 
interconnectedness (Cameron et al, 2012).  Two of our three top ranked species, the robin 
and blue tit, typify this profile perfectly.  Not only are they visually pleasant, but their size, 
stature and feeding habits serve as classic characteristics to invite human valuation through 
these other means (Tinbergen, 1953).  Humans might interpret such facets as signals that 
these birds require a greater level of protection in order to increase their chance of survival 
and ability to reproduce.  By being common birds, and thus frequent visitors to gardens, 
they offer the opportunity for repeated and routinely interaction which then boosts the 
utility humans develop from feeding them.  Fuelling further the plausibility of this approach, 
other species in our hierarchy are missing some of these enhancing qualities, be it 
aestheticism (house sparrow), dependency (blackbird), the opportunity for repeated 
interaction (bullfinch) or a combination of these (woodpigeon).   
By transferring this reasoning to identify ‘types of respondent’ who answered our 
survey, we can try and uncover what characteristics of a person or their attitudes may give 
rise to them behaving like a warden.  One way to do this is by comparing our alternative 
models.  For example, respondents from Model (4), our ‘altruistic feeders’, post significantly 
elevated valuations for the species which seem most vulnerable13.  Another way would be 
to use our Latent Class Model to make such inferences.  It appears that somebody belonging 
to Class 3 seems least aligned to possess our definition of a ‘warden mentality’.  Results in 
Appendix 2.6 infer that both knowledge (instrumented through the number of birds 
                                                          
13 Relative to the full sample, significantly higher values for the Robin ( 𝜒2 = 4.62, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.03**), Sparrowmult ( 𝜒2 = 3.48, 
𝑝(𝑧) = 0.06*), Tit ( 𝜒2 = 3.51, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.06*) and Titmult( 𝜒2 = 4.00, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.05**) from ‘altruistic’ feeders. 
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correctly guessed in the identification quiz) and age (given by a dummy variable for the 
oldest age group) might act as significant drivers in determining one’s value for birds.  Both 
sets of respondent are more likely to align to Class 2 than Class 3 membership and therefore 
exhibit a greater tendency to adhere to the principles of nature connectivity.  
Upon first inspection, the sign and significance of the ‘nutnum’ variable appears 
contradictory to previous analysis.  Surely individuals should place a constant worth on 
nutrition, or even increase it, as the volume of birds fed from their seed increases.  
However, by applying this finding to the individual who derives utility from ‘warden’ 
interaction, a negative coefficient may still be consistent.  Such people would clearly value 
the nutrition of a seed which attracted small numbers of dependent species.   However, 
they may gain less utility from the nourishment of food which brought birds in a greater 
volume and thus where their engagement took a more anonymous and detached stance.  
Furthermore, as bird numbers increase, the inherent perception would be of a lesser 
dependency - populations are clearly thriving and are therefore less reliant on human 
intervention.  Subsequently, the sense of responsibility diminishes, and with it the utility 
gleaned through this form of ‘nature connectivity’. 
Motivations for Feeding Birds 
Another key application of this study pertains to examining people’s stated 
motivations for feeding.  The self-rewarding enjoyment from viewing birds constitutes the 
primary reason for engaging in this act.  This is perhaps unsurprising given this is a stimulus 
which respondents would feel, regardless of if this were complemented by altruistic 
motivation or not. 
The placement of ‘help’ above ‘need’ within the stated motives in Table 2.7 is 
perhaps interesting.  This implies that a sizeable component of the utility people gain from 
nature engagement originates from a sense of responsibility they feel when aiding another 
species.  The word ‘need’ suggests obligation and that failure to act would otherwise be 
detrimental.  In contrast, ‘help’ is a slightly weaker phrase.  Here, one might wish to 
contribute to bird welfare, but abstaining from doing so is not necessarily harmful.  Under 
these circumstances, individuals can be more selective regarding when and what they 
decide to feed.   This complies with the aforementioned findings from our species 
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valuations.  Birds which glean the greatest worth correlate to those whose characteristics 
imply a sense of vulnerability and defencelessness and thus where (albeit non-obligatory) 
aid will reward a feeder with the most satisfaction. 
One additional note regarding these motivational rankings is the relative distaste of 
participants to state they feed birds because it ‘made them feel good’ to be helping.  Whilst 
happy to concede that they hold personal motives for feeding (namely through visual 
enjoyment), people were reluctant to agree with this alternative private reason.  Described 
through an altruistic or public goods framework, our sample appear to partition and 
prioritise a private utility component from watching birds and acknowledge that clear 
interactions exist between this and the public benefits of this act, namely via increased 
and/or healthier bird populations.  However, the suggestion is that their provision to the 
public good is to help birds and the produced subsidiary private utility (of feeling good) does 
not constitute the primary driver of such action.  This reasoning complies with the 
conjecture that people may approach such engagement through a “warden-type” role of 
responsibility, and acquire utility through channels more likened to that of keeping pets 
(Johnson, 2011) or gardening (Rappe, 2005). 
Donation and the Decomposition of Value 
We now turn the focus of our discussions to the experiment’s donation variable.  
This characteristic attempted to relate ‘everyday wildlife’ to the value people attribute to 
more general conservation efforts typically explored within the field.  This donation 
coefficient is consistently negative and was significantly so in Models (1) and (3).  The most 
plausible explanation for this arrived from the verbal reasoning of surveyed respondents.  
They explained their dislike of compulsory donations through the purchase price, which 
essentially forces them to contribute to a specific cause in pre-defined amounts.  Instead, 
individuals indicated a preference for compartmentalisation.  On the one hand they could 
voluntarily contribute to environmental charities and presumably would yield a form of 
utility in doing so.  On the other they took pleasure from bird-feeding, but as a separate, 
private act which should be dis-associated from the philanthropy of charity-giving.   
The notions behind such anecdotal views invite us to make a number of suggestions.  
One regards the care which should be taken when interpreting the negative sign: the 
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survey’s design and instruction made it very clear that price differences between two 
alternatives were caused purely from the presence of a donation.  This is clearly ill-aligned 
with the usual nature of such ‘bundling’, where companies employ far more complex 
systems such as proportional or corporately-matched donations.  Consequently, we retain 
great caution in the assertions we make over the absolute values people express for 
regional or national conservation causes.  However, this finding could mean that making 
direct comparisons between values for local and conservation species is somewhat 
dangerous (Clucas, 2014), and may also question a belief held within the field that 
engagement with local nature will automatically serve as a catalyst for achieving a wider 
interest in conservation issues (Miller & Hobbs, 2002; Dunn et al, 2006)  
Another insight pertains to the difference this form of existence value takes from 
that characterised by the “𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
” coefficient of Table 2.4.  In contrast to the strongly 
negative donation coefficient, this variable is positive and significant across Models (1) to 
(3).   When contextualised within an impure public goods framework, this disparity seems 
reasonable. Let us assume that humans value the interactions which occur between their 
personal engagement with wildlife, which is a private good, and the associated public goods 
facet.  In our example, individuals value seeing birds in their garden (a private aspect) yet 
realise that this also aids the wider bird population (a public aspect). They could quite 
plausibly receive contentment from realising the two are linked.  This helps explain why, 
albeit weakened, a value remains for our local existence (“(𝐞)+-bird”) variables.  By contrast, 
this value vanishes for the donation variable because the interactive element disappears.  
Notwithstanding the issues regarding how our particular donation characteristic was 
constructed, there appears to be a considerable importance in grasping a sound 
understanding of these non-use interactions within future research and study.   
One final conclusion we draw regarding our donation attribute returns to the theme 
of ‘nature connectivity’.  The type of engagement yielded through a donation mechanism is 
very distant from that obtained through our ‘responsibility-repetitive interactions’ 
conjecture outlined earlier in this section.  People are not only unlikely, but are actively 
discouraged, to try and ‘connect’ with species like the bittern and “Wildscape” conservation 
regions are, by definition, designed to resist human intervention or interaction.  Therefore, 
the utility which humans can extract from such expenditure can in no way fuel any feelings 
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of dependency-affiliation or repeated interaction.  It may be perceived that charities try to 
compensate for this by introducing elements like ‘animal adoption’ schemes into their 
marketing practices.  This attempts to connect donors to an individual creature or species 
and form some bond between the two.  Regardless of whether such action is successful in 
achieving this aim, the suggestion here is that those values which are derived from engaging 
with ‘backyard wildlife’ are more akin to that which might be established through 
domesticated nature (gardening or pets) than from regional or national wildlife 
preservation. 
 
2.7:  THE USE OF SEED PURCHASE DATA AS AN EXTRENAL VALIDITY CHECK 
 
 One of the greatest criticisms of stated preference (SP) studies is the tendency of 
individuals to respond in ways which belie their true opinions or beliefs.  Studies have been 
conducted which show that aspects such as ‘consequentiality’ (the belief that responses will 
directly influence policy) can lessen these tendencies (Carson & Groves, 2007; Vossler et al, 
2012). Nevertheless, there are many suggestions as to why ‘untrue’ responses may still 
persist.  Participants may consciously misreport and are adversely incentivised to provide 
untrue responses.  Such instances include a subject’s attempt to impress an interviewer, 
ethical protests, or a general exaggeration due to a perception that their answers will 
influence subsequent policy.  A second set of reasons surround subconscious error, 
including a lack of familiarity, insufficient topic comprehension and/or engagement or 
simple systematic preference miscalculation.  Thirdly, there may be design issues with the 
experiment itself, causing biases from framing effects or internal (within-survey response) 
inconsistencies.  For a full review of these concerns, which together form the ‘hypothetical 
bias’ of stated preference studies, see Bateman et al. (2002, p269). 
 External validity checks are a credible way to show that the findings of stated 
preference studies replicate or mirror people’s revealed preferences (RP).  For this study, 
one such opportunity is to apply the attributes of our choice experiment to bird-food 
products on the market.  This is another big advantage to our payment mechanism, offering 
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a clear chance to compare hypothetical products with those which the public actually 
choose between. 
 To conduct a basic external validity check, this study uses a dataset provided by a UK 
bird-feed wholesaler.  They make and distribute sixteen different products and provided 
monthly sales data for these for the period of October 2012 through to September 2013.  
Information could be obtained for each product regarding its weight, price and feed 
composition. Product descriptions also included the types of bird species which might be 
attracted to the feed.  We construct our dataset by assuming that each of the 12,918 
purchases made represent a consumer choosing a product from the full range of sixteen. 
 The purpose of this exercise is to compare this real purchase data and the values 
they imply people attach to feeding birds with the values obtained through the stated 
preference responses.  Our null hypothesis would be that the two sets of coefficients align, 
meaning in this case that the types of bird food people pay greater amounts for would 
correspond to the type of feed which attracts more highly valued birds.  If we are unable to 
reject this null hypothesis, this would constitute our hypothetical study passing its external 
validity test.  As described later in this section, there are key obstacles to providing a perfect 
comparison between the two sets of values we obtain in this case.  These problems arise 
through a combination of product differences themselves as well as perceptions-based 
disparities regarding what people’s expectations are of a seed product (as in the hedonic 
data) against what it actually provides (as stated in the choice experiment task).     
In the first step, each of the sixteen products are described as ‘bundles’ of various 
bird food types.  The information on product packaging means that this re-characterisation 
is based upon factual evidence.  Describing each good in this way allows us to measure the 
worth people apparently place on each of these various bird food components.  We then 
run these choice results in a simple logit model, the findings from of which are given in 
Table 2.10.  Feed coefficients represent the average change in probability that somebody 
buys a product given that it has contains a raised concentration of that particular type of 
food.  Maize is used as the base case, given that it is the most basic feed-type. 
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 Coefficient P>|z| 
Sunflower Seed 0.029 0.000 
Mealworm 0.086 0.000 
Berry 0.077 0.000 
Nut 0.257 0.000 
Fat  0.069 0.000 
Price (per gram) -0.013 0.000 
Model Fit (𝝌𝟐) 21202.49 0.000 
Pseudo 𝑹𝟐 0.2194  
 
Table 2.10:  The Revealed Preference Output 
 
Variables display signs which appear congruent with our previous analyses.  Each 
‘feed’ coefficient represents the changing probability of selecting an alternative if that type 
of food is used instead of maize.  For example, by replacing maize with sunflower seeds, the 
positive coefficient (0.035) illustrates the increased likelihood of a consumer selecting this 
adjusted product, supposing the feed remains the same in all other respects.  Many of our 
alternative feeds would attract aesthetic birds with vulnerable qualities.  This includes fat 
and sunflower seeds for blue tits or mealworms for robins.  These evoke strongly positive 
responses, suggesting a possible adherence to our assumed “warden model”. 
The coefficient for ‘Nut’ delivers a very high valuation in this consumer choice (RP) 
model.  Of the feeds included in this model, ‘nuts’ pose a very vague and wide-ranging 
category. It can potentially constitute a major dietary element for many garden bird species.  
Upon inspection of correlations (not presented here) there are also some strong 
collinearities between this and other foodstuffs, reducing the confidence we have in its 
absolute value. 
By taking the ratio between each food product and the price (per gram) coefficient, 
we can establish a ‘willingness to pay’ in order to replace a certain quantity of maize with 
each alternative feed.  Table 2.11 shows this by estimating the projected additional 
payment a respondent would offer to replace 100 grams of maize with each of the 
alternative food types. 
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Food Type Replacement Value (100g) 
Maize (base feed) 0.00 
Sunflower Seed £2.33 
Mealworms £6.86 
Fat £5.49 
Nuts £20.48 
Berries £6.13 
 
Table 2.11:  Estimated Replacement Costs 
 
At this stage, this is as far as we are able to take our hedonic analyses in deriving 
unambiguous calculations on people’s willingness to pay for real market products.  
However, a final step that one could take would be to transfer the values in Table 2.11 onto 
a willingness to pay for birds.  Undertaking this step will create some degree of inaccuracy, 
and this is because the ‘productivity’ of real seed purchased by respondents with regards to 
the birds it will derive can only be estimated by purchasers at that point when they buy the 
product. This is in contrast to the hypothetical study where choices relay exactly what birds 
would be attracted by each given alternative.   
Despite this, product descriptions do give information regarding which bird 
groupings14 are most likely to be attracted by each type of feed.  We can complement this 
with factual data regarding the composition of each product as described through the feed 
types above.  Of course, this process involves a degree of subjectivity, and mapping bird 
feeding groups onto market products requires one to both compile the advice from trusted 
bird-feeding authorities (e.g. web-page and issued guidance from the RSPB, BTO and other 
reputable sources) and appreciate that estimates rely upon average population statistics for 
any given location.  However, in an exercise to exemplify how this might work in practice, 
Appendix 2.7 gives a ‘best estimate projection’ of the type of bird bundles which might be 
                                                          
14 ‘Bird Groupings’ must more broadly represent multiple species of bird which have the same dietary 
preferences.  Because we cannot disaggregate these feeding groups of birds, this explains the nature of the 
comparisons made in Table 2.11.  For example, we directly compare ‘Woodpigeon and Sparrow’ from the SP 
study with just ‘seed-eating birds’ in the RP treatment. 
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attracted by the 16 products in our dataset.  From here, we can estimate the corresponding 
WTP values for different groups of bird species which feed in gardens.  These are provided 
in Table 2.12, with the interpretation of actual values perhaps being of a lesser importance 
for our purposes than the relativities.  
 
 RP Value  
(per feed)* 
RP Value  
(per 1kg bag) 
 SP Value  
(per visit) 
SP Value 
(bag)** 
Tit £0.11 £2.24 Blue Tit 0.17 £3.40 
Thrush £0.11 £2.18 Robin 0.27 £5.40 
   Blackbird 0.08 £1.60 
Finch £0.08 £1.55 Bullfinch 0.16 £3.20 
Seed-Eater £0.09 £1.79 Woodpigeon 0 £0.00 
   Sparrow 0.09 £1.80 
 
Table 2.12:  A Comparison of Revealed and Stated Preference Values 
* RP Value (per feed) is not directly comparable to SP Value (per visit) as we do not know people’s perception or factual 
evidence of how many birds will visit per feed for RP data.  
** The price estimations in the SP study were based upon retail prices of 1kg bags of seed (see P.29) 
 
 
 
Hierarchies are similar between the two if we appreciate that the ‘thrushes’ are a 
combination of the value people hold for the robin and blackbird, alongside others like song 
thrushes and wrens.  The ‘finches’ feed group provide a lower ranking than that of the 
bullfinch in the stated preference study, but the former would of course combine values for 
bullfinches with more common finch species like greenfinches and chaffinches. 
This brief inspection of the bird-feed market by no means constitutes a 
comprehensive external validity check for our choice experiment.  However, it is noteworthy 
to see how such a robustness analysis could be designed and performed so as to test many 
of the key attributes within this type of choice experiment.  At this juncture it is important 
to highlight where the use of a hypothetical study holds great advantage over this type of 
hedonic approach.  The latter contains issues of inter-attribute correlations which cannot be 
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overcome through a neat orthogonal design which a choice experiment permits.  
Furthermore, we have no way of testing our hypotheses regarding the existence or impure 
public goods values by using purely consumer choice models, and the flexible manipulations 
which a stated preference study allows enables a far deeper and comprehensive inspection 
of people’s preferences to be explored.  
Despite these advantages to stated preference studies, we believe this type of 
hedonic inspection is highly useful when trying to validate such hypothetical responses.  
Given the unique nature of this work, and in particular its transferable payment vehicle, 
designing a stated preference study which held a high degree of transference to existing 
seed products would seem both logical and beneficial for any replicative research in this 
area.    Not only could this strengthen the specific conjectures presented here, but having a 
relatively easy external validity check potentially has wider benefits for combatting stated 
preference biases and their associated criticisms. 
 
2.8:  CONCLUSION 
 
This study’s major motivation was to explore the extent to which people gain from 
their engagement with ‘everyday wildlife’.  Its findings suggest that humans hold a value for 
creatures in their local area, such as garden birds, in a distinct and separate manner from 
that of conservation or aid to rare and endangered species.  The types of utility which each 
evoke also appear different, and local interactions encroach into an area of our subjective 
wellbeing which raises our contentment through a sense of responsibility and/or repeated 
interaction with other entities.  Such attainment is not overly distant from the advocated 
practices of religion, culture and social-networking in raising one’s life satisfaction.  By 
contrast, the utility we derive from contributing to endangered species protection seems 
more aligned to the type of ‘warmth’ we receive from those charitable or philanthropic acts 
which consist of an ‘impersonal’ or detached form of giving.  Whilst some research has 
recognised the stand-alone benefits of local wildlife (Miller & Hobbs, 2002), there is a need 
to appreciate and distinguish between the values attained through everyday interactions 
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against those yielded from wider environmental or conservation causes.  We cannot 
automatically assume that each act as the other’s substitute and, more generally, this work 
suggests the important need to understand how people derive utility from the different 
components of the natural world around them. 
Seeking to manage the natural environment so as to enhance people’s well-being to 
the greatest extent is vital, and if the findings of this paper are to be replicated, this would 
certainly open new channels of discussion for a range of policy arenas.  Indeed, if 
‘preferences can be quantified in economics terms’, the relative advantages and drawbacks 
of associated empirical proposals can be more effectively analysed (Hanley et al, 2003 
p.123).   If we take the example of local conservation initiatives or public park management, 
recognising that some bird species hold a greater worth to the local population than others 
could provide direction upon the sort of habitat creation and restoration priorities which 
should be invested in so as to afford these communities the best chance of interacting with 
the wildlife which deliver them the greatest amount of nature-connected utility.  A similar 
interpretation could be applied to the redesigning of urban planning laws.  Furthermore, 
this type of investigation provides a first insight regarding how the bird seed manufacturing 
industry can deliver products which its customer base value most highly.  
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first paper which seeks to extract exactly 
why people gain value from ‘backyard wildlife’ and so its conjectures can only be 
strengthened or verified by the undertaking of assimilated work to either corroborate or 
refute the assertions made here. In particular, this work is yet to fully derive the conditions 
under which humans receive contentment from wildlife within an impure public goods 
framework and the corresponding role of non-use values in this context.  Subsequently, this 
paper has suggested that advantages may exist from investigating far more deeply the 
underpinnings of these values within the field of environmental economics.   
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SECTION 3 
‘PLEASE IN MY BACK GARDEN’: 
 
 WHEN NEIGHBOURS COMPETE IN THE PROVISION OF LOCAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper models the effort exerted by neighbouring individuals as they compete for an 
environmental commodity which exhibits the properties of a mixed public good.  Our 
motivating example is the levels of seed that neighbours dispense when trying to attract 
birds to their individual gardens for private enjoyment. 
Relying upon private contributions will typically result in an under-provision of a public 
good.  This sub-optimality will be exacerbated the stronger the good exhibits aspects of non-
excludability or non-rivalry in consumption, each of which create higher incentives to free-
ride (Olson; 1971).  The literature regarding the free-rider problem is vast, both in 
theoretical (Arnott & Small, 1994), empirical (Olson, 1971) and experimental (Andreoni, 
1988; Weimann, 1994) fields.  These papers typically describe a pure public good, yet there 
are many instances when an individual is able to derive a private utility stream through their 
act of contribution.  These impure public goods, first coined by Samuelson (1954), may begin 
to partially offset the free-rider problem, as now individuals have a greater incentive to 
contribute.  Although incentives may be monetary, payoffs could be intrinsic or 
psychological in nature, with examples including the social or reputation value one 
attributes to their action (Cameron et al, 2012; Sexton & Sexton, 2014)   
The Impure Public Goods model is algebraically explored by Cornes & Sandler (1994).  
They illustrate that the extent to which the private element of an impure public good can 
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tackle the free-rider problem largely hinges upon the degree of complementarity between 
its private and public aspects.  
 A detailed overview of early environmental valuation studies is provided by Carson 
et al (1996), assessing not only valuation but also methodological differences in this area.  
Previous empirical work by Brock, Perino & Sugden (2014) provides an interesting 
environmental example which exhibits the attributes of an impure public good, namely the 
feeding of garden birds in local neighbourhoods.  Survey responses suggest that individuals 
understand the public-goods benefits of feeding.  These arise in the form of positive 
externalities from an increase in the bird population to the local neighbourhood and, one 
could argue, to the birds themselves.  However, people state that the primary incentive for 
feeding is to view birds within the confines of their garden.  The private and public benefits 
which arise in tandem from bird-feeding give a very nice instance of how a public good’s 
impurity can begin to alleviate free-rider tendencies.  
While impure public good characteristics can reduce the degree of under-provision, 
they usually do not achieve the good at its socially optimal level when relying upon private 
contributions alone. This is because in many cases a public goods element will persist and 
will therefore not be internalised fully by private parties. 
 However, in the case of bird feeding there are additional mechanisms that may 
fundamentally change the nature of the game.  In order to successfully construct a model 
which most accurately resembles our motivating example, we must introduce two further 
theories to operate in conjunction with Impure Public Goods Theory.   
  Birds can move freely and usually forage in territories greater than an individual’s 
garden, yet a bird can only feed in one person’s private garden at any given time. Ecology 
provides us with a neat way to model the way birds allocate time within their foraging 
territory based on the spatial distribution of food within this area.  Ideal Free Distribution 
theory is an ecological modelling technique which illustrates how animals employ Nash-
equilibrium strategies in response to changes in food density so as to maximise their survival 
and/or reproductive success.  Whilst one of the earliest and most comprehensive 
applications of this theory is given by Fretwell & Lucas (1970) when assessing territorial 
behaviour, studies have furthered these notions to include the impacts of species mobility 
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(Cressman et al, 2004), relative species competitiveness (Parker & Sutherland, 1986) and 
spatial segregation (Corazzini & Gianazza, 2008).   
 These foraging strategies create a direct (strategic) link between the numbers of 
birds attracted by the food present in a given individual’s private garden against that 
available in neighbouring areas. Contest Theory illustrates situations where individuals 
‘expend effort to increase their probability of winning a given prize’ (Dixit, 1987).  This 
theory nicely fits our bird-feeding model,  with ‘effort’ characterised by the volume of seed 
an individual allots and birds constituting a ‘prize’ which can be distributed in proportion to 
effort.   In order to procure the private utility that is derived from viewing birds in their own 
garden, neighbours therefore face a strategic situation similar to a Tullock-type contest.  
Contests typically create incentives for an overprovision of effort relative to the level which 
is deemed socially optimal.  Such ‘over-dissipation’ (Konrad, 2009 p.55) is accentuated in 
applied settings and evidence shows the extent to which respondents engage in real 
contests consistently exceed the thresholds predicted by theory (Davis & Reilly, 1998).  
Our model now fuses theories which offer contrasting predictions regarding the 
direction of inefficiency that Nash-playing individuals create relative to a first-best solution.  
The combination of a public goods aspect inducing too little and a contest aspect inducing 
excessive incentives for private provision of this good is the key point of this paper.  The 
benefit of these theories’ contrasting predictions is that we are able to construct versions of 
our model where each effect is greater or lesser in magnitude.  We can then assess how the 
gap between privately and socially optimal levels of provision changes.  By doing so, we can 
explore the extent to which we find ourselves disparate from the socially efficient solution. 
Whilst modelling this motivating example is in itself interesting, it also generates first 
insights into a much more general setting where aspects of public good provision and 
contests interact.  Examples of these include eco-tourism and environmental volunteering.  
In this paper, we shall not only study bird feeding as an interesting environmental economic 
phenomenon in its own right, but also its ability to represent these alternative cases.  In 
particular, it is the contest between neighbours that drive their feeding decisions and thus 
provide the stimulus for the role of a mixed public good in delivering voluntary contributions 
which would otherwise not materialise.  The competitive mechanism through which this 
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occurs is pivotal here, and requires great scrutiny when assessing the transferability of this 
case to other situations both within and outside of the environmental economics arena.   
 In the UK, bird feeding is a common and well-practiced act.  Studies (Davies et al, 
2009; Saggese et al, 2011) estimate that as many as 48% of the population at least 
occasionally feed birds. Furthermore, 87% of people in the UK have private access to a 
garden, with a significant proportion engaging in a range of ‘wildlife gardening’ techniques 
to enhance biodiversity within their local environment.  The manufacture of seed for 
supplementary feeding also constitutes a noteworthy industry, with UK residents estimated 
to purchase around 60,000 tonnes of seed, creating a bird-food market valued at around 
£200 million in 2009.  This illustrates an economic importance to an industry which is not 
only substantial in its current state, but is expanding at an estimated 4% annually (Fuller et 
al, 2008).      
It is at this stage necessary to consider the extent to which bird-feeding holds 
economic, ecological and social importance.  We initially consider the human benefits that 
accrue from this association with local wildlife.  Engagement with the natural world exhibits 
many of the qualities which have been identified as beneficial to lasting life satisfaction by 
the literature on Subjective Wellbeing (SWB).  ‘Interconnectedness’ is a good example of 
this, and is an emotion common to many of the SWB enhancing actions such as involvement 
with religion (Frey & Stutzer, 2010), community (Dutcher et al, 2007) and wider society.  
Furthermore, the repetition associated with ‘everyday wildlife’ interactions can induce 
positive feelings of responsibility (Jacobssen et al, 2008), routine (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 
2008) and achievement of success under uncertainty (Dolan et al, 2008).  Given the many of 
these attributes which bird-feeding adhere to (see Fuller et al, 2008 for an overview), it 
appears highly relevant to explore the main factors determining if and to what extent 
individuals’ decide to feed birds in their own garden.  Given that such activities can induce 
positive feelings of social responsibility and connectivity, this may suggest that there are 
wider social benefits to understanding the factors which drive people to engage with their 
local environment.  Socially beneficial examples could relate to improving the quality of life 
for elderly members of society (Rappe, 2005), providing children with an extended level of 
education (Louv, 2008) or allowing people to recover more quickly from serious health 
issues (De Vries et al, 2003). 
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Even if feeding birds is beneficial to humans, it may be deemed unjustifiable if 
substantial evidence exists to suggest it is detrimental to the birds themselves.  Arguments 
against the act surround notions of species over-dependency (Sagesse et al, 2011), improper 
nutrition for juvenile birds (www.rspca.org.uk) and the ecosystem-related consequences of 
artificially elevated populations (Cannon et al, 2005).  Current attempts to combat many of 
these objections take the form of providing more detailed advice of when supplementary 
feeding is and is not conducive with the welfare of birds (see www.rspb.org.uk for one such 
source).  
 There is growing evidence that an ecological importance exists to supplementary 
feeding, yet the nature of this aid is quite complex.  This is because the help offered from 
artificial food would seemingly take two differing roles simultaneously.  Firstly, Fuller and 
co-authors (2008) explain that feeding birds in UK cities enables avian populations to viably 
thrive within the urban environment.  Whilst not explicitly defined in their paper, we 
assume that ’urban-adapted species’ describe those which can settle permanently within 
the confines of non-rural landscapes.  Secondly, bird-feeding may prove ecologically 
necessary through the benefits it yields as an ‘emergency stock of food’.  Longitudinal 
studies consistently show a greater tendency of birds to visit urban bird tables in times of 
harsh weather conditions (Glue, 2006).  Such species would normally reside in woodland or 
farmland habitats and one potential explanation for this ever more prevalent encroachment 
may relate to habitat loss and/or changes in agricultural practices which have occurred 
within the UK and other developed nations.   
 The role of bird feeding to either sustain resident species, or as an emergency fund 
for migratory or transient birds to ‘dip into’ illustrate the potential importance of 
supplementary feeding to sustain or even enhance biodiversity. This may also explain the 
urge of environmental organisations to issue their more detailed guidance.   
It is also highly relevant and insightful that these avian benefits align so neatly with 
those which accrue to humans from bird-feeding.  Firstly, the two streams of benefit 
complement one another in the aspects of human utility enhancement they appear to fulfil.  
The sustaining of ‘urban adapted species’ ensures an interaction and engagement with local 
wildlife which is repeated and interconnected, whilst the emergency stocks facet of bird 
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feeding enhances human welfare from a dependency and uncertainty of outcomes 
standpoint.  Furthermore, the latter of these sources ensures that this pro-social activity is 
self-supporting. Humans will increase their instances of feeding in winter time, when 
feeding is most productive in attracting different types of birds to their gardens, thus 
enabling them to feel a greater sense of responsibility.  Simultaneously, this is the exact 
time of year when the emergency stocks are most necessary, and so the greatest variety of 
species will profit accordingly. 
 So far, we have introduced the act of bird feeding among local neighbourhoods as a 
motivating example to understand why the private contributions to a public natural 
resource can exceed the level predicted by pure public goods theory.   This occurs through a 
combination of the impurity surrounding the contribution action, the contest which ensues 
between neighbours and the freedom of the ‘consumer good’ to arrange themselves in 
proportion of food densities.  Whilst this is interesting theoretically, it appears that there 
may be important ecological and socio-economic reasons to explore this topic more 
thoroughly, with increasing evidence that both humans and birds benefit from the act of 
supplementary feeding in local urban environments.  Furthermore, grasping a more rigorous 
understanding of the role of private motivations in determining contributions to public 
goods may prove insightful for a range of other policy arenas.  This applies to the field of 
environmental economics and toward wider social and economic situations where 
extracting private funds currently fails to fully exploit the true willingness of its beneficiaries 
to support and supply a good.  
Section 3.2 proceeds by identifying the Model.  This begins by introducing a special 
(simplifying) case, before advancing to include algebraic and implicit analysis with an 
exogenous and then endogenous population.  Section 3.3 makes some further extensions to 
the model to consider some empirically plausible situations.  Section 3.4 applies our model 
to other possible empirical scenarios both within environmental resource management and 
more broadly to the field of economics.  Section 3.5 provides some concluding remarks.   
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3.2: THE MODEL 
3.2.1: THE SPECIAL CASE 
To introduce the world we are modelling, we shall begin by outlining a special case 
of our neighbourhood.  Here we make a number of simplifying assumptions, some of which 
shall later be relaxed.  Firstly, we assume our neighbourhood population to be homogenous, 
and thus impose identical incomes, tastes and preferences across individuals.  We also 
restrict ourselves to a single bird species, whose members arrange themselves between 
gardens in accordance with Ideal Free Distribution theory.  This implies that birds are highly 
mobile within our neighbourhood and adjust their location so as to maximise their feeding 
opportunities under the IFD assumption that each plays a Nash strategy. Furthermore, the 
number of birds (N) is fixed, meaning the bird population is independent of the aggregated 
food stocks.  Introducing this variable as an exogenous parameter is not only useful for 
model simplification purposes, but also allows us to assess the Nash equilibrium against the 
first best when the contest but not the public good effect is present.  Under such 
circumstances, we can confidently predict that instances of over-provision should occur. 
In this special version of the model, no one neighbour is influential enough to impact 
upon the cost of attracting a bird, which means that this cost then remains constant for 
feeding decisions of our neighbours. We shall see later that this accentuates the contest 
element and shares intuition with the price-taking behaviour of agents in perfectly 
competitive markets.  Such a scenario would be realisable where we have a ‘large 
neighbourhood’. The interpretation of this which most naturally resonates is a settlement 
with a large or concentrated number of human residents (𝑀).  However, an equally feasible 
notion of a large neighbourhood is one where the bird species is far ranging in its feeding 
habits.  For example, ‘flock birds’ such as starlings will travel great distances in search of 
food.  Hence, a far larger number of neighbours actually compete when attempting to 
attract this type of bird.  By contrast, a less nomadic bird, such as a blue tit or robin, will 
concentrate their feeding in a small geographical area, constituting a ‘small neighbourhood’. 
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The Nash Equilibrium 
Once we have defined its structure, we shall initially derive the Nash equilibrium of 
this simple model. We will then compute the level of effort which is optimal socially, thus 
enabling us to see if these two levels differ, and, if so, whether this is in an over-dissipating 
direction.  We use a Cobb-Douglas function to represent the utility of a given neighbour. 
Equation (3.1) shows that neighbours can derive utility (𝑈𝑖) either from birds which visit 
their garden (𝑛𝑖) or through the consumption of other goods (𝑥𝑖): 
𝑈𝑖 =𝑥𝑖
(1−α)𝑛𝑖
α   (3.1) 
Only a small element of one’s budget is empirically assigned to bird feeding, leading 
to an assumption that α is positive yet fairly close to zero.  Any individual is of course 
constrained by a budget (𝑌), denoted through (3.2). The term  𝑠𝑖  is the quantity of bird seed 
bought and dispensed in a neighbour’s garden.  Each neighbour purchases this at price (𝑝) in 
order to attract birds to their garden. 
𝑌 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑠𝑖   (3.2) 
Note that we normalise the price of other goods (𝑥𝑖) to unity.  In order to ensure 
that our utility function and budget constraint are expressed as functions of the same 
variables, we will have to appreciate the way in which 𝑛 is derived from 𝑠.  Expression (3.3) 
relays this mechanism, with 𝑠 here denoting the seed dispensed by one representative 
neighbour: 
𝑛𝑖 =  
𝑠𝑖
∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1…𝑀
 +𝑄 
. 𝑁 (3.3) 
 The above formula supposes that the number of birds coming to any one 
neighbour’s garden will depend upon the seed allotted by that neighbour in relation to the 
total food stocks contained within the neighbourhood.  These stocks include both the 
aggregated seed of all neighbours (∑ 𝑠𝑗 in (3.3)) and exogenous natural food stocks which 
occur within the neighbourhood (𝑄).  This fraction is multiplied by the number of birds 
which are present in the neighbourhood (N).  Expression (3.3) describes a Tullock-style 
contest (Tullock, 1980), and resembles the behaviour of foraging birds as dictated by the 
Ideal Free Distribution theory.   
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A crucial simplifying assumption within this first version of our model is that the 
stocks of feed dispensed by all other households ([𝑀 − 1]𝑠𝑗) or the natural food stock (𝑄) is 
sufficiently large that an individual’s feeding efforts have a negligible effect on the total 
amount of food provided.  Hence, each neighbour takes 𝑛 as a linear function of 𝑠.  Under 
these conditions, we are permitted to use Equation (3.3) to amend our expression in (3.1).  
We construct our associated Lagrangian Function (𝐿) via Equation (3.4): 
𝐿 = 𝑥𝑖
(1−α)𝑠𝑖 [
𝑁
∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1…𝑀
 +𝑄 
]
α
+ 𝜆(𝑌𝑖  − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑖 )     (3.4) 
Taking the first order conditions and imposing symmetry (?̅? = 𝑠), we can then solve for 
these expressions: 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 :  (1 − α) 𝑥𝑖
−α𝑠𝑖 [
𝑁
∑ 𝑠+𝑄 
]
α
=  𝜆   (3.5(i)) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑠𝑖
 :  α [
𝑁
∑ 𝑠+𝑄 
] 𝑥𝑖
(1−α)
𝑠𝑖
(α−1) = 𝑝 𝜆   (3.5(ii)) 
Substituting 3.5(i) into 3.5(ii) and cancelling yields: 
α𝑥𝑖 +  αp𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠𝑖        (3.6) 
It is noteworthy that the above expression is independent of 𝑁, meaning that the 
exact threshold of the bird population is not crucial for the individual when they form their 
equilibrium effort. We make one small adjustment in that we express (3.6) in the form of 
income (𝑌) denoted by (3.2) and rearrange to find the Nash equilibrium level of seed 
purchased: 
𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
      (3.7) 
Equation (3.7) gives the standard Cobb-Douglas result.  The individual maximises 
their utility at a seed dispensation level (𝑠∗) which is a product of their taste for birds (α) and 
their income (𝑌), divided by the price of the good (𝑝) itself.  Simple comparative statics are 
intuitive; seed purchase increases with a rise in income or taste and decreases with a rise in 
the commodity’s price.  Note that this equilibrium is independent both of the number (𝑀) 
and feeding thresholds (𝑠𝑗) of other neighbours.  This confirms that we can impose 
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symmetry in this model and then make the distinction between 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 if need be.  
However, this is not crucial to our analyses in this limiting case.    
 
The Socially Optimal Level  
 The first-best allocation can be found by equating the Marginal Social Cost (MSC) to 
the Marginal Social Value (MSV) of bird feeding.   We consider an appropriate definition for 
the MSC as the monetary cost to society of attracting one more bird to gardens.  Again we 
impose symmetry (meaning 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗) and now capture aggregated artificial feeding through 
the expression 𝑀𝑠.   To discover the MSC, we use this updated version and describe the 
Tullock Contest via Equation (3.3(i))  
𝑛 =  
𝑠
𝑀𝑠+𝑄 
. 𝑁    (3.3(i)) 
 By differentiating this term with respect to 𝑠, we establish how the number of birds 
alter with a unit change in seed dispensed: 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑠
 = 
𝑄𝑁
(𝑀𝑠 +𝑄)2
  (3.8) 
 We now wish to find the reciprocal of (3.8), as this will illustrate the change in seed 
required to entice one extra bird to gardens: 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑛
 = 
(𝑀𝑠 +𝑄)2
𝑄𝑁
    (3.9) 
We now multiply (3.9) by the price of seed (𝑝) to obtain the MSC.  This gives a 
monetary measure of the cost involved in attracting one extra bird into the gardens of 
neighbours: 
MSC  =  
𝑝(𝑀𝑠 +𝑄)2
𝑄𝑁
 (3.10) 
 Having derived an expression for the Marginal Social Cost, we must now define and 
then produce a term to represent the Marginal Social Value (MSV) of birds.  The MSV should 
indicate the monetary value which an individual associates with the benefit of enticing one 
64 
 
extra bird to their garden.  Using our model, this can be expressed as the Marginal Rate of 
Substitution between our two consumption goods, 𝑥 and  𝑛: 
𝑀𝑆𝑉 =  − 𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
|𝑈 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  (3.11) 
A relatively simple way of calculating (3.11) is to use a version of the Chain Rule below:  
 
   
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
|𝑈 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 =  
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑈
 ×  
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑛
 
 
These two constituent parts of this equation can be established directly from our utility 
function (3.1): 
 
    𝑢 = 𝑥(1−α)𝑛α 
 
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑛
 =   α 𝑥(1−α)𝑛(α−1)   (3.12(i)) 
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑥
 :  (1 − α) 𝑥−α𝑛α      
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑈
 =   
1
 (1−α)
 𝑥α𝑛−α    (3.12(ii)) 
Using 3.12(i) and 3.12(ii), we can now derive  
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑛
 : 
 
   
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑛
= 
α
 (1−α)
(
𝑥 
𝑛
)     (3.13) 
 
We can then use (3.3) to remove n from Equation (3.13), and express this in terms of s.  The 
notation 𝑠𝐹 conveys the fact that this is the effort level of a representative neighbour seen 
as optimal from a first-best perspective: 
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𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑛
= 
α
 (1−α)
(
𝑥 (𝑀𝑠+𝑄)
𝑠𝑁
)     (3.14) 
 
 We equate the Marginal Social Cost from (3.10) the Marginal Social Value in (3.14).  
We then substitute this into (3.2) and rearrange in order to make the expression 
comparable to (3.7):  
 
   𝑠𝐹 =  
α𝑌
𝑝
(
 𝑄
(1−α)𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
)    (3.15) 
 
 Equation 3.15 can be rearranged to show our social equilibrium equation has two 
unique roots.  This is demonstrated by Equation 3.15(i) below.  We previously assumed α to 
be relatively small, as bird seed will only constitute a small fraction of overall expenditure.  
This ensures that the expression within the square root of Equation 3.15(i) will be positive, 
in turn confirming that Equation 3.15 has two real solutions.  The presence of the second 
component within the square root term means that one of these solutions will be negative.  
However, the ‘credible’ solution which is of greater interest for the purposes of this analysis 
would be the positive solution of Equation 3.15(i). 
𝑠𝐹 =  
−𝑃𝑄±√(𝑃𝑄)2+4𝑃𝑄αY(1−α)
2𝑃(1−α)
    (3.15(i)) 
 
 Comparing (3.7) with (3.15), we conclude that the first-best level of seed an 
individual should allot (𝑠𝐹) lies below that which the individual would choose (𝑠∗).  Thus, we 
confirm that there is an over-exertion of effort when neighbours after left to select their 
optimal feeding level.  Recall that this model currently lacks a public goods aspect as the 
bird population (N) is exogenous and so our only ‘distortion’ is that of the contest effect.  
Consequently, the elevated Nash equilibrium represents the superfluous individual action 
driven through competitive motivations.   
 This initial model contains many simplifying assumptions which may cause a 
disassociation with the empirics of bird feeding at this point.  However, it serves as a helpful 
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starting point from which to begin our analyses.  Furthermore, it establishes a useful 
reference point that helps to identify the key drivers behind the results which follow.   
 
3.2.2: THE EXOGENOUS POPULATION MODEL  
  In reality the number of individuals interacting across a neighbourhood 
through a bird-feeding contest will be finite, sometimes even quite small.  We therefore 
proceed by relaxing the assumption of a large neighbourhood used in the special case, 
appreciating that neighbourhoods vary in size and that such institutional differences may 
have a bearing upon the effort decisions of individuals (Evans & Weninger, 2014).  Studies 
have assessed the role of effort exertions both within (Baik, 2008) and between (Nitzan & 
Ueda, 2009) groups of varying sizes, and have discovered that the implications of varying 
such a parameter are often complex and context-dependent (see Konrad, 2009 for an 
overview).  Our model does holds the potential to reinforce or refute these ideas, although 
our greater focus is to assess what additional role an offsetting public goods effect may 
hold. 
 As previously described, neighbourhood size can be characterised through avian 
behaviour, and by analysing size through this method, our model hopes to build upon the 
findings of Cressman et al (2004).  This study assesses how relative mobility influences the 
feeding distribution of birds, and we complement this work by showing how human 
decisions may change for birds whose biology or habit lead them to more localised foraging 
tendencies.  We retain the assumptions of species and neighbour homogeneity, and also 
that of an exogenous bird population, supressing a public goods aspect. 
 
Nash Equilibrium 
 We adjust Equation (3.3) to account for the fact that any given neighbour will have 
to respond to the exogenous decisions of other residents.  Expression (3.3a) helps with this, 
decomposing the denominator in (3.3) to separate out 𝑠𝑖, the seed allotment decision of the 
individual, from 𝑠𝑗, the seed investments of other neighbours, which can be aggregated 
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across all other feeders ([𝑀 − 1]𝑠𝑗).  This decomposition allows us to disentangle the 
various feeding locations and show those which the individual can perceive as exogenous.  
𝑛𝑖 =  
𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
. 𝑁  (3.3a) 
  With a finite neighbourhood size we can no longer assume that the individual perceives  𝑛 
as a constant linear function of 𝑠.  The easiest way to achieve expressing our utility function 
and budget constraint through the same variables is to replace  𝑛𝑖   in the utility function 
with the right hand side of (3.3a).  This creates 3.16(i).  We can then re-write our Lagrangian 
function (3.16(ii)) expressed purely in terms of 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖: 
𝑈𝑖 =𝑥𝑖
(1−α) (
𝑠𝑖𝑁
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
)
α
     (3.16(i)) 
𝐿 = 𝑥𝑖
(1−α) (
𝑠𝑖𝑁
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
)
α
+ 𝜆(𝑌𝑖  − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ) (3.16(ii)) 
We again calculate First Order Conditions and then impose symmetry to find 𝑠: 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 :  (1 − α) 𝑥𝑖
−α [
𝑠𝑖𝑁
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄  
 ]
α
=  𝜆   (3.17(i)) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑠𝑖
 :   α [
([𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)𝑁
(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄  )
2
 
 ] 𝑥𝑖
(1−α)
[
𝑠𝑖𝑁
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄  
]
(α−1)
= 𝑝 𝜆  (3.17(ii)) 
 
We use the methodology of the proceeding section to then derive the new Nash 
Equilibrium:  
𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
 [
[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
(1−α)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
]     (3.18) 
The term contained in the square brackets of (3.18) is strictly less than one.  
Therefore, when comparing this new Nash equilibrium to that of the special case (3.7), the 
result is a fall in the individual’s optimal effort decision under the new conditions of a finite 
neighbourhood.  By imposing symmetry within our neighbourhood, 𝑠∗ is in fact equal to 𝑠 in 
this expression.  However, these two terms are kept as separate entities in order to simplify 
the analyses which are conducted in the following sections.  
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Equation (3.18) does not give a closed-form solution.  However, using the Implicit 
Function Theorem, we are able to derive comparative static results to show how effort 
levels adjust with each of our parameters.  Table 3.1 gives an overview of these comparative 
statics, with full results posted contained within Appendix 3.2. 
 
Comparative 
Static 
Sign Explanation 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑃
 
Negative As seed price rises, the amount of seed purchased 
should fall.  This is logical if bird seed exhibits 
standard demand properties. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
 
Positive As Income rises, the level of seed purchased also 
rises.  If we assume seed (and therefore birds) are 
normal good, then this is sensible. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝛼
 
Positive As a person’s taste for birds rises, they will expend 
more effort on seed allotment. Again this complies 
with intuition. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
 
Positive  If there is a greater intensity of feeding from other 
neighbours, a given neighbour will raise their effort 
levels.  This is discussed in the section below using 
the graphical representation.   
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
 
Positive  If a greater abundance of natural food exists, a given 
neighbour will raise their effort levels.  This is again 
discussed in the section below using the graphical 
representation.   
 
Table 3.1: An Overview of Nash Equilibrium Comparative Statics with an Exogenous 
Bird Population 
 
For the purposes of this study, another appealing method for exploring the impact of 
neighbourhood size is to graphically demonstrate the drivers at work within this model.  To 
achieve this, we rearrange Equation (3.18) so that all elements outside of the square 
brackets move to the left-hand side of the expression, denoted through (3.18a) below: 
𝑝𝑠∗ 
α𝑌
 =  
[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
(1−α)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
      (3.18a) 
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 By making this adjustment, we are able to now present both the left-hand side and 
right-hand side of the above equation on the same graph (Figure 3.1a).  We now want to 
consider how this Nash Equilibrium, signified by the intersection of the left (line) and right 
(curve) hand sides, adjusts as the neighbourhood size rises.  In this case, a ‘Larger’ 
neighbourhood refers to one where more neighbours exist in the model, meaning that the 
amount of food which is dispensed aside from that of a given individual [𝑀 − 1]𝑠  is 
relatively large compared to their contribution 𝑠.  Given the nature of the right-hand side 
term, this curve will pivot upwards as we move towards a larger neighbourhood.  Figure 
3.1b describes this movement, illustrating that 𝑠∗ rises as the neighbourhood gets larger.  A 
further note is that, due to the curvature of the line, these incremental increases in 𝑠∗ slow 
for a given rise in  [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 .  As we move toward an infinitely large neighbourhood, we 
converge towards point E.  This is the value of 𝑠∗ which we discovered in our special case, 
and holds a value of  
α𝑌
𝑝
 .     
 
 
 
 
 
It is possible to interpret this adjustment intuitively.  As a neighbourhood contains 
fewer and fewer rival residents the contest is dampened.  Thus, there is a smaller impetus 
Figure 3.1a: An Implicit Analysis 
of the Static Nash Equilibrium 
Figure 3.1b: The Impact of a 
Rising Neighbourhood Size 
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for those remaining neighbours to fight so fiercely in their attempts to draw birds to their 
private garden and away from those nearby.  We could assess this in the limit by imagining a 
‘one person neighbourhood’.  Here, the contest element collapses, with the now 
monopolistic individual knowing that any level of seed put out will result in a strong 
redistribution of birds toward their garden.  This effect is exacerbated further in a case 
where the monopolistic feeder lives in a neighbourhood devoid of natural food (𝑄).  We can 
check for consistency with (3.7) by assessing how (3.18) adjusts if our neighbourhood 
returns to its infinitely large level.   In this case, the additional expression in the 
denominator of our bracketed term ((1 − α)𝑠∗) becomes less and less influential, meaning 
𝑠∗ tends to the special case.   
 
 
 
This implicit analysis could also be used to demonstrate the impact upon the Nash 
Equilibrium of a neighbourhood having varying levels of natural food (𝑄).  Figures 3.1c and 
3.1d confirm that the effects are very similar, with the only difference being the threshold of 
convergence upon which the individual tends toward as 𝑄 falls.  As before, when natural 
food stocks become very large, the right-hand side tends to one for all values of 𝑠 and we 
return to the Nash Equilibrium of the Special Case where the individual is non-influential 
Figure 3.1c: An Implicit Analysis 
of the Static Nash Equilibrium 
Figure 3.1d: The Impact of Rising 
Natural Food on the Nash Equilibrium 
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and dispenses at a value of  
α𝑌
𝑝
.  As  𝑄 falls, the competitive influences decrease in our 
neighbourhood and the individual holds a lowered incentive to dispense seed so intensely in 
order to procure birds to their garden.  This effect is captured by the downward swivelling 
of the right-hand side and a fall in the intersection which derives 𝑠∗.    
There is an empirical ecological importance in discussing a change in 𝑄 separately 
from [𝑀 − 1]𝑠.  This is that we can assess how the effort decision of our individuals adjusts 
across potential habitats.  For example, in remote rural settings, we are likely to have a low 
level of  [𝑀 − 1]𝑠, as there are relatively few competing residents, but this might be offset 
by a high level of natural food which a neighbour must compete against in order to attract 
birds to their garden.  By contrast,  𝑄 is likely to be fairly low, even non-existent, in densely-
populated urban areas, but here the concentration of other human feeders will be higher, 
meaning [𝑀 − 1]𝑠  is the main source of competition for a given neighbour.  It is also 
credible to envisage habitats where both 𝑄 and [𝑀 − 1]𝑠  are either low or high, and so it is 
prudent to investigate how our equilibrium changes when each of these variables are 
adjusted in isolation. 
Returning to the basic comparative static results, 𝑠∗  retains a positive and negative 
inversely linear relationship with income and price respectively.  With its additional (yet 
relatively minor) inclusion in the denominator of (3.19), there is a slight adjustment in the 
way  𝑠∗ alters with changes in tastes (α).  However, simulations of a closed-form solution 
confirm that a positive and broadly linear relationship is maintained between these two 
variables.  When assessing the way in which 𝑠∗  changes with alterations in other food 
sources, the association is confirmed as positive yet concave, aligned to the graphs in 
Figures 3.1a to 3.1d.  Proofs of this relationship, which show that both 
𝜕𝑠
 𝜕𝑀
 and 
𝜕𝑠
 𝜕𝑄
  are 
positive but that 
𝜕2𝑠
 𝜕𝑀2
 and 
𝜕2𝑠
 𝜕𝑄2
  are negative can be found in Appendix 3.1 The positive 
relationship is derived from the contest element of our model, forcing any neighbour to 
compete more intensively in the presence of a greater number of alternative feeding 
sources.  The concavity, played out as a function of Cobb-Douglas Model, relates to the 
increasing futility of such effort as the number of rival sources tends to infinity.  Of course, 
the threshold upon which this concave expression converges is that of the Special Case 
(3.7).   
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The Social Equilibrium  
It is not possible to say whether the lower Nash investment decision of ‘small 
neighbourhoods’ is better or worse than in the special case until we have determined if the 
first-best feeding rate is affected by this change in conditions.  The original social optimum, 
defined by (3.15), is re-written below: 
𝑠𝐹 =  
α𝑌
𝑝
(
 𝑄
(1−α)𝑀𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
)    (3.15) 
Recall that we did not rely upon an infinite neighbourhood size when deriving this 
and therefore the expression for the social equilibrium is then applicable to all 
neighbourhood sizes and remains unchanged for this version of our model.  With algebraic 
calculations given in Appendix 3.2, Table 3.2 gain summarises the algebraic comparative 
statics which can be derived through using The Implicit Function Theorem: 
 
Comparative 
Static 
Sign Explanation 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑃
 
Negative As seed price rises, the amount of seed purchased 
should fall.  This is logical if bird seed exhibits 
standard demand properties. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
 
Positive As Income rises, the level of seed purchased also 
rises.  If we assume seed (and therefore birds) are 
normal good, then this is sensible. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝛼
 
Positive As a person’s taste for birds rises, they will expend 
more effort on seed allotment. Again this complies 
with intuition. 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
 
Negative  If there is a greater intensity of feeding from other 
neighbours, a given neighbour should lessen their 
effort levels.  This is discussed in the section below 
using the graphical representation.   
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
 
Positive  If a greater abundance of natural food exists, a given 
neighbour will raise their effort levels.  This is again 
discussed in the section below using the graphical 
representation.   
 
Table 3.2: An Overview of First-Best Comparative Statics with an Exogenous Bird 
Population 
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Again we can use graphical analyses to see how the social equilibrium adjusts with 
neighbourhood size.  We again begin by rearranging the expression to give a linear left-hand 
side and curved right-hand side: 
 
𝑝𝑠𝐹
α𝑌
=
 𝑄
(1−α)𝑀𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
    (3.15a) 
 Replicating the steps then taken for the Nash solution, we can describe a 
relationship through Figure 3.2b, which symbolises how the two sides adjust as the value of 
[𝑀 − 1]𝑠   rises.  This creates a downward swivel in the curve and thus from the perspective 
of a first-best solution, it would be better if each individual fed less intensely in a larger 
neighbourhood ceteris paribus.   
 
 
 
 
The beauty of such an analysis is that we can present the two above equilibrium 
results (3.1b and 3.2b) on the same diagram.  Figure 3.3 captures this, illustrating the 
divergence of the Nash and first- best solutions as the number of rival neighbours rise. 
Figure 3.2a: An Implicit Analysis of 
the Static Social Equilibrium  
Figure 3.2b: The Impact of a 
Rising Neighbourhood Size 
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Our conclusion for the special case was that we witnessed an over-exertion of 
feeding effort by neighbours.  With no alterations in the expression for first-best optimum 
and yet seeing our new individual equilibrium (3.18) fall, our model predicts a convergence 
toward social efficiency as we reduce neighbourhood size.  From an inspection of the 
alterations in the bracketed terms of expressions (3.15) and (3.18), it becomes clear that 
when 0 < ∝ < 1 over-provision persists within the model and that this over-dissipation of 
effort rises as [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 increases.  This is reinforced by Figure 3.3, where the Nash 
equilibrium always appears above that of the first-best solution, and we witness a greater 
gap between dashed and filled lines as the neighbourhood size rises.   
 If we instead explore the impact of increasing the stock of natural food on the first-
best solution, this direction of efficiency is not so clear.  Using the same analysis as above, 
we see that the social optimum also shifts upwards towards our special case (seen in Figure 
3.4).  Thus, the analysis of Figure 3.3 no longer holds, as now  𝑠∗ and 𝑠𝐹 both move in the 
Figure 3.3: An Implicit Analysis of the Divergence from Social Efficiency 
as the Neighbourhood Size Rises 
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same direction.  In the limiting case of an exceptionally large level of 𝑄, the Nash and first-
best solutions converge to a value of   
α𝑌
𝑝
  :  
 
 
How can we associate this difference with the Contest elements within our model?  
In the former case, where we increase the number of other supplementary feeders, our 
individual feeds more intensively, but a social planner would prefer them to relent from 
feeding.  In this scenario, the reason for the divergence is that whilst the individual feeds in 
order to try and attract more birds to their garden, they disregard the negative implications 
that this has on the neighbours who they ‘steal’ birds from.  However, from the first-best 
standpoint this disutility of stolen birds has to be accounted for.  In essence, this 
reallocation of birds from one neighbours’ garden to another constitutes wasteful 
duplication of effort as a social planner is indifferent as to which neighbour receives the 
birds so long as they appear in somebody’s garden. 
In the latter case, we are adjusting the natural food holding all other variables 
constant.  Here, the individual is feeding in greater quantities for the same purposes, only 
this time their ‘rival’ is that of the natural sustenance as opposed to other artificial feeders.  
However, this explains why the first-best solution also advocates an intensification of 
Figure 3.2a: An Implicit Analysis 
of the Static Social Equilibrium 
Figure 3.4: The Impact of Rising Natural 
Food on the First-Best Solution 
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feeding.  Now, a greater effort from a neighbour will predominantly result in a relocation of 
birds from natural sources, where society yields no utility, to neighbours’ gardens where 
they do.  Because the contest is not occurring between two neighbours, there is no wasteful 
repeated effort and the motives of the individual and the social planner align.   
From a policy perspective, our analysis concludes that a ‘small neighbourhood’ leads 
to a lower but more socially optimal level of effort when decisions are purely driven by an 
inter-neighbour contest.  The rationale behind this is clear: in smaller neighbourhoods the 
negative spillovers are lessened as they affect fewer people and hence the wedge between 
the private and the social optima is smaller. This resonates with the empirical notion that 
close-knit or localised communities expend effort in a more efficient manner (Frank, 2003).   
If we instead use our avian interpretation of neighbourhood size, our results indicate that 
regions which contain a greater proportion of bird species who forage locally create a more 
economically and ecologically efficient neighbourhood than ones which contain a higher 
percentage of birds with nomadic feeding tendencies.  This is because in the latter case, the 
birds are essentially living in a ‘neighbourhood’ with a greater number of competing 
neighbours ([𝑀 − 1]𝑠 ).      
  
3.2.3: THE ENDOGEOUS POPULATION MODEL 
The over-provision which exists in the models discussed until now is unsurprising 
given that we still only include one of our two contrasting effects.  Neither model 
representing an exogenous bird population gives an individual the opportunity to contribute 
to a public good and therefore no incentive to refrain from exerting effort in behaviour akin 
to free-riding.  With just contest-induced motives active thus far, a situation describing 
autonomous over-investment is a natural product of our world in its current form.  The next 
challenge is to remove the assumption that bird populations are independent of feeding 
intensity and repeat our analyses when both the public good and contest effects exist within 
our model.  Assuming neighbourhoods with greater disposition to put down seed will hold a 
greater concentration of local sustenance compared with adjacent regions, Ideal Free 
Distribution Theory implies that these will then profit from elevated local bird populations.  
This could occur in one of two ways; either through the migration of new birds into this 
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food-rich location and away from other neighbourhoods, or through the additional 
reproductive success which will be afforded from birds living in a now more nutritious 
environment.  The motivations for this amendment are obvious as we finally allow our 
model to assess the impact of including a public good aspect, identifying the role that avian 
population adjustment has on human decision-making.    
In order to capture the notion of an endogenous bird population, we replace N in 
our model with an expression where bird numbers react positively to food levels.  How 
public goods are introduced into a model can have profound implications for the level of 
ensuing contributions (Isaac & Walker, 1988; Chan et al, 1996; Chan et al, 1999) and so it is 
important to use a mechanism which is credible and realistic.   Our chosen method is 
defined through (3.19) below, which replaces (3.3a) and gives a new expression to resemble 
our contest: 
𝑛𝑖 =  
𝑠𝑖(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)
𝛽
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
,     𝛽 ≥ 0    (3.19) 
 As well as allowing us to incorporate a public goods aspect into our model, 
transforming (3.3a) into (3.19) affords us the opportunity to evaluate how different values 
of β influence our equilibrium solutions.  This parameter can be thought of as the degree to 
which higher food stocks provide more birds, analogous to returns to scale.  Through the 
following calculations, we use this new endogenous population expression whilst also 
retaining a relaxation of the assumption that there exists a finite population of neighbours. 
Nash Equilibrium 
 In order to calculate the new Nash solution, we apply the same method from the 
‘exogenous population’ model, simply amending the initial utility function to appreciate the 
new public goods opportunity:  
𝑈𝑖 =𝑥𝑖
(1−α) (
𝑠𝑖(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)
𝛽
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
)
α
     (3.20(i)) 
𝐿 =  𝑥𝑖
(1−α) (
𝑠𝑖(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)
𝛽
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
)
α
+ 𝜆(𝑌  − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ) (3.20(ii)) 
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𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 :  (1 − α) 𝑥𝑖
−α [
𝑠𝑖(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)
𝛽
𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 
 ]
α
=  𝜆      (3.21(i)) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑠𝑖
 :   α [
(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄)
𝛽[𝛽𝑠𝑖+ [𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄]
(𝑠𝑖+[𝑀−1]𝑠𝑗+𝑄 )
2
 
 ] 𝑥𝑖
(1−α)
[
𝑠(𝑠+[𝑀−1]?̅?+𝑄)𝛽
𝑠+[𝑀−1]?̅?+𝑄
]
(α−1)
= 𝑝 𝜆  (3.21(ii)) 
Imposing symmetry and rearranging the above expression yields our associated Nash 
equilibrium effort level:  
𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
 [
𝛽𝑠+ [𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄
(1−α(1−𝛽)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
]      (3.22) 
As with the exogenous population model, the comparative static results can be 
found in Appendix 3.2, with calculations derived using partial differentiation of The Implicit 
Function Theorem. The introduction of this public good element leads to some interesting 
changes within the individually-optimal feeding decision.  Crucially, we realise that the 
extent to which the level of exertion coincides with previous counterparts (3.7 and 3.18) 
hinges upon the value of β.   
When β is equal to zero, we return to a world whereby bird populations are 
unaffected by feeding concentrations.  Algebraically, we can confirm that the consequence 
of this is a partial collapse in the bracketed expression of (3.22) which leads to a reversion to 
the expression for 𝑠∗ denoted by (3.18).  Conversely, consider the impact of when β is equal 
to unity.  This represents an environment exhibiting ‘constant avian returns to scale’ from a 
given change in the level of food made available within a neighbourhood.  Here, the 
bracketed term in (3.22) collapses completely (to one) and we return to the equilibrium 
level of the special case (3.7).  Figure 3.5 relays these insights diagrammatically. 
This result illustrates that the absolute level of feeding in the presence of a public 
good element is completely dictated through the degree of productivity associated with 
pro-social activity.  This analysis suggests that the greater the value of β, and thus the more 
easily attainable the public good, the greater the absolute level of effort exerted by the 
individual.  We must realise that witnessing a higher value of β simply represents the 
enablement of a greater level of birds (𝑛𝑖) to be achieved by an individual at any given food 
level.  As we assume birds to be a normal good, this increased effort can then be taken to 
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represent an outward swinging of the budget constraint as aggregate food stocks (𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄) 
increase.  
 
 
  To see whether the inclusion of this public good has driven any real change in 
the level of social efficiency requires a re-calculation of  𝑠𝐹 .  This should also allow us to 
ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, free-riding tendencies emerge. 
 Creating a new expression for both the Marginal Social Cost and Marginal Social 
Value is necessary given that both elements adjust under these new conditions.  However, 
the mechanism by which these are derived does not alter, meaning we simply repeat the 
earlier methodology: 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑠
 = 
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽[𝛽𝑀𝑠+𝑄]
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)2 
 
  
     
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑛
 = 
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)2
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽[𝛽𝑀𝑠+𝑄]
    
  
Again, we multiply the above expression by seed price in order to formulate the MSC: 
Figure 3.5: The Relationships between the Various Nash Equilibrium Effort Levels as 
the Productivity of Feeding (β) Rises.   
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    MSC  =  
𝑝(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)2
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽[𝛽𝑠+𝑄]
     (3.23) 
   
   𝑀𝑆𝑉 =  − 𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
|𝑈 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
 
 
   
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
=  α 𝑥(1−α)𝑛(α−1) 𝑥 
1
 (1−α)
 𝑥
α
𝑛−α  
 
    MSV = 
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
= 
α
 (1−α)
(
𝑥 
𝑛
)   (3.24) 
This time, we use our adjusted contest expression (3.19) to define the Marginal Social Value 
in terms of 𝑠: 
 
   MSV = 
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑛
= 
α
 (1−α)
(
𝑥 (𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)
𝑠(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽
)   (3.25) 
 
Finally, we equate MSC = MSV by setting (3.23) equal to (3.25): 
 
 
𝑝(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)2
(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽[𝛽𝑀𝑠+𝑄]
=  
α
 (1−α)
(
𝑥 (𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)
𝑠(𝑠+[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄)𝛽
)   
   𝑠𝐹 =  
α𝑌
𝑝
(
 𝛽𝑀𝑠𝐹+𝑄
(1−α(1−𝛽))𝑀𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
)    (3.26) 
 
    Having found a new first-best equilibrium, we initially compare this with the original 
optimum (3.15), before considering whether these adjustments create any differences 
between the private effort exertion and that deemed communally best. 
 When moving from 𝑠𝐹 of the exogenous (3.15) to the endogenous (3.29) population 
model, it is apparent that the socially optimal level of bird feeding is larger in the latter.  To 
confirm this, consider the alterations that occur in the bracketed terms.   Both the 
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numerator and denominator contain an additional term (𝛽𝑀𝑠), although the latter is 
multiplied by alpha.  Given the nature of this fraction, we observe an increase in the social 
equilibrium whenever 0 < ∝ < 1.  If both 𝑠∗ and 𝑠𝐹  are now increasing, this reinforces the 
earlier statement that a rising individual optimum does not necessarily signal a violation of 
the free-rider problem.     
 When assessing how this new first-best optimum (3.26) relates to that of the Nash 
effort level (3.22), we use a similar analysis as above.  This time we compare the alterations 
which occur in the numerator and denominator as we move from the social to private 
equilibrium.  The numerator rises by a factor of (1 − 𝛽)[𝑀 − 1]𝑠, and again the 
corresponding adjustment to the denominator is this expression multiplied by α.  Our 
assumptions on the magnitude of alpha and beta are now critical in determining whether 
the individual over, under or exactly provides food relative to the level advocated in a first-
best situation.  If we assume β < 1, meaning the public good exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale, then 𝑠𝐹 <  𝑠∗ and thus over-provision persists within our model.   However, the degree 
of over-provision is reduced compared to the exogenous population model. 
 The diminishing potency of over-exertion continues as β approaches 1, or as the 
public good gains in its productivity.  Algebraically, we can confirm that over-dissipation is 
completely eradicated when β equals unity.  This means that if bird (re-)production exhibits 
constant returns to scale there will be no difference between (3.26) and (3.22), meaning 
that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum .  Moreover, this situation 
where β = 1 results in a complete collapse of the bracketed fraction (to unity).  In this case, 
both the private and social equilibrium will exist at a magnitude of  
α𝑌
𝑝
 .   
 We can take the analysis one step further and imagine a world where the public 
good offers increasing returns to scale, or where β > 1.  We see that now the social optimum 
(3.26) will be at a level higher than the privately optimal amount of bird feeding (3.22) and 
individuals under-provide seed relative to the first-best level. 
 Let us explicitly assess these differing scenarios from the perspective of our two 
effects.  For either ‘exogenous population model’, we see an unequivocal over-provision of 
bird seed relative to the social optimum.  In these cases, this occurred because only the 
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contest facet was present within the model.  By adapting our world to then include the 
public goods effect, we see our results change.  When nature exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale in providing birds, meaning values of β which are positive but less than one, the 
contest effect continues to dominate, albeit to a lesser degree.  However as beta rises, the 
over-dissipation of effort from the contest finds itself being substantially eroded by the 
public goods effect.  This reaches a threshold, where β = 1, when the two forces perfectly 
offset one another and 𝑠∗ represents a level of feeding which exactly corresponds to 𝑠𝐹 .  
When β is allowed to surpass unity, neighbours fail to exert effort in the volumes advocated 
by the social optimal.  Under-provision now ensues within the neighbourhood, signifying a 
domination by the free-rider tendencies of individuals over content effects.  These 
neighbours can now draw private benefits from the relative productivity of others’ 
contributions in delivering birds to the neighbourhood.  Put another way, when the model 
contains increasing avian returns to scale from raising aggregate food levels, people can 
satisfy their taste for birds by dispensing a socially sub-optimal quantity of seed. 
 It is worth noting at this stage that adjustments in the Nash and first-best solutions 
are more exaggerated within smaller neighbourhoods.  In the limiting case where 
neighbourhoods become infinitely large, some of the comparative static results displayed 
here and in subsequent analyses will only cause relatively insignificant changes in the 
behaviour of each individual neighbour.  Despite this, the analyses contained here nicely 
demonstrate how our two offsetting effects operate, and describe how their relative 
potencies determine whether the aggregated private contributions of individuals within a 
local area will be below, at or above that which is efficient from a communal perspective.   
 
3.3: FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
Within both our ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ population models there are still a 
number of assumptions which we may wish to question and adjust in order to exhort 
additional realism.  The next two sub-sections relax two such facets.  
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I. Private Natural Food (𝑞)  
 Natural food (𝑄) is a sensible variable to contain within our model.  It gives us the 
chance to construct a hypothetical scenario whereby no neighbours feed and yet birds can 
still thrive within the neighbourhood.  Additionally, it enables the modeller to assess the 
impact of these natural food stocks being relatively abundant or scarce in relation to 
aggregate (𝑀𝑠) or individual (𝑠) supplementary seed.  
 Despite its relevance for the model, the current notion that natural and privately 
provided stocks of food are located in spatially separate areas is not always realistic.   Whilst 
natural food does exist outside of private gardens, for example in urban parks or waste 
grounds, it is equally feasible that natural sustenance can be found within the borders of 
people’s private gardens.  This is perhaps even more likely across urban landscapes, where 
gardens constitute a high proportion of total foraging space.  Furthermore, even when they 
feed upon natural sources of food, the very presence of birds in people’s gardens still offer 
an opportunity to engage with nature and establish inter-connectedness, forming a channel 
from which residents could derive utility.  Subsequently, we briefly consider how 
neighbours’ dispensing efforts are influenced by converting 𝑄 to a disaggregated ′𝑞′ that 
represents garden-specific natural food.  Of course, from a subjective wellbeing standpoint, 
we cannot necessarily assume 𝑞 and 𝑠 as perfect substitutes because the utility-enhancing 
attributes of dependency and responsibility are reduced (if not eradicated) when birds 
forage ‘naturally’.   For the purposes of our analysis, we shall ignore this technical disparity. 
 We would imagine that this conversion should reduce the incentive to actively 
engage in supplementary feeding.  Essentially, 𝑞 provides neighbours with a pre-existing 
threshold of food and consequently the marginal productivity of dispensing seed falls.  
Assessing this effect allows us to consider how people adjust their behaviour when a 
substitutable product not only exists, but also how their decisions may vary as the degree of 
exclusion or ownership alters.   
Whilst calculations are not explicitly included here, we re-ran our analyses to test 
our conjectures regarding the adjustments in the Nash equilibrium when converting natural 
food stocks from an externally to privately-located variable.  For both the exogenous 
population models and the endogenous population model with  ≤ 1, the equilibrium effort 
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level of our individuals falls.  This relates to a form of ‘crowding out’ akin to that described 
by other studies (see Bergstrom et al, 1986 for an example).  Given these models were 
previously susceptible to qualities of over-provision, the effort dissuasion which is facilitated 
through this redistribution mechanism resembles a convergence towards the associated 
level of supplementary feeding deemed socially optimal.  It is also worth mentioning that, 
for a sufficiently high level of 𝑞, we may find the individual completely unwilling to supply 
supplementary feed.  We excluded our analyses of these corner solutions by imposing the 
restriction that 𝑞 cannot be so high that the optimal seed dispensing level is at a threshold 
below zero.  
Regarding the endogenous population model, this effect becomes smaller as β rises.   
Why would the inclusion of a public goods effect decrease a neighbour’s disinclination to 
feed in the presence of  𝑞?  When β is strictly positive, aggregate bird numbers rise from an 
increase in food stocks.  Holding all other things constant, neighbours are now rewarded 
more greatly from feeding relative to a case where bird numbers are fixed (the exogenous 
population model).  This, at least partially, re-incentivises them to feed.  Further to this 
point, where β > 1, the conversion to 𝑞 actually causes a rise in contributions relative to the 
case containing 𝑄, lessening the extent to which this neighbourhood would under-provide.  
These findings, depicted through Figure 3.6, suggest that amending the 
characterisation of natural food stocks from a location independent to an individually 
allotted system creates a ‘regulating’ mechanism.  This means that neighbours reduce their 
feeding levels in an over-exerting world but will increase their efforts when private 
contributions are falling short of the threshold which is seen as socially optimal.    
Reiterating our earlier reasoning, the disinclination to feed in over-providing 
scenarios usually stem from dampened contest effects.  This is essentially what occurs when 
neighbours are endowed with an initial natural food stock (𝑞). However, delivering an 
empirical distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘manual’ food sources is not straight-forward.  
For example, humans who invest in wildlife gardening indirectly expend money on 
substances which then constitute ‘quasi-natural’ sources of sustenance although not being 
manually dispensed in the traditional bird-feeding manner.  This is not unusual in the UK, 
and 29% of those sampled in the 2013/14 ‘Monitor of Engagement with the Natural 
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Environment (MENE) survey’ indicate that they invest in some form of wildlife gardening to 
encourage local creatures to visit and thrive (www.gov.uk, p.2).  Despite this confounding 
practical facet, it is interesting and important to realise the impact that digressions such as 
these may have upon the private actions of an individual.  This gives further reason to 
emphasise the importance of understanding the context-specific considerations associated 
with the provision of environmental public goods.  Indeed, it is only by appreciating these 
types of factor that environmental economists will be able to advocate insightful and useful 
policy recommendations.  
 
 
II. Introducing Heterogeneity in Income (Y)  
 The final assumption we relax in these analyses is that which imposes symmetry 
across neighbours.  Some degree of homogeneity is clearly realistic when examining a 
neighbourhood.  People who live within the same residential area are likely to reside in 
houses of similar size, have comparable incomes and hold some overlap in their tastes.  
Figure 3.6: An Illustrative Explanation of Moving from External to Locally-Specific 
Natural Food 
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However, strict homogeneity is unrealistic.  We briefly discuss the implication of introducing 
a dispersion in particular personal attributes upon the aggregated seed investment within a 
neighbourhood. The standard theoretical prediction is that ‘asymmetry between 
contestants who participate actively in the contest reduces total expenditure’ (Konrad; 
2009, p.63-64).  Here, we consider just one attribute, income (𝑌).  In our opinion, this 
constitutes one of the most empirically intuitive aspects to model heterogeneously.   
The existing literature casts a varied picture regarding the impact of disparate incomes 
and contributions to public goods.  Some studies show the aggregate impact as unaffected 
(Sugden, 1984; Buckley & Croson, 2006; Bartling & von Siemens, 2011), whilst others 
suggest that wealth or power differences can lead to greater (Chan et al, 1996; Bewley, 
1999; Olszewski & Rosenthal, 2002; Frank, 2003) or lesser (Isaac & Walker, 1988; Doraszelski 
& Markovic, 2007) levels of contribution.  These authors have assessed the impact of 
heterogeneity in both experimental and empirical settings.  They have also applied them to 
a range of topics including employee effort, taxation, group co-operation and advertising.   
In order to assess the impact of income heterogeneity without the complex comparative 
static analysis of a closed form solution, we explain our results implicitly through the 
graphical model of Figure 3.1a: 
 
 
Figure 1a:  An Implicit Analysis of the Exogenous Population Equilibrium 
 
Figure 3.1a: An Implicit Analysis of the Static Nash Equilibrium 
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This graph confirms that income (Y) appears as a linear interaction with seed effort 
decisions.  Those with higher incomes would expend an above-average level of effort whilst 
those on lower incomes would allot seed and levels below the mean.  Using a set of 
reasonable parameters (runs of which are not shown here) confirm that by introducing 
heterogeneity of income, aggregate investment efforts fall relative to when income 
homogeneity exists.  This effect, constituting a convergence towards social efficiency, rises 
as we increase neighbourhood size.  This result adheres with the theoretical prediction of 
Konrad described above, and can be attributed to the contest element of our neighbours’ 
utility functions.  Under conditions of homogeneity, all neighbours have an equal 
endowment with which to compete.  However, as incomes are transferred to create an 
unequal society, the feasibility for less endowed neighbours to actively engage in the 
contest is lessened.  In the limiting case whereby all income is transferred to one individual, 
the Nash Equilibrium would converge to the first-best solution because the contest is 
effectively eradicated from the neighbourhood.  An equally pertinent finding realises that 
even when the average income of a group is held constant, there is a significant 
redistribution of effort expenditures when income heterogeneity is introduced. 
Our model began as one of simplicity, containing a number of convenient assumptions.  
However, the above analyses have enabled us to explore the impact of relaxing many of 
these restrictions.  These investigations have enabled us to derive a set of sound conjectures 
of when and by what extent competing neighbours would feed their local garden birds with 
greater or lesser social efficiency.  By doing so, we have discovered different instances 
where our ‘autonomous neighbourhood’ finds itself feeding above, below or at the 
threshold advocated by the social optimum.  This is widely dictated by two competing 
effects; contest-driven competition and public goods-fuelled free-riding.  Neighbourhood 
size (𝑀), natural food substitution (𝑞) and socio-demographic heterogeneities (𝑌) can all 
impact upon the extent of neighbourhood inefficiency and thus are all important factors to 
consider before advocating a policy recommendation.  In the final section we discuss some 
empirical applications and implications of this model and draw some conclusive remarks 
which we hope will hold some poignancy for the field of environmental economics. 
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3.4: APPLICATIONS 
Whilst our analyses applied this model to bird-feeding, there is no reason to believe that 
our theory cannot be extended to situations beyond this example.  Indeed, there are a 
variety of relevant problems within the field of environmental economics where the 
competing impacts of public goods and contests could be modelled in a way similar to that 
which we presented here.  In each case, society can use the competitive nature of private 
individuals to establish a greater level of effort or expenditure.  This would simultaneously 
secure a greater level of the associated public good (Cameron et al, 2012; Croson & Treich, 
2014).    Potential instances include the motivating of energy efficiency (Allcott, 2011; 
Delmas & Lessem, 2014) or examining the desire for humans to undertake eco-tourism, 
grouse-shooting and wildlife volunteering (e.g. toad rescues www.bbc.co.uk).    
The studies by Allcott and Delmas & Lessem provided individuals with information on 
their peer-related energy efficiency.  This is an example of where relatively cost effective 
behavioural mechanisms can be implemented so as to drive competitive individuals toward 
socially advantageous outcomes.  Allcott’s study found that by raising a resident’s 
awareness regarding their approximate energy efficiency created a private adjustment in 
action equivalent to a 1-2% drop in energy usage.  Furthermore, many of the behavioural 
changes were simple and already known by the residents.  This suggests that imposing 
competitive stimuli can create fairly cost-free and self-beneficial impacts for the private 
individual, whilst at the same time generating desirable public advantages. 
Another example which illustrates the potency of competition in enabling the private 
provision of public goods relates to litter rebate mechanisms established in developed 
societies such as Germany.  This Government introduced legislature which entitled people 
to a refund when they return the packaging of products such as plastic and glass bottles.  
One unforeseen implication of this policy has been that, in many public places, a social norm 
has arisen whereby people discard the packaging of these goods as an act of charity.  Their 
rationale is that the litter will be collected by those most in need who will then receive a 
form of payment for their action.  Let us apply this example to our model.  The ‘contest’ is 
akin to the efforts of competing litter-pickers.  The environmental public good relates to the 
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removal of unsightly litter from public areas.  Let us assume that litter levels are fixed in a 
given area (like the exogenous population model).  If no payment existed, we would expect 
an under-provision of effort by citizens relative to the social optimum.  Litter is left unpicked 
and the public good is insufficiently provided.  If instead a very small rebate is paid, then we 
should expect a reaction to this.  Those with very low marginal value for time invest their 
efforts collecting the packaging to receive the associated payments.  However, we would 
not expect this to completely eradicate litter.  By contrast, at a very high rebate rate, there 
is now a sizeable private incentive to retrieve litter.  Individuals are driven by these 
payments but are also in direct competition with each other.  The consequence of this will 
surely be an over-exertion of effort, demonstrated through agents spending time searching 
for litter in areas absent of packaging, or through wastefully duplicated search efforts (Evans 
& Weninger, 2014).  Whilst this will mean the public good objective is met (i.e. all litter is 
removed), this will have been achieved in an effort-inefficient manner relative to that which 
the social optimum would dictate.  Overall, our analyses would lead us to assume that an 
equilibrium rebate rate would be one whereby the level of effort employed by citizens 
exactly matches that required to eradicate all litter from public places efficiently.  However, 
the contest and associated private monetary incentive to retrieve litter will cause this 
equilibrium rate to be lower than if no such dynamic existed.  We assume the level of litter 
to be exogenous, yet it is plausible to adapt this example so that the volume of litter is 
endogenous.  This would resonate with our charitable German population who discard more 
rubbish in public places through seeing a higher concentration of people dependant on litter 
picking in their society.  Such action is in fact promoted in Germany (see http://www.pfand-
gehoert-daneben.de/ for an instance of this).  This example of course has a natural policy 
implication.  Although employed in Germany, many similar societies have not introduced 
such a scheme.  Our analyses therefore nicely show one way in which an institution might 
manipulate the private incentives of individuals in order to derive social constructs which 
simultaneously solve classic public goods dilemmas.       
Our model of offsetting effects may also be of interest to other areas in economics.  One 
natural application would be to the advertising decisions of rival firms.  An area already 
explored by competition economists (Grossman & Sharipo, 1984; Simbanegavi, 2009), this 
industry has a similar public goods dilemma.  The difficulty lies in establishing whether the 
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total private advertising efforts of firms are excessive or inadequate relative to the socially 
advisable level.  Excessive advertising primarily arises when strong competitive tendencies 
exist between substitutable products, whilst inadequate advertising will occur when the 
promotional efforts of one firm provide strong public spill-overs to those of allied products, 
facilitating extensive inter-firm benefits.  Understanding just how these two aspects interact 
within a given industry will allow competition authorities to decide when the intensity of 
advertising is too great or is insufficient.  Furthermore, it may potentially suggest how to 
adjust the market’s structure so as so remedy against these imperfections. 
Whilst the cases above show likenesses to our motivating example of bird-feeding, one 
should always be wary of the ease with which the findings from one example can be 
transferred to another (Evans & Weninger, 2014).  In this case, this may hinge of a number 
of factors.  One of the most important of these is the mechanism by which a contest is 
formed.  In the bird-feeding case, the competitive drive of neighbours is borne from their 
self-motivated desire to attract birds to their own garden.  In the three examples we 
examine above, the derivation of a contest instead occurs through status relativities, 
institutional structure and product substitutability respectively.  Despite this technical issue, 
the purpose of this section was to illustrate more broadly how the role of competition could 
be instrumental in combatting free-rider tendencies synonymous with traditional public 
goods theory.  Nevertheless, one important research recommendation of this paper is to 
establish whether, and if so to what extent, the contest structure itself influences people’s 
decisions.  This should help ascertain the degree to which our bird-feeding model is capable 
of representing these assimilated cases. 
 
3.5: CONCLUSION 
The under-provision of public goods when dependent upon private voluntary 
contributions is a well understood phenomenon and discovering a solution to this issue 
poses a sizeable social, economic and political obstacle.  Environmental goods are no 
exception, and attempts to make private organisations or individuals invest adequate time 
and/or finances in the procurement or conservation of natural public resources typically 
falls short of the required standard.   Previous studies have already shown that one 
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mechanism which may partially alleviate this disinclination to contribute involves 
manipulating the ‘impurity’ of a good.  When executed correctly, an individual should hold a 
greater incentive to contribute because they can simultaneously derive some form of 
private utility through this action.  This notion has been used to explain how instances of 
charitable donations (Sieg, 2012), environmental offsets (Kotchen, 2009) and lottery 
fundraising (Morgan & Sefton, 2000) can procure higher thresholds of revenue than 
traditional economics would predict. 
The theoretical model in our paper employs contests as a way to boost private 
incentives for contributing to public goods.  Using bird-feeding as a motivating example, we 
have illustrated how an individual’s contribution efforts will depend upon two opposing 
mechanisms.  We define these as ‘the contest effect’ and ‘the public goods effect’.  When 
compared against a first-best solution, these forces should create over-provision and under-
provision respectively when analysed as individual actions.  However, our analyses have 
shown that it is possible to combine these two effects within one model in such a way that 
their influences can partially or completely counteract one another.  An instance of perfect 
offsetting occurs when nature exhibits constant avian returns to scale from food stock 
alterations.  If instead we have decreasing or null returns to scale, our model illustrates a 
domination of the public goods effect by the contest, leading to a level of provision (or 
effort) deemed excessive to that which society warrants.  This ecologically plausible scenario 
is a far cry from the usual dilemma of insufficiently procuring environmental resources.  
 This is also of great importance from a policy perspective.  As an environmental social 
planner, realising how to achieve collectively desirable objectives could hinge upon many 
context-specific facets.  The necessary advisory action may be altered or even reversed 
when applied to a location where neighbours are more or less heterogeneous, where the 
endowment structure is endogenously influenced (for example by garden size), and where 
the bird species are of a different level of scarcity, diversity or ornithological habit. 
Section 3.4 attempted to provide a number of alternative examples which our model 
looks to represent.  A similarly important aspect of this paper was to highlight the necessity 
in developing a sound understanding of how humans interact with the environment.  This 
involves grasping why people do or do not engage in environmental activities and the 
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underlying causes for their motivation or disinclination.  Only upon achieving this will it be 
feasible to deliver or conserve our natural resources at economically and socially efficient 
levels.  By way of example, it would have been hard to explain our findings without realising 
how neighbours yield utility through the ‘nature connectivity’ (Dutcher et al, 2007) they 
establish when engaging with local wildlife.  It is only once we appreciate that individuals 
primarily gain satisfaction from birds coming to their garden that we are able to describe 
and defend the notion of a contest effect and see instances of optimal or even over-
provision for this impure public good.  Therefore, a leading recommendation of this paper is 
to urge conservationists, politicians and other policy directors to appreciate our need to 
capture the underpinnings of people’s interconnectivity with nature.  Until we are able to 
confidently understand this aspect, it will not be feasible for accurate and insightful 
environmental proposals to be devised.   
The paper also illustrates the opportunities which environmental economists must take 
regarding the ‘manipulation’ of private motivations.  Natural resources are fast decreasing, 
and the retention of those which still exist will not be possible unless we use all the available 
tools at our disposal.  Where a human population exists who are prepared to pay and there 
is a mechanism whereby payment is possible, this chance must surely be taken by the field.   
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SECTION 4 
PUTTING BAMBI IN THE FIRING LINE: 
APPLYING MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC 
ATTITUDES TO DEER CULLING 
 
 
 
4.1 :  INTRODUCTION 
This study elicits the values associated with deer population control and forest 
management in the UK.  In particular, it seeks to explore the key determinants of one’s 
choices over ethically contentious environmental decisions.  We use discrete choice 
experiments to test whether two alternative theories can outperform the rational choice 
model in this regard and, if so, identify the extent to which either can better represent the 
stated preferences of individuals.   
Effective deer management has both an environmental and economic importance, 
with the various types of destruction caused by these animals estimated to cost £4.3m in 
the UK each year (Haw, 2013).  Culling is one of the leading methods to combat this type of 
problem and such human interference is typically seen as ‘necessary’ when a species’ 
population is sufficiently high to negatively impact upon the wider ecosystem, local 
economy or other social aspects.  The justification is seen as particularly strong if, as with 
deer, humans are at least partially responsible for the population explosion via historical 
predator removal or species introduction (Melstrom & Horan, 2014). Despite this, there 
often exists a considerable resistance to culling and other forms of animal population 
control.  Attitudes and perspectives regarding this type of environmental issue are often 
“associated with strong moral feelings” (Croson & Treich, 2014 p.336) and, under these 
conditions, an agent is unlikely to base their decisions purely by event outcomes (Boyce et 
al, 1992; Falk et al, 2003) or through strategic motivation (Vossler et al, 2012).  To this end, 
it is highly plausible to believe one’s perception of whether a process by which deer 
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numbers are reduced is well intended, or indeed necessary, will largely depend upon their 
level of knowledge and style of interaction they hold with their local environment.   
Sometimes people deviate from rational choice (or outcomes-based) models through 
sub-optimal or erroneous decisions.  However, it is also true that on other occasions these 
choices represent a genuine preference construction that is beyond at least the more 
narrow of frameworks that standard economics have used to describe utility maximisation. 
We offer an example of where, contrary to classic economic thought, people’s strength of 
agreement with a forest management scheme will focus less heavily on the outcome of an 
act per se.  Instead, they will contemplate whether the procedure by which a result was 
achieved can be judged as just or ethical. In this study, we present two alternative 
procedural theories, namely intentions-based reasoning taken from behavioural economics 
and the Doctrine of Double Effect, a principle which attempts to explain our moral and 
philosophical perspectives towards harm.  Our findings give evidence that intention does 
play an important role in delivering choice, but neither economic theory nor the Doctrine of 
Double Effect appear to truly capture people’s preferences when considered in isolation.  
Instead, our results suggest that the roles of intention, action and outcome interact when 
shaping the moral decisions of an individual.  Only by appreciating the nature of this fusion 
are we able to better understand the underlying determinants of an individual’s choice and 
use this to produce more robust predictions on their true preferences.   
   
A second reason to explore our attitudes to culling pertains to how humans derive 
Subjective Well-Being (SWB).  The associated literature promotes activities where people 
can obtain a sense of responsibility, dependence and/or repeated interaction (see Diener & 
Biswas-Diener, 2008 for an overview).  Practices advocated to enhance life satisfaction 
include strong interactions with one’s community, religion and family.  These stimulate 
feelings of interconnectivity whilst simultaneously providing stability and routine to our 
lives.  Engagement with our local environment, which can be termed as ‘Nature 
Connectivity’ (Dutcher et al, 2007), seems another channel from which one could plausibly 
attain the same type of life satisfaction.  In such instances, humans could derive pleasure 
from performing a ‘warden’ role, inducing valued qualities of repetitiveness and protective 
care.  Furthermore, this type of benefit seems more applicable to local nature.  Not only 
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might these welfare benefits reverse trends of environmental detachment (Cameron et al, 
2012), but via its interactive nature could constitute a distinct and disparate worth from that 
of conservation or preservation which people establish through classic donation 
mechanisms.   
 
Studying intention in this setting also allows us to assess how engaging with local 
wildlife might conflict with long-term sustainability.  Generally, a warden mentality should 
complement wider environmental objectives.  Take the example of feeding birds; this not 
only endows the human feeder with a ‘warden-style’ utility, but simultaneously raises the 
survival chances of fed birds, benefitting long-term conservation efforts.  Such 
complementarity disappears when nature connectivity is applied to culling.  Our warden 
desire is to protect individual creatures and so the action to cull, even if ‘well-intended’ for 
long term sustainability, may be highly objectionable to those who place a strong value 
upon nature connectivity.    
 
Our results indicate that ‘warden ethics’ may deliver the crucial missing determinant 
in shaping our sample’s alternative preferences.  Therefore, this study not only seeks to 
identify how people exhibit warden-style preferences, but also acknowledges the views of 
Scholtz (2005) by considering how society should organise population control so that is then 
deemed morally permissible.  Regarding policy, this work nicely exemplifies the need for 
woodland managers to exercise caution as they attempt to create schemes designed to 
maximise societal welfare.    This requires inventing sustainable habitat management 
strategies which strike a balance between nature connectivity and the need to protect wider 
biodiversity. 
The remainder of the paper is set out accordingly.  Section 4.2 outlines our two 
alternative theories and their associated literatures; Section 4.3 gives a comprehensive 
overview of the survey design, methodology and implementation; Section 4.4 presents the 
results whilst Section 4.5 then proceeds with a discussion of the main findings.  Section 4.6 
provides some secondary insights from the study.  Section 4.7 concludes, and proposes 
some next steps in light of these findings. 
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4.2:  INTENTIONS, THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT AND TROLLEY PROBLEMS    
Whilst both of our alternative theories are similar in their belief that choice is not 
driven solely by outcomes, they differ in how they imagine procedure to impact upon 
decision-making.  ‘Good’ intentions, as defined by behavioural economics, attach weight to 
how an agent justifies their choice and the morality of their underlying motivations to select 
a particular option.  The Doctrine of Double Effect has a slightly different focus, and 
supposes that ethical permissibility is dictated by perceptions on whether a harmful impact 
is created as a direct consequence of a given action, or whether it is a foreseen but 
unintended secondary effect.  The ‘double effect’ arises from the fact that although the final 
outcome from two events can be the same, these events may not be judged as ethically 
equitable. More specifically, morally ‘just’ events are those where bad effects are foreseen 
but were not the intended purpose of the perpetrator’s initial action, whilst ‘unjust’ events 
are those which require or necessitate the bad action in order for a ‘good outcome’ to be 
achieved15. Whilst the remainder of this section looks to provide a greater degree of clarity 
over this distinction, we characterise this difference through the two statements below: 
Intentions-Based Reasoning: “Why did you undertake that (harmful) act?” 
Doctrine of Double Effect: “Did you mean to cause that (harmful) outcome?”   
 
Intentions-Based Reasoning 
 
Many situations in the real world exemplify where humans fail to adhere to the self-
interested agent which traditional economic theories have portrayed as rational.   As such, 
there now exists significant evidence within the literatures of experimental and behavioural 
economics which illustrate scenarios where we exhibit ‘bounded rationality’.  These studies 
and their potential explanations are presented in both classic and modern reviews 
(Kahnemann & Tversky, 1984; Marwala 2014). 
Whilst it is instructive to identify systematic deviations from the standard 
behavioural assumptions of the homo oeconomicus, it is equally vital to understand the 
underlying causes of these departures in order to gauge the transferability of choice 
                                                          
15 For a further discussion of this with real-world examples, please see Audi R. (1999), p.737-38  
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practices.  The initial line of enquiry sought to explain our non-self-interested behaviour 
through consequentialist means.  One such example involves our perceptions regarding 
outcome-based egalitarianism.  Rabin’s 1993 paper is cited as one of the first to approach 
the incorporation of payoff fairness into economics, with subsequent work by Fehr & 
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) demonstrating how adjusting a standard 
utility function so as to incorporate measures of outcome inequity aversion readily improves 
the predictive nature of a model. 
More recently, the literature has shifted its focus to appreciate that aspects of 
procedural or intentions-based action may be of equal importance in explaining choices 
which defy the rational choice theory.  In these studies, the concern is not necessarily 
whether resulting outcomes are equal per se, but instead consider whether the actions 
taken by an agent can be judged as appropriate or fair given the choices which were 
available to them.  We exemplify the impact of procedural intention through the two 
scenarios below.   
 
Game 1: Person A (“The Proposer”) is initially given £10 and is presented with the task 
of offering an amount £X to Person B (“The Respondent”). If Person B accepts 
the proposal, then they will receive the offered amount and Person A will keep 
what remains of the £10.  If they reject the proposal, each will receive 
nothing.  The amount Person A could offer to Person B can be any integer 
value between £0 and £10.  Both players know that this is the range of 
choices open to Person A.  After careful consideration, Person A decides to 
offer £2 which, should Person B accept, will leave them with £8.  Imagine now 
that you are Person B.  Do you accept the offer of £2?  
Game 2: Person A (“The Proposer”) is initially given £10 and is presented with the task 
of offering an amount £X to Person B (“The Respondent”). If Person B accepts 
the proposal, then they will receive the offered amount and Person A will keep 
what remains of the £10.  If they reject the proposal, each will receive 
nothing. The proposal choices open to Person A is restricted, and they can 
only offer Person B either £1 or £2.  Both players know that this is the range 
of choices open to Person A.  After careful consideration, Person A decides to 
offer £2 which, should Person B accept, will leave them with £8.  Imagine now 
that you are Person B.  Do you accept the offer of £2? 
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For each of the above ‘ultimatum games’, “The Respondent’s” decision regarding the 
£2 offer will result in the same monetary payoff for each player.  In either situation an 
acceptance creates a Proposer-Respondent split of £8/£2, and each will receive nothing in 
the case of rejection.  Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, these games should be 
perceived equivalently.  However, behavioural economists have shown that a typical 
respondent will reject the offer of £2 in Game 1, whilst accepting it in Game 2.  A strong 
explanation for this stems from Person B’s perceptions regarding Player A’s intentions.  In 
Game 1, “The Proposer” is unrestricted in their offer choices and therefore could have 
proposed a more egalitarian sum to Player B.  However in Game 2 the imposed constraints 
mean that by offering £2, Player A seemingly signals an intent to reach the most equal split 
of the endowment they are allowed to make.  Thus, we assume that it is this disparity in 
procedural opportunity which fuels the switch in Player B’s decision.   
Many studies have acknowledged the range of determinants which cause the type of 
decision-making shown by Person B.  These include an individual’s ability to plan or control 
their choices (Ajzen, 1991), their opportunity to signal why they made a particular decision 
(Falk et al., 2003) and other factors which allude to the intent of one’s action (Terry et al., 
1999; Bolton et al., 2005).  In all cases, a similarity exists in that subsequent choices depend 
upon one person’s judgment regarding another person’s intention of their action.  
The Doctrine of Double Effect 
The Doctrine of Double Effect (hereafter DDE) is a longstanding philosophical theory 
which illustrates how our moral attitudes my hinge upon the perceptions we hold of a 
perpetrator’s intention from their action. This ethical exploration was resurrected by 
Philippa Foot in 1935, who describes these adjustments in moral permissibility through a 
combination of theoretical examples.  Perhaps the most famous of these (and certainly 
most intensely scrutinised) is the ‘Trolley Problem’.  Whilst various strains of this ethical 
dilemma have emerged since Foot’s initial proposal, its basic principles are outlined through 
Stories 1 and 2. 
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Foot’s conjecture is that people on average believe flicking the switch to be ethically 
permissible, yet pushing the large man is not.  However, from an outcomes-perspective we 
see no distinction between the two stories - the consequence of either is to sacrifice one to 
prevent the death of five.    This creates the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’. 
 
Story 1: When standing next to a rail track you see an out-of-control trolley hurtling 
down a hill.  In its path are five individuals.  The sides of the track are steep 
and the five have no way of escaping.  You cannot stop the trolley and if you 
do nothing it will hit and kill all five with certainty.  There is a switch next to 
you that you can flick.  By doing so, you would divert the trolley onto an 
alternative track, preventing the death of the five.  However, on this other line 
is one individual with no means of escape.  If the trolley is switched to the 
other line, this individual will be killed with certainty.  Should you flick the 
switch?  
Story 2:  When standing on a bridge overlooking a rail track, you see an out-of-control 
trolley hurtling down a hill.  In its path are five individuals.  The sides of the 
track are steep and the five have no way of escaping.  You cannot stop the 
trolley and if you do nothing it will hit and kill all five with certainty.  There is 
a large man stood next to you on the bridge.  You realise that, given his size, if 
you pushed this man into the path of the trolley then it would de-rail, 
preventing the death of the five.  However, the force of the trolley hitting the 
man will kill him with certainty.  Should you push the large man?  
 
Foot proposes that the opposing moral stances are caused through differences in the 
intentions of one’s action.  In Story 1, flicking the switch saves the five individuals through a 
means which, under different circumstances, could have achieved the same result without 
any death (i.e. had no individual been on the other line).  Here, the one’s death is a foreseen 
and unavoidable yet unintended side-effect of the initial action.  By contrast, the death of 
the large man in Story 2 is a necessary and integral component to achieve saving the five.  
Foot believes it is this aspect which creates the ethical objection, and immorality is 
expressed despite its final outcome appearing justifiable. 
Many philosophers and theorists have since revisited and extended this dilemma.  
Notable contributors include Thompson, 1976; 1985, Ungur, 1992 and Kamm, 1996.  These 
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authors explore this ethical conundrum by adjusting aspects like anonymity, rail-track set-up 
and other social dynamics.  More recently, the theoretical literature has been 
complemented by hypothetical experiments such as those by Lanteri et al, 2008 and Liao et 
al, 2012, the results of which generally reinforce the conjectures of Foot and others.  Further 
experimental studies have extended their analytical focus by exploring the effects of the 
type of harm endured (Greene et al, 2009; Gold et al, 2013) or have introduced ‘trilemmas’ 
to assess the impact of similarity effects (Shallow et al, 2011), self-sacrifice (Di Nucci, 2013) 
and the role of reputation (Gold et al, 2014).  
It is true that many economic theories are reluctant to move away from 
consequence-based analyses (Iliev et al, 2009) and, as such, our two alternative theories and 
their related conjectures are potentially troublesome for such pragmatic theories.  Just as 
with Game 1 and Game 2 in the previous section, the resulting outcomes of Story 1 and 
Story 2 are identical.  Because a utility-maximising agent should only ever consider the final 
pay-offs, traditional economic theories of consequentialism, such as Rational Choice Theory, 
have no way to explain the switches in preference which occur in either case.   
Regarding the focus of our study, the moral quandary which we wish to test assesses 
whether individuals express an ethical objection to the killing of deer in order to protect and 
sustain the wider woodland habitat.  If so, how are these ethics influenced by procedural 
differences regarding the way in which forest management is undertaken and how directly 
or intentionally a woodland manager causes harm to deer through their choice of protection 
scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to apply discrete choice 
modelling to Trolley Problems and certainly is the first to do so in order to explore animal 
death, which may certainly challenge people’s willingness to make attribute trade-offs 
(Colombo et al, 2013).  Thus, this paper will build upon others in the field (Needham & 
Lehman, 1991; Boyce et al, 1992, Hanley et al, 2003) to try and gauge how moral 
perceptions for non-human harm may correspond to those for our own species.  Ethically 
this may be particularly poignant: our study, through its emphasis upon ‘warden 
tendencies’, presents one possible reason why people can hold seemingly inconsistent 
perspectives between different types of animal welfare.  For example, one’s ethics toward 
the protection of local wildlife may differ to that for meat-producing livestock.  Of course, 
people display general differences in preferences which are unrelated to ethics, and we 
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acknowledge that this form of heterogeneity may complicate and hinder us deriving any 
concrete solutions from conducting just one study.  However, we believe that this 
experiment can illustrate the possible role ethical perspectives may play and stimulate a 
wider interest in exploring the impact of morality within the field.   
Furthermore, this study may provide an example of where local and wider 
environmental objectives conflict with one another (Glaeser, 2014).  As a research area 
experimental philosophy is relatively young, yet the ever-sharpening experimental skills of 
behavioural economists could considerably help in revealing answers to the ethical 
quandaries which theoretical philosophers throw into the academic sphere.  By applying 
economic experimentation to long-standing philosophical dilemmas, our work seeks to 
maximise the research synergies which exist between the two disciplines and thus provide 
another potential contribution to the field.   
    
4.3:  SURVEY DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY   
  
Designing the Survey     
 The survey comprised a 16-case discrete choice exercise and a questionnaire.  The 
latter sought to establish each individual’s topic-related attitudes and socio-demographic 
status. 
When addressing the former, an ‘efficient’ choice model seeks to “maximise the 
amount of information… to identify the estimates of vector β” (Scarpa & Rose, 2008, p.257), 
where “β” measures and weights the characteristics which a person values in their utility 
function.  For us, this will involve the various woodland-related attributes which are 
described below. When designing a choice experiment of this nature, consideration must be 
given to ensure that a survey holds both ‘statistical’ and ‘behavioural’ efficiency (Scarpa & 
Rose, 2008).  For the former, achieving pure statistical efficiency had to be partially 
compromised in our model because of the constraints which we wished to impose in order 
to ensure credibility and realism.  An example of this would be to ensure that no choice case 
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suggested the sale of meat when no culling was taking place. Despite taking these 
complicating factors into consideration, we were able to derive designs which achieved an 
orthogonal and fully balanced choice exercise. 
Once produced, each design was tested in Microsoft Excel.  Here, we follow 
recommendations from the literature (see Scarpa & Rose, 2008 p.265-266) and apply a 
utility function which estimated attribute values of “β”  under a priori beliefs on their 
relative worth.  We included ‘noise’ within our simulated utility functions which sought to 
reflect possible preference and/or moral heterogeneity within the sample.  These ‘simulated 
responses’ were then run through a conditional logit model, the purpose of which was to 
test and compare how well each design could replicate the assumed utility function by 
providing robust coefficients and valuations.   
The two strongest of these designs were then presented to independent focus 
groups, providing a pilot test that could examine the second element of successful design – 
behavioural efficiency.  Here, all aspects of the survey were combined in order to assess the 
duration and ease with which respondents could complete the task.  Assessing efficiency 
also required an assessment of how often clarity was sought and whether any cases arose 
which confused or perplexed members of the focus group.  A recurrent theme from both 
studies showed an inability for these groups to appreciate alternative options relative to the 
Status Quo.  As a consequence, the wording and detailing of the tutorial was adjusted to 
emphasise this factor and the piloting re-run on a further two groups.  This second wave of 
focus group testing delivered no repeat of this confusion, instilling a confidence that the 
chosen design and length were both statistically and intuitively suitable for the main study.   
 
a) The Choice Experiment  
Based on Lancaster’s Characteristics Approach (Lancaster, 1966), discrete choice 
experiments assume that a good’s value can be established through its constituting 
attributes.  Not only do the characteristics carry value, but these are formed independently 
from the way in which they are bundled.  This section describes each of the attributes used, 
explaining not only how each were defined to respondents, but also how their presence 
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could help answer the study’s objectives.  To provide a visual interpretation of how 
characteristics were displayed, an example choice set is given in Appendix 4.1. Explanations 
of all attributes were provided through tutorial-style instructions.  All respondents received 
this prior to undertaking the choice task, and abbreviated versions are provided in both 
Appendix 4.2 and throughout this section.  
  
 
 
Figure 4.1:  The Baseline (Option C) 
 
Constituting the main part of the survey, the choice experiment offered each 
respondent 16 forest management ‘cases’.  Focus group discussions and pilot testing 
indicated that the way in which this number of cases had been presented struck a balance 
between enabling a participant to see a variety of possible scenarios without creating a 
survey whose length proved cognitively burdensome or led to disinterest or disengagement 
with the task (Colombo et al, 2013).  Each case presented two alternative schemes and a 
constant ‘current plan’ baseline.  Presenting three-alternative sets in this way is believed to 
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improve model robustness (Bennett & Rolfe, 2009) and because people were asked to 
express both their first and second preferences, a complete ranking was established for 
every choice set.   A description of the baseline (shown in Figure 4.1) was given at the 
instructions stage, and a copy was available on each respondent’s desk for them to review if 
necessary.  This choice (“Option C”) was based upon current practices and plans and was 
developed following consultations with East Anglia’s Forestry Commission.   
Whilst answer sheets were paper-based, the instructions and survey were presented 
on computer screens.  A researcher read the tutorial-style instructions aloud to subjects in 
order to overcome any issues of illiteracy or ambiguity.  A laminated copy of the abbreviated 
tutorial displayed in Appendix 4.2 was also made available for a participant to refer to.   
 
Woodland Quality   
 
Exemplified in Figure 4.2, all alternatives held a corresponding woodland quality, 
with scores ranging from 0 to 10.  The integer scale was deemed the simplest way to 
present this grading system.  This was confirmed in our pilot studies, where a range of 
alternative mechanisms were tested and discussed at the focus group stage.  The yellow-
bordering on the images within Figure 4.2 illustrated this scales’ extremes, and related to a 
photograph shown at the start of the tutorial instructions which had depicted the impact of 
deer-proof fencing on woodland vegetation.   
 
 
Figure 4.2: The ‘Woodland Quality’ Attribute 
 
105 
 
 
Respondents were informed that ‘high quality’ woodland related to an ecosystem 
which enjoyed a superior and sustainable health.  Whilst focus groups seemed to grasp the 
grading concept fairly well, the tutorial text was complemented by a reiteration that scores 
further to the left-hand side of the scale represented more greatly degraded forests.  Those 
who participated in the survey were also told that a woodland quality could be achieved 
through either an exclusive or mixed use of policies.  This could involve deer management 
through fencing or culling, or via other methods unrelated to deer population control.  This 
‘vagueness’ held two purposes.  From a respondent perspective, this should prevent over-
speculation regarding how quality changes might occur between cases, and also confirmed 
to them that although a major contributor, deer populations were not the only determinant 
of a woodland’s quality.  For us, this enabled orthogonal choice sets to be achieved with 
both greater ease and credibility. 
 
Deer Populations 
 
 A description of East Anglia’s deer populations were presented in the form shown 
through Figure 4.3.  Regarding ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ deer, each characteristic could exist at 
Low, Medium or High thresholds, and a key gave visual and written representations of these 
levels.  In relation to the latter, it was described how each level resonated with the 
likelihood of seeing a deer, indicating a form of use value.  Respondents were given a brief 
description of the types of destruction that each size of deer might cause, alongside simple 
background information such as species names. 
Deer population changes were relative to Option C and would occur over a two-year 
period.  Instilling that changes were comparable to the constant Option C was important 
given that this was the area of pilot testing where respondents had struggled the most.  In 
this baseline, ‘Large’ deer appeared at a medium population level and ‘Small’ deer at a high 
one.  Whilst this could potentially influence the results we received regarding deer 
valuation, it seemed important to try and accurately convey the nature of the Forestry 
Commission’s intended plan through Option C.  Consultations with the Commission in East 
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Anglia revealed that under the current system, the management’s biggest concern related 
to the spiralling populations of small deer and the associated damage this would bring.  
With their current resources and finding, they felt unable to control these small deer 
populations sufficiently, and thus believed that Option C should try and indicate this to 
respondents by having the population at its highest attribute level.   
 
 
 
  Figure 4.3:  The Deer Populations Attribute 
 
 
 Although many species of deer reside in East Anglia, we defined deer through just 
two ‘types’.  The first reason for this related to simplicity; with no prior information on a 
respondent’s knowledge of deer (i.e. whether species were native, common, destructive 
etc.) a broad categorisation prevented a need to relay such detail, which could have caused 
survey disengagement and/or unnecessary cognitive burden.  Nevertheless, some level of 
species disaggregation was necessary to test the role of nature connectivity.  We told 
respondents that large and small deer were equally destructive, meaning any elevated 
values expressed for small deer could represent warden-type preferences.  Small deer such 
as Roe and Muntjac certainly appear more vulnerable and dependant on human aid than 
the more physically robust large species of Fallow or Red.  These two groups also vary 
behaviourally, with Roe and Muntjac deer typically visiting suburban areas more frequently 
(Austin et al, 2013), affording greater opportunities for repeated interaction.  Of course, a 
respondent could hold species-related historical experiences which interfere with this 
valuation story and, as such, we approach this interpretation cautiously. 
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Deer Population Change 
 The third characteristic the tutorial introduced were deer population reduction 
mechanisms.  Table 4.1 gives an overview of how each method relates to both DDE and 
intentions-based reasoning: 
 
  Trolley/DDE 
Equivalent 
Intentions 
Perception 
1 Licenced Hunter Culling Story 2 (Unethical) Bad Intention 
2 Forestry Commission 
Culling 
Story 2 (Unethical) Good Intention 
3 Fencing Story 1 (Ethical) Good Intention 
 
Table 4.1: How Deer Population Reduction Methods relate to DDE and Intentions 
 
 Licenced hunting most closely resembles the bridge version (Story 2) of the Trolley 
Problem.  By indicating that these hunters undertake culling for leisure, we imply that the 
deer’s death is both a necessary and intended component of their action to shoot.  
Furthermore, the hunters cull for ‘bad’ reasons in that they do not shoot deer for 
environmental sustainability and its affiliated benefits for woodland management.  Instead, 
their motivation is to fulfil their private utility from killing.  It is this second (intentions-
based) component which distinguishes licenced hunters from Forestry Commission culling.  
Because Commission culling still involves the shooting of deer, this form of population 
control would still conform to Story 2 if we were to follow Foot’s description of DDE when 
applied to human harm in a Trolley Problem context.  However, a Forestry Commission 
huntsperson is employed to ensure long-term woodland preservation and society might 
perceive this as a ‘better intended’ and therefore more ethically permissible reason for 
culling to be undertaken.  Prior to implementing the survey, we wanted to ensure that this 
perceived difference between the intentions of hunters and Commission workers was 
believable.  Whilst discussions with members of East Anglia’s Forestry Commission 
suggested this was so, our strongest affirmation of this came through the focus groups, 
where participants regularly expressed a vehement dislike of hunters controlling deer 
populations, whilst seeming far more favourable to the exact type of cull being undertaken 
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from a body like the Commission, whom they felt would be doing so as part of their work 
obligations.  Whilst purely anecdotal, it was pleasing to hear similar verbal comments being 
expressed by respondents through the real choice survey, relating both to a confidence in 
the Forestry Commission’s good intentions and a disdain for the hunters conducting a cull.    
 Fencing coincides with Story 1 of the Trolley Problem because the associated action 
(erecting a fence) is done to ensure long-term woodland sustainability.  A foreseen but 
secondary consequence of this action is that deer starve, yet their death was not a 
necessary condition for the fencing to have achieved its primary aim.  Through DDE 
reasoning, this action would be seen as ethically permissible. 
 
  
                 
   Figure 4.4a: Method with Deer        Figure 4.4b:  Method with Deer  
                                  Populations Falling       Populations Rising 
 
  
Figures 4.4a and 4.4b illustrate how these population changes were portrayed and 
again it was explained that these adjustments were relative to Option C.  In order to show 
that the intended plan did involve a population reduction, some alternatives allowed 
populations to actually rise.  In these cases the wording was altered to that in Figure 4.4b.  
Because the word adjustment was so slight, an identical verbal prompt was issued to every 
respondent by the experimenter when the first case of rising populations appeared in the 
choice task.  Alongside this, each alternative included a box which explicitly indicated 
whether populations were projected to “Rise” or “Fall” (see Appendix 4.1).  This 
combination of prompts seemed sufficient to ensure respondents recognised when each 
scenario was being presented. 
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 A detailed slide within the tutorial explained each method.  Agreement with a 
system of licencing often heavily depends upon public perceptions surrounding the degree 
of hunter regulation (Holzer et al, 2012).  Therefore, it was explicitly stated that hunters 
would be trained to a sufficient standard.  Whilst maintaining ethical impartiality was crucial 
to this experiment, the tutorial had to draw attention to the private enjoyment which 
licenced hunters yielded from culling and to the deer starvation that would occur should an 
intense level of fencing be pursued by the woodland management organisation.  Although 
this may seem emotively influential, a failure to explicitly state these aspects could have 
meant respondents failed to view each scenario within their intended ethical context.  One 
strategy employed to try and dilute these potential biases was to intersperse the statements 
with more factual ones, such as the aforementioned training standards and the cost 
implications to each system.   
  
Meat Sales 
 
  A simple attribute to describe, it was explained that venison meat could be sold from 
deer when they were culled.  The beneficiary from these revenues would be whichever 
party had undertaken the cull.   
 Once again, financial advantages were explicitly relayed to subjects.  Should the 
Forestry Commission be the group receiving these revenues, it was highlighted that this 
could reduce the costs to managing the woodland.  We provided this information in part to 
retain consistency with previous cost-related cues.  However, from an intentions-based 
standpoint, this also sought to test attitudes toward licenced hunters selling venison.  A rise 
in the support for this form of culling could represent an ethical judgement that hunters 
now held an alternative (and more permissible) justification to shoot deer.  Alternatively, 
one could argue that hunters profiteering from their ill-intended deed may actually 
decrease instances of agreement with this method.   
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The Cost Attribute 
 
 Vital to any choice modelling exercise is the construction of a payment vehicle.  One 
of the greatest difficulties is to ensure that this attribute instils both credibility and realism 
in both its magnitudes and format of delivery.  Given that the Forestry Commission is 
funded by the government, the use of taxation was an obvious instrument of cost to use.  In 
the UK there has been a relatively intense and well documented debate on how public 
forestry is financed16 .  Advantageous from our perspective, this has meant that people are 
now better informed on how woodlands are funded and raise their beliefs that their 
responses could be ‘consequentialist’, or truly impact upon public policy.  Put another way, 
if subjects felt that taxation alterations may actually be enforced through ongoing public 
funding pressures, they are more likely to provide honest answers through the greater 
degrees of control and realism they assume regarding this topic (Boyce et al, 1992; Iliev et 
al, 2009, Vossler et al, 2012) as well as improving the degree of attention which they pay to 
attributes (Colombo et al, 2013).  Whilst ethical or cognitive disadvantages can accompany 
the use of taxation in some settings, it was felt that such impacts may be considerably 
lessened given the nature of the topic and associated magnitudes of change involved.  
  Once again, cost changes were expressed relative to Option C.  The tutorial 
described that cost adjustments would involve a flat annual levy placed upon each and 
every resident in East Anglia in an attempt to ensure that all respondents felt changes could 
impact upon them personally.   Effective survey design usually requires “input from policy 
staff” (Hanley et al, 2003, p.125) and in deriving our scales, we undertook consultations with 
East Anglia’s Forestry Commission regarding associated training, staffing and monitoring 
costs to deer culling.  These discussions also proved useful insofar as the Forestry 
Commission confirmed that woodland users understand the substantial element of forest 
management costs which must be dedicated to controlling deer populations.  The 
consequence of this is that we were able to feel more comfortable using this parameter as a 
                                                          
16 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-plans-huge-selloff-of-britains-forests-2115631.html for this article 
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basis for our WTP calculations.  Our taxation changes took four possible tiers, namely to cost 
£5.00 less, yield no change or impose an additional £5.00 or £10.00 payment. 
   
b) The Socio-demographic Survey 
This questionnaire covered a range of topics regarding one’s environmental 
attitudes, associated behaviour and demographic status.  Respondents were informed that 
all questionnaires were anonymous and that disclosed information would be used solely for 
data analyses.  A sample questionnaire is provided in Appendix 4.3. 
 
Attitudinal and Behavioural Questions 
 Six questions within the survey looked to gauge a mix of actions and opinions that 
respondents held regarding forests.  Each were asked their woodland visit frequency 
(question 1) and range of activities they undertook there (question 2).  Questions 4 and 5 
respectively asked if they had contributed to animal welfare and/or environmental charities 
within the last 12 months, or whether they regularly fed birds in their garden.  Whilst 
question 5 was of particular interest given previous work in the field (see Brock, Sugden & 
Perino; 2014), we perceived that those who engaged in bird feeding may place value upon 
local nature connectivity which formed one of the study’s main focuses.  
 Questions 3 and 6 invited more subjective answers from participants.  The former 
asked whether a subject agreed in principle with culling and fencing as schemes for 
population control.  For culling, this was asked in relation to both deer and badgers.  Badger 
culling is a highly topical and contentious UK initiative, and there exists conflicting scientific 
evidence as to whether killing these animals would actually achieve its intended aim of 
preventing the spread of tuberculosis in cattle.  Providing robust and verifiable scientific 
evidence is deemed crucial for topics such as culling (Waber et al, 2013).  Whilst public 
perspectives to deer management can vary considerably, an example being those 
surrounding red deer in Scotland (Nilsen et al; 2007, MacMillan & Leitch; 2008) it still 
seemed reasonable to compare the culling of badgers to that of deer where the reasoning is 
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widely seen as more defensible for the latter.  In all cases, respondents could select a ‘Don’t 
Know’ option, deliberately designed to make no distinction between those possessing a lack 
of knowledge and those who, in view of the current evidence, felt unable to actively express 
an opinion.   Question 6 offered a (1 – 5) Likert Scale which asked for one’s strength of 
agreement with whether they believed (a) effective forest management was important, (b) 
culling deer was preferable to starvation as a means of reducing deer numbers and (c) that 
educating children in environmental studies was important.  We expected a general 
agreement with these statements, but they gave some measure for people’s notions of 
nature connectivity and of sustainably managing resources for future generations.  
 
Socio-demographic Questions 
Forming the final five questions of our survey, these requested standard 
demographic information on one’s gender (question 7), age (question 8) and income 
(question 9).  The two final questions asked whether those surveyed had participated in 
shooting or fishing (question 10) or were vegetarian or vegan (question 11), both of which 
correspond to attributes of the choice task itself. Confirmed by the response distributions 
contained in Appendix 4.4, the small number responding positively to question 10 meant 
only question 11 was fit for analysis.  
 
Conduct and Execution of the Survey           
  All 200 surveys took place through February 2014, with half being conducted at a 
Norwich garden centre and the remainder held at a country park in Thetford Forest, Suffolk.    
Inclusive of the ten to fifteen minute tutorial, the average completion time was between 
twenty and thirty minutes.  In both locations we assume that, on average, a participant 
would hold an accentuated interest in outdoor and/or environmental issues.  Given the 
focus of this paper was to explore the moral preferences surrounding animal harm, it was 
imperative that our sample held an existing interest and level of engagement in this area.  
On this note, we were not concerned that subsequent valuations may not reflect those of 
the general UK population.  It was also judged that the choice experiment itself may be seen 
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as quite tasking to completely uninformed audiences, and so by selecting from this sample 
we felt confident that instances of topic miscomprehension would be lessened.  
Despite this, the two locations were also chosen in order to offer a meaningful 
contrast.  Based near Norwich city centre and therefore away from woodland of any 
substantial magnitude, the former site constitutes one in East Anglia where deer 
populations are typically low.  Conversely, the Thetford site should provide a greater 
fraction of respondents who live within close proximity to dense forest, although it should 
be noted that no question explicitly asked how far a respondent lived from forests.  These 
two samples therefore may hold preference structures which convey different practical 
understandings of woodland management or on average possess disparate use values for 
forestry.  Furthermore, it is quite plausible that because each location holds a different 
focus (i.e. garden centre versus forest park) this could impact upon the stance or approach 
that a respondent possessed at the point at which they completed the survey. These 
elements constitute cultural aspects that can be highly influential in shaping decisions in 
such ethically driven contexts (Machery et al. 2004).  On a practical note, both sites formed 
non-obligatory environments in which to conduct a survey.  This ensured that when 
approached, any potential respondent felt confident to decline to partake in the survey if 
they so wished.  
Surveys were collected through face-to-face interviews. Whilst answer sheets were 
paper-based, the instructions and survey were presented on computer screens.  This format 
enabled participants to engage orally with the researcher over the topic, and provided 
complementary qualitative statements to accompany quantitative data.  This also did not 
restrict our sample only to those confident in the use of information technology.  The 
response rate was very good, averaging 50% and 80% at the Norwich and Thetford sites 
respectively.  Reasons for decline typically consisted of time constraints as opposed to 
subject disengagement or disinclination.  Whilst uptake was roughly consistent across 
genders, 110 (55%) respondents were female.   
The optimal number of cases to present participants with is widely debated and 
different stances exist within the field (Swait & Adamowicz, 1997; Adamowicz et al, 1998; 
Scheufele & Bennett, 2012).  By issuing 16 choices, this study sits at the upper bound of this 
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recommended range.  However, it was felt that the familiarity respondents held with this 
particular topic would prevent a damagingly excessive degree of fatigue or cognitive burden 
occurring.   
  As reward for participation, each respondent was issued with a voucher for a hot 
drink and snack at the respective on-site cafes.  This incentive scheme seemed highly 
suitable for the study.  Firstly, it made no financial promise which could influence participant 
responses through a form of ‘interviewer effect’ (Bowling, 2005).  Secondly, the average 
redemption value came to approximately £4.00, which is judged as adequate compensation 
given the survey duration.  We were pleased with this system of reward and would advocate 
such a monetary-alternative compensation method if both the topic’s nature and survey’s 
duration permits. 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
  Attribute Description 
Quality Level 
With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in 
choosing an option because the woodland score increases by one integer 
value.  
Large Deer 
With all other attributes unchanged, this is the change in the probability that 
a respondent chooses an option because ‘large deer’ are of one frequency 
level higher.   
Small Deer 
With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in 
a respondent choosing an option because ‘small deer’ are of one frequency 
level higher.   
Commission 
Culling 
With all other attributes unchanged, this is the probability change in a 
respondent selecting an option because one percentage point of fencing has 
been replaced with that of Forestry Commission-led culling.   
Licenced 
Hunter 
Culling 
Holding all other attributes constant, this is the probability change in a 
respondent choosing an option because one percentage point of fencing has 
been replaced with that of hunter-led culling.   
Meat Sales 
With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in 
a respondent choosing an option because the meat is now being sold.   
Cost 
With all other attributes remaining constant, this is the probability change in 
a respondent choosing an option because the taxation-based price to deliver 
that management scheme has risen by one penny (£0.01). 
 
Table 4.2:  A Description of the Coefficients 
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With regression coefficients described in Table 4.2, characteristics were presented 
across alternatives in a way which ensured choice-set orthogonality.  The coefficient for 
‘Quality Level’ represents the probability change for increasing one integer score on the 1-
10 scale denoted by Figure 4.2.  The same interpretation can be made for our two size-
differentiated deer variables with respect to changes in population level.  Culling variables 
compare people’s preference for these methods relative to that of fencing, which acts as 
the base case. 
The data is analysed using a conditional logit model17.  Algebraically, this means that 
the utility person 𝑛 derives from alternative 𝑗 is assumed to take the form characterised by 
(4.1). 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗 +  𝜀𝑛𝑗  (4.1) 
Here, 𝑥𝑛𝑗 constitutes the variables which are observed by a participant for any given 
choice option and which are pre-determined by the researcher through the survey’s design. 
𝛽𝑛 then relates this to the person  𝑛’s personal preferences over the attributes at these 
particular levels. These models apply a Gumbel distribution to the random element of 
people’s utility (𝜀𝑛𝑗), which is deemed appropriate when included, as above, as an additive 
element to the utility function (McFadden, 1974; Louviere et al, 2000; Hoyos, 2010).  
Consequently, it is possible to establish the projected probability change for a participant’s 
selection of a given alternative 𝑖 based upon the rule that person 𝑛  will only select option 
𝑖 if that derives them the greatest utility relative to any other option (𝑗) available to them in 
a given and fixed choice set.  A formula to demonstrate this is given by (4.2): 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑛𝑖) =  ∫ (
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛽
′𝑥𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝛽′𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝑗
)  (4.2) 
Attribute coefficients thus represent the respondent’s change in probability for 
choosing an option if, ceteris paribus, there is a unit change in that attribute’s level when 
described as a discrete variable, or through its presence relative to a base case for dummy 
(0-1) coded attributes (Bennett & Blamey, 2001).  The coefficient on price (𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) 
                                                          
17 Our econometric specification does not deviate from that which is used widely in the literature, yet much of 
the notation and descriptions are adapted from Train (2009).   
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represents the marginal utility of income, which for such environmental commodities is 
assumed to remain constant and negative (Hanley et al, 1998a). Presuming that product 
characteristics act as normal goods, determining any attribute’s marginal valuation then 
involves taking a ratio of its coefficient against that of price (Hoyos, 2010).   
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑥 =  
−𝛽𝑥
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
   (4.3) 
 Participants were asked to state both their first and second preferences, essentially 
creating a ranking of the three alternatives for each choice set.  Our regression groups 
responses by choice set whilst clustering these over individuals.  By doing so, this 
specification is able to incorporate the fact that each individual is making multiple choices 
and therefore can identify any participant-specific patterns and error variations which may 
occur with and between respondents in their in decision-making.     
 
4.4:  RESULTS 
Sample Representation 
 Given its taxation-based payment vehicle, the study hoped to predominately survey 
people who were knowledgeable on household budgeting and responsible for their financial 
management.  Table 4.3 decomposes the sample’s age profile and compares this to the 
2011 Census data for Norfolk’s population (www.norfolkinsight.org.uk).  Wilcoxon Mann- 
Whitney U tests confirm no significant differences exist between these (𝑧 = -0.85, 𝑝(𝑧) = 
0.3955).   
 
Age Bracket Sample Population 
(%) 
Norfolk Representation (%) 
18-25 years 23/200 (11.5%) 52/681 (7.6%) 
26-35 years 25/200 (12.5%) 96/681 (14.1%) 
36-45 years 26/200 (13%) 105/681 (15.4%) 
46-55 years 35/200 (17.5%) 118/681 (17.3%) 
56-65 years 44/200 (22%) 114/681 (16.7%) 
Over 65 years 47/200 (23.5%) 196/681 (28.7%) 
 
Table 4.3: Age Profile Comparison 
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 Table 4.4 provides similar summary statistics for income, acknowledging that 15% of 
respondents opted not to provide this information.  The remaining distribution seems to 
adequately represent that of the Norfolk region (𝑧 = 1.295, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.1952).  The slight 
under-representation of lower income households potentially relates to our below-average 
proportion of pension-age respondents.  Anecdotally, this group typically show a reluctance 
to view pensions as ‘income’ which often lead to greater tendencies to select the non-
disclosure option.  
 
Income Bracket Sample 
Population (%) 
Norfolk Representation (%)* 
Under £20,000 54/200 (27%) 39% 
£20,000 - £29,999 37/200 (18.5%) 21% 
£30,000 - £39,999 21/200 (10.5%) 24% 
£40,000 - £49,999 23/200 (11.5%)  
£50,000 - £59,999 10/200 (5%)  
£60,000 - £69,999 9/200 (4.5%)  
£70,000 - £79,999 5/200 (2.5%) 16% 
£80,000 - £89,999 6/200 (3%)  
Above £90,000 5/200 (2.5%)  
Preferred not to 
disclose 
30/200 (15%) N/A 
 
Table 4.4: Income Profile Comparison 
*Data approximations from Norfolk Insight (CACI), 2010  
 
   
Regression Results: Parameter Estimations    
Using our Conditional Logit model, Table 4.5 estimates the results from our complete 
sample of 200 participants.  The dataset benefits from the fact that fully ranked preferences 
were derived for every choice set.  Table 4.6 displays Models (2) and (3), which analyses the 
same explanatory variables from particular subgroups.  The former extracts those from both 
the lowest age bracket and the highest age bracket, each of which can then be contrasted 
against the full sample estimates in Table 4.5.  Model (3) does likewise for income groups.  
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Valuation sensitivity with respect to income can often be a concern with choice experiments 
(Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009) and it should be noted that for our study the lower cost 
parameter for ‘Low Income’ respondents is mildly significant ( 𝜒2 = 3.93, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.0476) 
when compared against the full sample.  The impact of this would of course be slightly 
inflated WTP valuations.  However, in an exercise not displayed here, we substitute the cost 
parameter for the full sample and re-calculate the WTP values for this sub-group.  This 
revealed that elevated values still persisted even with a less responsive cost coefficient.  No 
significant differences exist between the full sample and the ‘High Income’ subgroup ( 𝜒2 = 
0.93, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.336).  Interestingly, adding an interaction term between income and quality 
produces a variable which has no statistical significance.  These regression results can be 
found in Table 1 of Appendix 4.6.  
 Whilst not presented here, many similar analyses were conducted by isolating a 
certain subset of respondents who held particular characteristics.  These are referred to in 
later discussion and Appendix 4.5 contains a matrix displaying these valuations. 
  
   Full Sample  
(n=200) 
Associated Valuation 
 (£) 
 
 Coef. St. Error P>|z| £ 
Quality Level 0.249* 0.016 0.000 3.85 
Large Deer 0.227* 0.036 0.000 3.51 
Small Deer 0.612* 0.057 0.000 9.46 
Commission Culling 0.007* 0.001 0.000 0.12 
Licenced Hunter Culling 0.000 0.001 0.780 0.01 
Meat Sales 0.789* 0.050 0.000 12.19 
Cost -0.065* 0.005 0.000   
Model Fit (𝜒2) 643.80  0.000   
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.1591     
* Significant Coefficient (p<0.05) 
Table 4.5:  Conditional Logit Regression Results from the Choice Experiment 
 
In both Tables 4.4 and 4.5, columns in bold give the average marginal valuation 
associated with each attribute.  Attribute non-attendance or partial attendance can be 
problematic for choice models.  Whilst attribute ranking can be unaffected by this problem 
(Colombo et al, 2013 p.26), systematically ignoring or disregarding characteristics can 
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impact upon WTP magnitudes. Regrettably, we did not test for this by explicitly asking 
respondents whether they had considered all aspects subsequent to their undertaking of 
the choice task.  However, we perceive that most participants would have attended to all 
variables contained on the choice card.  The foundations for this are based upon the pilot 
testing and focus discussions, alongside the verbal reasoning which occurred whilst 
respondents partook in the survey. 
Reiterating the descriptions given in Table 4.1, in most cases this implies the 
willingness to pay for a one-step improvement in a characteristic (for example increasing 
the woodland grade score by one for ‘Quality Level’).  However, for our culling attributes the 
interpretation adjusts slightly, and these values represent the willingness to pay for a one 
percentage point shift away from fencing and instead towards the particular culling type18.  
Before analysing and interpreting these parameters, we conduct a number of 
specification tests, applying these to Model (1) only.  As shown by Table 2 in Appendix 4.6, 
there is significant evidence that respondents are persuaded by the status quo (𝜒2 =
 8.34, 𝑝 = 0.000).  This reinforces some of the anecdotal comments from respondents who 
felt confident in the Forestry Commission’s judgment and so would then opt for the 
‘intended plan’ of Option C.  Table 2 of Appendix 4.6 does confirm that the impact of these 
Status Quo effects apply only to the quality and deer attribute WTP values and regarding the 
former, this disparity disappears if we compensate for cost parameter differences between 
models.  Importantly, this means that tending towards Option C bears no impact upon the 
ranking or magnitudes the sample attribute to the population reduction methods that link 
choice to ethical value.   Regarding the effect for deer valuation, these changes may occur 
through the way Option C was presented, as it displays ‘Small Deer’ numbers at their 
highest frequency level.  This is something which we perhaps should have addressed in the 
survey’s design.  Regardless of this possible explanation, a Status Quo inclination will impact 
upon the emphasis we are able to place upon Nature Connectivity as an explanation for 
wildlife WTP differences. The model does not pass the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) test (𝜒2 =  58.98, 𝑝 = 0.000), yet we add two caveats to this result.  The 
                                                          
18 For example, if ‘Commission Culling’ holds a value of 0.12, this suggests respondents would be willing to pay £0.12 to see 
one percentage point of fencing replaced with culling of this type.  In the cases where deer numbers rise, they would pay 
£0.12 to see one percentage of fencing retracted instead of reducing Commission culling by that proportion. 
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first is that alternatives are unlabelled and so our interpretation of omitting an ‘alternative’ 
does not hold the usual meaning which is applied to the IIA test.  Furthermore, this test is 
widely seen as inappropriate for clustered models like the conditional logit (see McFadden, 
1973, p.243).  This is a further reason why the alternative Latent Class Model was pursued.  
Likelihood ratio tests do confirm the joint significance when multiple attributes are omitted 
from the regression19,  
 
 Youngest (Aged 18-25) 
Respondents  
(n= 23) 
Oldest (Aged 65 +) 
Respondents 
 (n=47)  
Low Income (<£20,000) 
Respondents  
(n= 54) 
High Income (>£40,000) 
Respondents 
 (n=58)  
 Coef. P>|z| £ Coef. P>|z| £ Coef. P>|z| £ Coef. P>|z| £ 
Quality Level 0.365 0.000 5.69* 0.235 0.000 3.82* 0.242 0.000 5.17* 0.257 0.000 3.44* 
Large Deer 0.634 0.000 9.89* 0.203 0.006 3.29^ 0.345 0.000 7.36* 0.237 0.001 3.17* 
Small Deer 0.727 0.001 11.34* 0.437 0.000 7.09* 0.543 0.000 11.61* 0.651 0.000 8.71* 
Commission 
Culling 
0.002 0.375 0.03 0.009 0.000 0.14* 0.006 0.002 0.12* 0.008 0.000 0.11* 
Licenced 
Hunter Culling 
-0.005 0.232 -0.08 0.000 0.937 0.00 -0.003 0.231 -0.07 0.001 0.757 0.01 
Meat Sales 0.579 0.000 9.04* 0.993 0.000 16.10* 1.055 0.000 22.55* 0.729 0.000 9.76* 
Cost -0.064* 0.001  -0.062* 0.000  -0.047* 0.000  -0.075* 0.000  
Model Fit (𝜒2) 89.57 0.000  140.31 0.000  203.55 0.000  171.44 0.000  
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.2045   0.1588     0.1847  0.1640 
    * Significant Coefficient (p<0.05); ^ Significant Coefficient (p<0.10) 
Table 4.6:  
 
Comparison of Results by Age Group  
 (Model 2) 
Comparison of Results by Income Group  
(Model 3) 
 
 
Across all samples, the ‘Quality Level’ characteristic remains positive and significant, 
showing that participants prefer a management policy which, ceteris paribus, raises 
woodland quality.  Reviewing Table 4.6, these quality valuations increase with mild 
significance for both the youngest participants ( 𝜒2 = 3.69, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.0547) and low income 
respondents ( 𝜒2 = 3.93, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.0475).  A range of possible explanations exist for these 
findings.  One is that those on low incomes are more greatly restricted by the set of 
activities which they can engage in.  They may therefore place extra emphasis on public 
forestry being of high quality.   We would imagine that younger respondents, on average, 
could utilise woodlands for a wider variety of physical and aesthetic uses, raising their desire 
                                                          
19 For example, omitting deer (𝜒2(2) =  687.14, 𝑝 = 0.000) or method (𝜒
2
(2) =  84.73, 𝑝 = 0.000) variables 
shows evidence of joint significances.  
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to have a good quality forest within close proximity to them.  From a broader perspective, 
young people also have longer personal time-span in which to interact with the woodland 
resource.  This may lead to them adopting a less myopic stance regarding sustainable forest 
management compared with older users. 
The coefficients on both deer attributes are positive and significant, with absolute 
values again elevated among young20 and low-income21 respondents on large but not small 
deer.  The relative difference between these two size-differentiated variables is important 
given our conjecture that one possible explanation for these valuation differences may 
correspond to nature connectivity and a desire to engage with local wildlife.  As described 
earlier, this would arise because small deer possess greater ‘warden-inducing’ qualities and 
habits compared with larger deer.  Relative to the full sample, the disparity is most 
pronounced for older respondents and those who gave to animal welfare charities and is of 
a lesser prevalence among younger participants and men. 
Our culling attributes reveal an interesting story.  Econometrically, their coefficients 
describe the projected probability change for selecting an option whereby a fencing policy is 
partially replaced by the respective culling alternative.  For example, Table 4.5 suggests that 
on average our sample would pay £0.12 for a one percentage point swing away from 
fencing and towards Forestry Commission culling.  A fairly consistent pattern forms across 
both the main sample and many of our analysed sub-groups.  This suggests a small yet 
significant preference for moving from fencing to Commission-based culling, with no 
statistically significant difference placed upon a similar swing from fencing towards the use 
of licensed hunters.  Exceptions to this rule include those who agreed with badger culling 
and respondents of the lowest age bracket. The former express a positive and significant 
preference for either version of culling relative to fencing, whilst the latter state indifference 
between any policy.  In analyses not given here, we included interactions between deer 
population thresholds and method of population change, testing if participants responded 
to the magnitudes of adjustment over alternatives.  Including these attributes added very 
little explanatory power to our model, and we attribute this to the fact that deer 
populations were described through levels as opposed to numbers.  This creates a hugely 
                                                          
20 Large Deer:  𝜒2 = 8.64, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.003; Small Deer: 𝜒2 = 0.33, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.5644 
21 Large Deer:  𝜒2 = 5.62, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.0178; Small Deer: 𝜒2 = 0.84, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.3602 
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burdensome cognitive challenge for a respondent who wishes to consider how many deer 
might be affected by each method of population change.    
Finally, ‘Meat’ and ‘Cost’ variables hold intuitive signs.  Respondents strongly value 
the efficiency of selling the meat from culled deer.  Later discussed in Section 4.6, this 
relationship is quite complex, and meat valuation appears highly sensitive to who 
participants are informed the beneficiary will be from the venison revenues.  Our negative 
cost parameter stays fairly consistent in magnitude across sub-samples. 
Subsequent to running the basic conditional logit analysis on this data, further 
exploration involved regressing the same data using a latent class model.  This alternative 
model affords researchers greater flexibility by removing the restriction that all respondents 
will place the same value upon the attributes and their levels.  Econometrically, this involves 
adjusting the utility specification from Equation (1.2): 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑛𝑖) =  ∫ (
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛽
′𝑥𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝛽′𝑥𝑛𝑗
𝑗
) 𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽  (1.2a) 
The Latent Class model seeks to group ‘classes’ of respondent who hold collectively 
similar valuations.  A more detailed overview of this econometric test is given by Pacifico 
(2010). 
  
 Conditional Logit 
(Model 1) 
Latent Class Model 
Class 1 
Share: 0.375 
Class 2 
Share: 0.387 
Class 3 
Share: 0.238 
                                                                         Values are expressed in Pounds Sterling (£0.00) 
Quality Level 3.85 5.07 2.56 4.24 
Large Deer 3.51 6.44 -0.96 4.63 
Small Deer 9.46 16.59 6.08 -2.48 
Commission Culling 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.09 
Licenced Hunter Culling 0.01 -0.17 0.11 0.04 
Meat Sales 12.19 8.00 10.24 10.61 
     
Cost Coefficient -0.065 -0.096 -0.127 -0.046 
 
Table 4.7:  A Comparison of WTP Values across Regression Models 
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A three class model seems to perform particular well for this choice data (the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) method was used to identify this) and full regression 
results from this specification can be found in Table 3 of Appendix 4.6.  Again comparisons 
with the original conditional to model only extend to that with Model (1).  Table 4.6 shows 
that WTP differences which occur between the valuations between these models.   As will 
be discussed in the next section, it appears that segregating our sample in this way may lead 
us to disentangle participant ‘types’ and distinguish between ethical or warden-affiliated 
patterns of valuation.    
 
4.5:  MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Decision Making for Deer Population Reduction  
This paper used choice experiments in order to provide evidence that would either 
support or refute the conjectures contained within Rational Choice Theory, behavioural 
economics and philosophical theories such as the Doctrine of Double Effect regarding how 
people make ethically challenging decisions.  Assuming that a deer death is considered 
comparable no matter which method of population control is used, we would assume a 
pure consequentialist to be indifferent to whichever management tool is applied.  Instead, 
their decisions would simply rest upon which scheme derived the woodland quality or deer 
numbers most favourable to them. 
Let us instead imagine that a respondent solely bases their decisions upon the 
principles of DDE.  If we assume, as with Trolley Problems, that one ought to avoid the 
causation of deer death where possible, then these preferences should adhere to the 
following preference structure: 
Culling by Licenced Hunters ~ Culling by the Forestry Commission < Fencing   (1) 
 To briefly recap, ‘Fencing’ constitutes an action which does not require deer death as 
a necessary means to achieve the desired outcome of long-term woodland preservation.  
Instead, their death through starvation is just a foreseen and regrettable side effect.  Thus, 
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this branch of moral philosophy would assume individuals to find this method ethically 
permissible.  This is in contrast to the ‘morally wrong component’ attached to the act of 
culling.  Here, the deer’s death must be incurred in order to achieve the sustainable 
woodland.  To this end, it is irrelevant whether a Commission worker or licenced hunter 
conducts the cull as it is the action (of firing the gun) which is unethical. 
 Let us now consider the preferences of a respondent driven purely by perceived 
intention, which behavioural economics regularly demonstrate play a vital determining role 
in the way people make decisions. For this group, it would be possible to segregate the 
culling methods and issue an adjusted preference profile:   
Culling by Licenced Hunters < Culling by the Forestry Commission ~ Fencing  (2) 
 Participants would now be able to state a clear preference for a Commission 
employee to conduct a cull over a licensed hunter.  Because ‘hired’ by society to maintain 
and preserve public forestry, the former’s intention for pulling the trigger is to enable long-
term woodland sustainability.  Put another way, they are not assumed to derive any private 
pleasure from the culling action itself, but undertake this procedure as a means to achieve 
their target of providing well-managed forests.  Conversely, because licenced hunters pay 
for a permit to hunt deer for pleasure, they cannot be assumed to cull for these same ‘good 
intentions’.  For one making intentions-fuelled choices in this way there would be no 
obvious preference between the culling of deer by a Commission worker and the erecting of 
a fence. In both cases the action is undertaken under the well-intended circumstances of 
sustaining the woodland.   
 In light of these theoretical assertions, we now apply our empirical findings to this 
preference-construction methodology.  As confirmed by of Latent Class Model, it is perfectly 
possible that a range of preference structures can exist among our population regarding 
environmental action and behaviour.  Czajkowski and co-authors show this with regards to 
recycling, which can not only be influenced by financial or cost-based aspects, but also 
through social or psychological aspects such as self-image (Czajkowski et al; 2014).  
Appreciating this heterogeneity is highly necessary given the moral nature of our study yet 
even if we account for the fact that our aggregated sample could consist of a mixture of 
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preference type (1) and type (2) candidates, this elicited profile in (3) - which the 
Conditional Logit model discovers - fails to fully adhere to either aforementioned hierarchy: 
Culling by Licenced Hunters ~ Fencing < Culling by the Forestry Commission   (3)  
 This ranking structure represents the pattern of responses stated from both our full 
sample and the majority of our ‘extracted’ sub-samples.  It suggests that Commission culling 
is preferable to fencing, yet no difference exists between the support for a policy of fencing 
and of licensed hunting.   
 As our theories seem unable to explain the data collected here, we must now 
consider whether there are in fact other factors which, when combined with these 
procedural or intentions-based aspects, can explain preference structure (3).  A major 
difference between the procedural theories we assess here and our study is that examples 
of the former often suggest that an identical form of death occurs from each eventuality.  
Use the example of the Trolley Problem: whoever dies does so through the collision with a 
truck and this type of death is the same regardless of which choice the individual makes.  
This may allow respondents to more easily construct preferences over these situations 
because they are devoid of any empathetic or emotive differences which may arise from 
changes in the way that death occurs. 
It is in this respect that our study potentially produces a complication, and the 
starvation of deer through a policy of fencing may be emotively received very differently to 
that of shooting, as occurs when deer are culled.  Whilst one might argue to the contrary, 
starvation suggests a suffering that is more drawn out and thus less appealing when 
compared to the almost instantaneous death when deer are shot.  This is particularly true 
given the tutorial’s insistence that both sets of hunter would be sufficiently trained.  Such 
insistence would lessen concerns that a deer could be shot inaccurately, consequently 
preventing their immediate death.  In order to impose DDE onto the study in question, the 
instructions explicitly informed subjects that deer would die through starvation as a result of 
widespread fencing, increasing the salience of this factor from what might otherwise have 
been an unconsidered aspect in the minds of our respondents. 
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To try and uncover how an individual constructs moral preferences, Table 4.8 adds 
this extra factor, method of death, to those which currently existed to test our two 
procedural theories. 
 
 Good Action 
(As seen by pure DDE) 
Good Intention 
(as seen by 
behavioural 
economics) 
Good Consequence 
(shown by method of 
deer death) 
Fencing Yes L Yes  M No 0 
Commission 
Culling 
No 0 Yes  M Yes  N 
Hunter Culling No 0 No 0 Yes  N 
 
Table 4.8:  A Matrix to Illustrate how Perceptions appear over Deer Reduction Methods  
 
 Included in Table 4.8, we allow letters L, M and N to represent the ‘positive 
characteristics’ associated with each deer reduction situation for the relevant school of 
thought.  For example, the letter M signifies a numerical ‘score’ which people have for the 
characteristic of an action being well-intended.  In this way, letter L symbolises ‘Goodness of 
Action’, letter M the ‘Goodness of Intention’ and letter N the ‘Goodness of Consequence’. 
 We can normalise those processes devoid of such merits to zero.  By then assuming 
that letters L, M and N hold some positive weight in determining choice, each deer control 
mechanism can be expressed as a vector of moral attributes in the form shown below: 
 
Fencing :    (L, M, 0) 
Commission Culling :   (0, M, N) 
Licenced hunter Culling:  (0, 0, N) 
 
 From these moral attributes, we are able to describe how the utility one derives due 
to these factors exist through a simple characteristics approach in expression (4.4) below 
(Lancaster; 1966).   
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑣𝐿𝐿 + 𝑣𝑀𝑀 +  𝑣𝑁𝑁     (4.4) 
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The subscripted ‘v’ symbols represent the relative values people place upon each of 
the moral attributes. We can now explore the preference structure (3) elicited from our 
sample using this notation: 
Culling by Licenced Hunters ~ Fencing < Culling by the Forestry Commission   (3)  
 Our first insight confirms that no one policy dominates another with respect to its 
moral attributes.  Despite this, we are able to make some inferences regarding the weight 
which our sample attach to these.   For example, the preference for Commission culling over 
licensed hunting implies 𝑣𝑀 > 0.  Thus, the role of intentions is important in determining 
choice, and a woodland manager’s more genuine mandate for culling makes it more morally 
just for them to shoot deer.  As assumed in other studies, intentions must be considered ‘in 
conjunction with other factors’ (Greene et al, 2009 p.369) and a second thing we can 
decipher is that 𝑣𝑁 > 𝑣𝐿.  This is because Commission culling is stated as preferable to 
fencing and M (the importance of intention) is common to both methods.  This implies that, 
on aggregate, our sample attach a greater value to how deer are killed, and find starvation 
distasteful, than whether a method adheres to the ethical permissibility advocated by DDE 
reasoning.  
This style of analysis can be insightful for a number of reasons.  It illustrates very 
clearly why context-specific details matter for ethically contentious topics.  People often 
have emotively-charged reasons which dissuade them from selecting certain policies and 
whilst this study has found evidence to support intentions-based reasoning, subtle factors 
such as method of death can also determine choice.  This echoes the scepticism which 
surrounds ‘pure economic’ theories which believe that the rational agent should not look 
beyond the basic outcomes which accrue from any given option.  Thus, great caution must 
exist regarding the ability to transfer ethical reasoning from one case to another, or in the 
delegation of such decision-making to an expert analyst (Liao et al, 2012). 
 Specific to this research topic, these findings give additional evidence of how our 
relationships with wildlife may hold weight in determining human utility.  Valuation profile 
(3) suggests that people carrarte about how an animals’ death occurs and the type of 
suffering the creature may endure.  This could naturally extend to the human interactions 
with agriculture, including our views regarding free-range meat and dairy products (Croney 
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& Millman, 2007), organic livestock farming (Alrøe et al, 2001) or sustainably sourced fish 
(Needham & Lehman, 1991; Verbeke et al, 2007).  This alludes again to the role which 
‘nature connectivity’ might perform and its potency for influencing optimal collective choice 
policy.  
 
Deer Valuation and Nature Connectivity  
 Aside from its influence in shaping our moral preferences over deer death, the role 
of ‘nature connectivity’ is cautiously assumed as the source of valuation disparities between 
Large and Small deer, with the latter enjoying more favourable appearances and habits to 
instil a ‘warden-style’ satisfaction. These valuation differences exist among of general 
Conditional Logit model, but also appear to persist for both Class 1 and Class 2 members 
(who between them account for around 75% of our sample) when preference heterogeneity 
is considered within the Latent Class Model (as illustrated through Table 4.7).   
 When considering absolute deer species valuations, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
these are greatest for groups such as vegetarians and animal welfare charity donors.  In 
contrast, men and those who agreed with badger culling express some of the lowest 
absolute values for deer. 
 We extend our analyses by combining absolute and relative values in order to 
speculatively review the possible role of nature connectivity.  Let us exemplify this by 
contrasting the deer valuations of animal welfare donors against those who feed birds 
regularly.  It seems reasonable to assume that an average member from either group would 
hold a stronger connection to nature when compared against the population as a whole.  
Appendix 4.5 confirms that both sub-samples hold an elevated worth for small deer over 
larger ones.  However, whilst absolute deer values expressed by ‘bird-feeders’ adhere quite 
closely to those of the full sample, the values elicited from animal charity donors rise by 28% 
and 43% for large and small deer respectively.  Such increments are even more pronounced 
for vegetarians.  One way to interpret this would consider the ‘environmental mind-set’ of 
each group.  Whilst attaching a ‘warden-style’ worth for deer, those who feed birds may 
acknowledge the potentially detrimental impact that artificially high deer numbers can have 
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for long-term woodland biodiversity.  If this is so, the average bird feeding individual would 
then prioritise wider environmental processes when forming their valuation.  This more 
pragmatic stance to culling (Scholtz, 2005) would explain the alignment of absolute deer 
values with those of the full sample.  By contrast, your average vegetarian or donor to an 
animal charity could be assumed to prioritise the welfare of an individual beast over that for 
the collective ecosystem, creating warden-style inflationary values upon the deer attributes. 
 This reasoning could be extended to other sub-group valuations, potentially 
resonating with slightly deflated deer values from arguably more informed woodland users, 
including those who visit more frequently or live in closer proximity to forestry. 
 Age is the final parameter which we explore regarding the deer valuation and nature 
connectivity relationship.  The disparities between our two sized deer attributes appear to 
diminish as the age of a respondent falls, and our youngest band of participants (aged 
between 18 and 25) do not seem to differentiate between the two.  To confirm this, we 
introduce an interaction term between age and each deer variable.  With full regression 
results contained within Table 4 of Appendix 4.6, the impact of adding these interactions, 
named “largeage” and “smallage”, is given in Table 4.9:  
 
 
  Model 1 Model 4 
Absolute Value Absolute 
Value  
Average change as Age Group rises 
by 1  
Large 
Deer 
£3.51* £8.70* -£1.30* 
Small 
Deer 
£9.46* £7.58* +£0.46 
* Significant Coefficient (p<0.05) 
Table 4.9: The Impact of Age in Determining Deer Values 
 
 The impact of these interaction terms are that as somebody ages they will reduce 
their value for large deer whilst retaining a high worth upon smaller ones.   
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This finding implies that ‘nature connectivity’ may be driven by age, with the oldest 
members of society gleaning most value from local engagement with nature.  This assertion 
corresponds to those made within the existing literature who suggest that older people can 
derive particular utility by engaging in activities such as keeping pets (Johnson, 2011), bird-
feeding (Brock, Perino & Sugden, 2014) or gardening (Rappe, 2005), and that they may hold 
particularly strong moral attitudes to harm (Gold et al, 2014).  Assessing this through the 
rationale of SWB, older members of society are on average endowed with fewer channels 
from which to obtain warden-style interconnectivity.  One example of a removed avenue is 
that their children have grown up and so are no longer dependent upon their parents.  
Many older people also do not work and thus have no employment-related responsibilities.  
Finally, those in the higher age brackets may suffer from a decrease in their mobility.  This 
limits the range of actions they can undertake to otherwise engage and interact with the 
wider community.   
An alternative yet equally relevant theory is that older people have the greatest 
amount of leisure time in which to engage with their local environment, and subsequently 
appreciate more fully the wildlife which resides close to them.  This combination of factors 
builds a strong case to suggest the importance of local wildlife as a tool for improving the 
wellbeing of otherwise isolated and vulnerable groups in society and surely testing the 
scope and robustness of this conjecture in future research could prove highly informative to 
a range of agents. 
 
4.6: FURTHER FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section delves deeper into some of the other results of our study, and issues 
some conjectures regarding what drives our preferences for environmental engagement 
and economic efficiency. 
Exploration of the Latent Classes 
 Here, we investigate how our three latent classes from our sample may resonate 
with the ethical stances and environmental preferences which have so far been discussed.  
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The corresponding valuations of the Latent Class Model were presented in Table 4.7, which 
is copied below here for reader reference: 
 Conditional Logit 
(Model 1) 
Latent Class Model 
Class 1 
Share: 0.375 
Class 2 
Share: 0.387 
Class 3 
Share: 0.238 
                                                                         Values are expressed in Pounds Sterling (£0.00) 
Quality Level 3.85 5.07 2.56 4.24 
Large Deer 3.51 6.44 -0.96 4.63 
Small Deer 9.46 16.59 6.08 -2.48 
Commission Culling 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.09 
Licenced Hunter Culling 0.01 -0.17 0.11 0.04 
Meat Sales 12.19 8.00 10.24 10.61 
     
Cost Coefficient -0.065 -0.096 -0.127 -0.046 
 
Table 4.7:  A Comparison of WTP Values across Regression Models 
Let us firstly consider those members which fall into ‘Class 1’.  These form just under 
40% of participants, who collectively have a more elastic ( 𝜒2 = 35.95, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000) cost 
sensitivity than the pooled sample of our conditional logit model.  This sensitivity is even 
greater among those of ‘Class 2’22, who represent a similar proportion of respondents.  The 
remaining subjects, here defined as ‘Class 3’, are less price elastic than the main sample ( 𝜒2 
= 12.84, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000) yet form just under one quarter of those surveyed. 
Assessing the preference rankings of these three groups with respect to deer 
reduction method, we see that Class 1 respondents display a hierarchy which, of the three, 
concentrate most heavily upon intentions: 
Culling by Licenced Hunters < Fencing < Culling by the Forestry Commission   (4.1)  
The suggestion here is that they are dissuaded from the ill-intentions of the licenced 
hunter, who as you will recall can least justify their actions through the pretence of ensuring 
environmental sustainability.  However, there is not a complete agreement from this class 
with DDE because they do not exhibit a clear preference for fencing, where starvation is a 
side effect, over direct Forestry Commission Culling.  Nevertheless, this group would 
                                                          
22  𝜒2 = 142.42, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000) 
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seemingly be those who place the greatest emphasis upon ‘Good Intention’ as described by 
Table 4.8. 
By contrast, Classes 2 and 3 members hold this hierarchy of methodological 
preference: 
      Fencing < Culling by Licenced Hunters < Culling by the Forestry Commission          (4.2) 
 This pattern of responses would infer a greater value is placed on ‘Goodness of 
Consequence’ as we label it in Table 4.8, and means that potentially 60% of respondents 
attach a greater weight to death being instantaneous and are less preoccupied by ‘pure’ 
procedural intention as is described by behavioural economics or DDE. 
 We can apply this same type of analyses to whether classes of respondents display 
‘warden-style’ preferences by considering their associated deer valuations.  Assuming 
increments in ‘Small Deer’ values are attributable to Nature Connectivity, we would assess 
that around 75% of our sample (Class 1 and Class 2 members) adhere to this notion.  The 
remainder of the sample, who place low or even negative value upon deer species, would 
be seen as less driven by this reasoning.  Instead, their priorities may lie with either ensuring 
environmental sustainability or economic efficiency, given the retained valuation this class 
still place upon quality woodland and meat sales respectively.  
 Combining these two aspects could lead us to describe Class 1 members as 
‘sensitive’ respondents.  This is because this group are highly influenced by intention and 
caring for the wildlife they perceive as most vulnerable.  By contrast, Class 3 subjects could 
be described as ‘practical’, showing preferences for efficient and sustainable deer reduction.  
Class 2 participants deliver a ‘mixed’ response, falling somewhere in between these two 
labels. 
 A reinforcing test we conduct here uses some of our behavioural or demographic 
sample characteristics to assess what types of factor may determine class membership and 
whether these adhere to the assumptions made above.  With regression results given in 
Table 3 of Appendix 4.6, this analysis shows that those who agreed to a principle of badger 
culling are 68.1% less likely to be a Class 1 ( ‘sensitive’) member than a Class 3 (‘practical’) 
one.  By contrast, respondents who gave to animal welfare charities are 84.9% more likely 
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to appear in Class 1 than Class 3.  Both findings seem intuitive, and this type of analysis gives 
us a further reason to suspect that whilst preference heterogeneity is likely to exist for 
contentious issues such as culling, there may be systematic indicators which allow us to 
estimate how likely particular groups of people are to support one way or thinking (or 
associated policy directive) over another.      
 Of course, the analyses we do here are purely conjectures, and this conclusion forms 
just one story that could be told from our results.  This is not least because our values are 
subject to scrutiny given both our design concerns with respect to Status Quo Effects and 
our tenuous association between elevated values for small deer and warden-style 
preferences.  However, these subjective thoughts still serve an important purpose, and we 
hope they can act as first steps for the field of environmental economics.  If nothing else, 
they should stimulate thoughts on our need to address preference elicitation for ethical 
topics and how to account for the heterogeneity which will doubtlessly exist in this area.  
Furthermore, identifying the dynamics of both different classes and their relative 
memberships could profound implications for how to implement policy.    
General Behavioural and Attitudinal Data 
Regarding our behavioural data, 39% and 42.5% of those questioned had donated to 
an environmental or animal welfare charity within the last 12 months respectively.  No 
restrictions were imposed upon an interpretation of ‘donating’, meaning that this could be 
understood as direct payment, environmental membership or engagement in conservation 
work.  In contemplation of this broad definition, these ratios appear to reasonably reflect 
the proportion of people who contribute to this type of cause within the UK 
(www.coreofline.org; www.gov.uk).  63.5% said that they regularly fed birds, and this level is 
not exceptionally disparate from factual statistics for rates of bird-feeding and related 
activities in the UK (Saggese et al, 2011; Fuller et al, 2008),.  It is encouraging that this level 
corresponds well to that of our previous study, which surveyed a similar demographic 
(Brock, Perino & Sugden, 2014).     
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 Fencing to 
Control Deer 
(%) 
Culling to 
Control Deer 
(%) 
Culling to 
Control Badgers 
(%) 
Yes 
(Agreed it was legitimate) 
62 76.5 26 
No 
(Disagreed it was legitimate) 
25.5 
 
12 41 
Don’t Know 
(was unsure or not sufficiently 
informed) 
 
12.5 
 
11.5 
 
33 
    
 
Table 4.10:  An Overview of the Animal Population Control Question 
  
Regarding woodland management attitudes, Table 4.10 summarises the sample’s 
levels of agreement with various animal population control policies.  We exercise caution 
when assessing these distributions.  This is because the question had been posed after the 
choice exercise, where we had explicitly informed respondents that fencing woodlands 
caused deer starvation.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that nearly two thirds agree 
with a principle of fencing and over three quarters do so regarding deer culling.  Such rates 
could reflect an above-average level of environmental understanding from our sample, 
especially given their self-selected participation in a woodland management survey.  Yet, 
this may instead reveal a general realisation that deer populations must be reduced in order 
to sustainably safeguard forestry. 
This conjecture could also explain the difference between the “don’t know” 
responses for deer and badger questions.  The latter, being more contentious and less 
scientifically-proven, may mean a higher proportion of respondents felt a disinclination to 
state a definite viewpoint.  Conversely, the greater familiarity our sample may have with 
deer and woodland processes may endow them with an increased confidence to issue an 
opinion in both cases.  On a broader note, these notions echo other research within the field 
which highlight that it is essential for policymakers and environmental managers to issue 
credible, factual information regarding animal population control if they are to receive a 
strong and unified backing to their proposal (Glaeser, 2014; Melstrom & Horan, 2014; Van 
der Made, 2014).  This can also reduce attitudinal heterogeneity (Clucas et al, 2014) and 
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scope effects (Czajkowski & Hanley, 2009), potentially dampening behavioural and statistical 
inefficiencies from participant responses. 
Regarding frequency and type of use, 54% of respondents accessed forestry at least 
once per month, with only seven participants never visiting woodlands.  The most popular 
use was walking (75%), with lower rates for nature watching (42%) and cycling or sport 
(26%).  Stated “Other” uses included general recreation, spending time with family and 
photography.  The frequency distributions differ significantly between the two sites ( 𝑧 = 
21.497, 𝑝(𝑧) = 0.000), with respondents at the Thetford site accessing forests on a much 
more regular (weekly or even daily) basis. Data collected on forest usage potentially provide 
a direct linkage to aspects of nature connectivity, with certain users holding particular 
preferences regarding both deer populations and associated reduction methods.  Take the 
example of cyclists.  For these users, high populations of large deer are concerning as this 
increases the risk of personal injury through collision, yet this group voiced concerns over 
the widespread use of fencing given that it provides a physical barrier to their own 
recreational usage. 
 
Meat sales and the Role of Economic Efficiency 
 Our penultimate discussion area investigates the perspectives of participants to the 
sale of culled deer meat.  The ‘Meat’ variable is consistently positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that whilst deer reduction methods may be contentious, people 
possess a desire to see a productive utilisation of any resulting carcasses.  The magnitude of 
importance our sample attached to this variable certainly exceeded our expectations, with 
many respondents verbally expressing their dislike for alternatives which indicated a failure 
to sell meat.  To this end, exploring this attribute further seemed sensible.   
Considering our sample’s apparent concerns over intention, Table 4.11 tests whether any 
attitudinal differences existed when the Commission sold venison as opposed to when the 
beneficiary was a licenced hunter.  To do this, we include interaction terms between the 
‘Meat’ attribute and each of the culling methods.   Full regression results appear in Table 5 
of Appendix 4.6, with the salient elements given in Table 4.11.     
   
136 
 
  Model 1 Model 5 
Change in Value for 1% rise in Commission Culling (at the 
expense of  fencing) 
£0.12* £0.00 
Change in Value for 1% rise in Licenced Hunter Culling (at 
the expense of fencing) 
£0.01 £0.04 
Change in Value for:  A switch in meat not being sold to  
                                       meat being sold 
£12.19* £-0.10 
         Additional meat Value for an extra 1%    
       rise in Commission Culling (relative to  
       extra fencing) 
-- £0.26* 
        Additional meat Value for an extra 1%  
       rise in Licenced Hunter Culling (relative  
       to extra fencing) 
-- -£0.01 
* Significant Coefficient (p<0.05) 
Table 4.11:  The Impact of Who Sells the Meat 
 
  Adding these interactions may lead us to further contemplate the way in which we 
interpret our sample’s responses. The results of Table 4.11 indicate that in cases where the 
meat from additionally culled deer will not be sold, individuals hold no clear preference for 
any of our three population reduction methods.  This is shown by neither absolute culling 
coefficient holding statistical significance in Model 5.  However, if additional deer death is to 
occur and the meat from those culled is to be sold, our participants revert to the method-
based priorities given by profile (3).  This involves a preference for Commission culling over 
both fencing and Licenced hunting, between which they remain indifferent. 
These findings indicate that the ethical perspectives of our respondents are 
instrumented through the sale of meat.  In a scenario where meat is sold, the preference for 
Commission culling over fencing shows a wish for economic efficiency and a willingness to 
see deer shot and healthy carcasses be sold as opposed to deer starving and this potential 
human food source going to waste.   Yet this desire for economic efficiency is conditional on 
the notion that culling is undertaken by the party which does so for well-intended reasons.  
One assertion is that people are happy for the Commission to gain revenues from selling 
venison given that these huntsmen cull under the premise of sustainability and through 
their mandate to act as an ‘environmental warden’.  Another interpretation might conclude 
that the Commission huntsman does not personally profit from the meat revenues, which 
instead help to reduce the Forestry Commission’s financial reliance upon the government.  
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Hence, it may be perceived that the benefits which accrue from these meat sales are 
publically distributed instead of being privately enjoyed by an ill-intending Licenced hunter.  
The main focus of this study had been to explore our moral perspectives regarding 
deer reduction, and these findings may possibly dilute the ethical conjectures that are 
presented in this paper.  Indeed, the impacts that our meat interactions create for our 
findings may signal that what we infer as procedurally-based preferences by our sample 
actually represent another element of forest management, for example the economic 
production and efficiency opportunities which it can yield.  However, we approach these 
analyses with caution. The meat variable had been included only as a peripheral attribute, 
and had not been envisaged to have the impetus that it seemingly does for our sample.  
Given this underestimation, we are wary that it may not have been given adequate 
attention in either the choice set design or within the instructions of the tutorial.   For 
example, this may mean that respondents fail to fully comprehend that venison revenues 
are already accounted for in the stated taxation threshold, and so do not constitute an 
additional ‘bonus rebate’ through these Commission revenues.  Overall, such interactions 
and their possible impact illustrate once again the complexity which surround our choice 
construction for ethically sensitive subjects.  This can only serve as an indication that future 
work is essential if we are to fully comprehend the intricacies involved in this type of 
research.    
  
Income Effects and Public Forests as Inferior Goods 
 The final aspect judged here is how our sample’s woodland values adjust with 
income. This information is contained in Table 4.6 and suggests that, on average, the value 
people place upon forest management may fall as they become wealthier.  Whilst this 
appears surprising at first, considering public forestry as an inferior good seems highly 
plausible.  Whilst travel costs may constitute a major determining factor in dictating 
people’s choice of using forestry (Willis & Garrod, 1991; Boxall & MacNab, 2000), these 
amenities might be considered an reasonably ‘open-access’ public goods relative to other 
recreational alternatives.  Therefore those on low incomes, who are relatively restricted in 
their range of substitutable activities, should prove the most intense users of this resource.  
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At the other extreme, wealthy people have a much broader spectrum of alternative 
activities which they may otherwise choose to partake in.  This could involve national or 
international travel, attending sporting and entertainment events or visiting more 
‘prestigious’ tourist attractions.  Their affluence also raises their scope to gain a utility from 
engaging with the natural world via other sources, including national parks, international 
wild-scape, entry to zoos and safari parks or even owning a personal woodland estate! 
  From this one study we of course do not seek to conclude that public forests 
unequivocally inferior goods, unvalued by the wealthiest in society.  Indeed, the field offers 
a mixed picture regarding the correlation between income, development and public natural 
asset value.  Whilst overall it is perceived that greater worth is ascribed to protecting 
biodiversity and conservation as a country improves in its economic development (see 
Jacobsen & Hanley (2009) for a meta—analysis of this), questions still exist over how income 
distribution and variations in the type of amenity and its level of use value impact upon this 
relationship.  This is particularly true if we consider notions such as ‘Nature Connectivity’ to 
exist, because the target population for value elicitation (i.e. local communities) may be very 
different from those within the type of biodiversity valuation studies contained in the meta-
analyses mentioned above.  Our latent class analyses have exemplified just how diverse 
such valuation patterns may be in such areas.   
If public woodlands are indeed inferior goods, this could majorly influence how they 
are funded.  Many public amenities rely upon contributions from wealthy benefactors to 
finance their upkeep, and this has been a lifeline for many art galleries, charities and 
museums.  If rich and influential members of society place a relatively low value upon public 
forestry, the ability to either raise additional revenues or to defend the scale of existing 
ones could be severely jeopardised.  This study provides only a first insight into this notion, 
and complementary studies would be needed to reinforce this idea.  However, it is vital that 
this type of question is addressed if financial securities are to exist for the maintenance of or 
improvement to our local natural environment.  
 More generally, our findings above have illustrated how expressing people’s 
environmental preferences in the form of economic values can invite valuable discussion.  
This in turn means “the costs and benefits of different policy designs can be compared” 
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(Hanley et al, 2003 p.123).  Not only can a choice experiment like ours try to make some 
preliminary conjectures on people’s attitudes to animal harm and towards their interaction 
with local wildlife, but also invites a wider discussion regarding forest management, utilising 
natural resources in an economically efficient way and the financing of public amenities.       
 
4.7: CONCLUSION 
Whilst behavioural economists have comprehensively illustrated that choice theories 
based purely on outcomes fail to replicate empirical decision making, scepticism also exists 
around the ability of these or traditional philosophical theory to meet these needs when a 
topic involves moral or ‘sacred’ values.  We use discrete choice experiments to test the 
impacts of procedure, intention and justification upon the preferences people hold over the 
ethically sensitive subject of deer culling.    
Overall, the results of this study have confirmed many a priori beliefs held within 
what exists of the affiliated literature.  At the same time, they have introduced some fresh 
ideas and injected some new thoughts into this area.  The preferences of our sample 
regarding the ‘just’ method of deer population control fails to fully adhere to those 
predictions given by any one traditional theory.  Our moral code is neither rigid nor 
universally transferable (Machery et al, 2004; Greene et al, 2009; Iliev et al 2009), yet there 
are many instances, as with ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect’, where tested theories exist on 
our ethical beliefs even if these are built upon a ‘complex set of rules, concepts and 
principles’ (Gold et al, 2013 p.215).  However, this complexity should not inhibit the use of 
techniques such as choice experiments to try and elicit further information regarding our 
ethics.  As with this study, they can afford researchers the chance to test bold conjectures, 
using theories such as DDE to test the extent to which we can transfer our well-established 
moral perspectives on human harm to harm towards other animals via ethically charged 
real-world events such as deer culling.  We would argue that in fact choice experiments 
present a nice compromise and, echoing the findings of other studies, feel they can be used 
alongside traditional methods in driving policy initiatives (Hanley et al, 2003; Jacobsen & 
Hanley, 2009).  They offer a given participant the chance to construct a unique moral 
statement through the multiple cases presented to them.  Yet through choice aggregation 
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and analysis, researchers can explore preference trends across a sample, and supply these 
to policy-affiliated discussion. 
Rational choice theorists, behavioural economists and moral philosophers do 
concentrate upon consequences, intentions and actions to varying degrees, yet this work 
suggests a more subtle blend of these characteristics is required if empirical choices are to 
be most accurately replicated.  We echo the recommendations of other studies in ethically 
sensitive areas, suggesting a need to apply mixed methodology approaches given the futility 
of using outcomes-based, materialist or attitudinal analyses in isolation (Azjen, 1991; Falk et 
al, 2003).  Relative to culling, researchers should consider the type of harm incurred by a 
victim from a given policy.  For the wildlife of this study, these preferences may be highly 
influenced by our degree of ‘nature connectivity’ and the obligation we feel as a warden to 
protect and minimise the suffering of creatures in our local area.  
 Nature connectivity and our desire to act as a protector may also explain why lower 
values are held for large, remote or robust species against those which are smaller or more 
‘locally engaging’.  These disparities are seemingly correlated to one’s age, with older 
respondents possessing valuation structures more akin to that of a local environmental 
guardian.  Other studies have made similar conclusions when analysing our attitude to 
culling, stating that humans could be ‘likened to trustees responsible for protecting … 
resources’ (Scholtz, 2005 p.24).  Nature connectivity might prove problematic if a woodland 
manager finds opposition to culling from the public, who also perceive themselves as a form 
of ‘trustee’.  This group prioritise the welfare of individual creatures at the expense of the 
detrimental impacts deer cause for long-term sustainability.  Another consequence of this 
work for policy is that stakeholders should issue “sound scientific evidence” (Lundhede et al, 
2014, p.7) in an attempt to minimise the objections which arise through public 
misconception as opposed to well-informed ethical stance.  The study also analyses the 
roles of income and efficiency, seeking to identify how and to what extent woodland 
habitats can be managed in a socially and economically viable way. 
 “Social Scientists need a number of tools in their behavioral toolbox to appeal to a 
variety of motivations” (Delmas & Lessem, 2014 p.366) and this work suggests the benefits 
which can accrue by combining economic and philosophic thought to morally-sensitive 
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subjects.  Through inter-disciplinary collaboration, it tries to synergise the strengths of each 
field in order to answer these questions, which for areas like environmental morality can be 
incredibly complex and intricate (Croson & Treich, 2014).  This work provides only 
preliminary conjectures regarding how humans approach environmentally sensitive issues 
and how these correspond to our economic and ethical stance.  Similar future research 
would be valuable, not only to corroborate or dismiss the claims made here, but to more 
widely question the transferability of morality between environmental topics.  If verified, 
our results suggest that the existence of emotional and ethical attachments to nature and 
the environment must be acknowledged and incorporated into the associated academic 
field.  If a more sound grasp can be gauged in such areas, collective decision-making will 
become more efficient, productive and welfare maximising, creating wider social and 
economic benefit.  
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SECTION 5 
CONCLUSION 
  
Over the course of this thesis, a recurring and persistent theme has emerged where 
people express positive valuations for local or common wildlife.  Humans partake in a wide 
variety of environmental actions within close proximity to their home, and by doing so 
display a preference to connect with the natural world around them.  Examples include 
decisions to undertake wildlife gardening, to access public parks or other green spaces and 
to volunteer within local conservation initiatives.   Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
mankind places a positive worth upon the creatures which coexist alongside them.  
This work endeavoured to shed light on why such values persist, and the reasons 
that people invest their time, effort and/or money to engage in such practices.  Overall, it 
has characterised the role that individuals take on in relation to local wildlife as that of a 
‘warden’.  We apply this analogy because it aptly describes how an individual would fuse 
together a role of protection and responsibility with an action that is both repetitive and 
conducted in a routine fashion. Due to the fact that they reside on our doorsteps, this 
mixture of elements can be more readily attached to our interaction with creatures we are 
able to experience every day.  Such engagement also remains consistent with the types of 
activity which are promoted in order to achieve lasting levels of life satisfaction.  These 
include the time we spend with family, friends and community groups.  Finally, it appears 
that such ‘nature connectivity’ attends to a very different element of our well-being than 
that of classic conservation or existence values, meaning this worth potentially offers a very 
new channel of exploration for environmental economists. 
The first chapter of this thesis gave a good example of where a guardian mentality 
could present itself within an environmental setting.  By conducting choice experiments that 
explored people’s hypothetical preferences over seed purchases, it elicited the value held 
for garden birds.  The results of this work showed that whilst an aesthetically pleasing 
appearance is highly sought, people seemingly yielded the greatest worth from those 
species which not only came to one’s garden and fed with regularity, but that also instilled a 
sense of dependency which allowed the human feeder to feel like a carer or protector.  If 
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such conjectures are to be believed, this would have key policy relevance for a range of 
environmental economic settings.  These include how we decide to approach urban 
planning, how to provide private and public urban green-space and a possible re-
consideration of how we prioritise conservation expenditure.  
The realisation that there existed an interaction between private and social benefits 
to bird-feeding motivated the second thesis chapter.  Here a model was constructed 
whereby competing neighbours decided how much seed to dispense in an attempt to 
attract birds to their private gardens.  The equilibrium results implied that behavioural 
influences such as competitive drive could potentially act as a tool for offsetting classic free-
rider problems for (impure) public goods.  How closely this offsetting enabled us to 
converge to a first-best solution was largely driven by the returns to scale of seed allocation 
in its ability to increase bird numbers within the local vicinity.  A key feature of this work was 
that it provided a neat example of where attending to people’s behavioural motivations 
could enable the procurement of environmental assets to their socially optimal thresholds. 
In terms of its practical application, decision-making authorities may be able to use quick, 
easy and/or cost-effective ways to adjust our perceptions or actions toward natural capital 
that simultaneously raise social and private well-being. 
The third and final paper returned to choice modelling, this time testing whether 
respondent decision-making corresponded more towards procedural or consequentialist 
mind-sets if applied to ethically-contentious environmental issues such as deer culling.  
Perhaps more aligned to a protector than had been envisaged, people’s choices are 
seemingly driven not only by human intention but also by the type of harm local wildlife 
may suffer.  The care which people express for these animals echoed the findings of the first 
paper and appear consistent with a ‘warden style’ mentality.  Interestingly, such welfare 
concerns seem quite disparate from those which humans attribute to creatures which are 
killed for food or because they are considered pests.  In these latter cases, we seem to hold 
on average a much less stringent moral position.  This perhaps reiterates our notion that 
local wildlife may constitute a distinct and unique set of creatures regarding the way in 
which we obtain utility from nature.  Such ethics deliver serious food for thought, as they 
illustrate the incapability of many standard economic or environmental theories to fully 
capture the true preferences of the public for such emotive subjects.  Regarding the 
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empirical repercussions of this work, the attitudes explored in the third paper suggest that 
policy-makers may wish to expend time and effort explaining to people the necessity to 
conduct particular population or habitat alteration regimes.  This could mean they are able 
to overcome a resistance to their action which the public have formed due to them holding 
an otherwise unsustainable attitude over animal welfare.   
This thesis could also hold more general implications regarding the way in which 
decision-makers utilise man’s desire to interact with the environment.  One such impact 
concerns social infrastructure, and the presence of these local ‘amenities’ could provide an 
excellent avenue through which to reconnect vulnerable or isolated members of the 
community with the area in which they live.  Another relevant opportunity involves taking 
advantage of people’s behavioural motives in areas such as preoccupation with relativities 
or competitive drive to deliver environmental assets at their socially desirable levels.  This 
could be extended beyond the investigations of Section 3, and are transferable to areas 
such as improving energy and water conservation, inviting greater instances of recycling or 
simply raising the frequency with which people exhibit green behaviour.  These studies have 
also provided significant evidence to illustrate how our attitude to and interaction with ‘the 
environment’ is complex and multi-dimensional.  Given this, a policy-maker must exercise 
extreme caution when applying a ‘one size fits all’ approach and assuming the one set of 
proposals will automatically transfer to other sites or topics which involve the natural world.   
Whilst this work provides some first insights regarding how notions such as nature 
connectivity and the role to act as a warden could exist, it also raises two notes of concern 
when finding ways to uncover their scale and magnitude.  The first relates to the mechanism 
by which value is derived.  In each choice experiment, a clear and well-understood set of 
payment methods were used to elicit the values people held for the wildlife in question, but 
such research should not fall into the trap of desperately seeking any way to discover value.  
A hypothetical study of this kind must retain realism and credibility for respondents, 
requiring researchers in the field to remain innovative and aware to the potential criticisms 
which can arise from their survey conduct.  The second note of caution is in remembering 
that valuation is not about discovering prices for environmental entities such as wildlife per 
se, but asking why the value might exist and why it might differ between species or settings.  
This may be because the species hold particular characteristics which heighten warden 
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tendencies (as with garden birds and their potential to be ‘cared for’), or through ethical, 
emotional or moral obligations which lead to humans engaging in costly actions and effort 
to prevent harm to creatures (as with deer culling or starvation).  How these beliefs are 
constructed may well be very complex, and their accentuation or deflation might arise 
through private behavioural motivations, or through more subtle channels such as public 
perceptions and how we want others to see us.   
  Throughout this thesis and reinforced by others in the field (Hanley et al, 2003;  
Christie et al, 2006; Dunn et al, 2006; Jacobsen et al, 2008; Czajkowski & Hanley, 2009), the 
prior level of familiarity and background education which people hold on an environmental 
topic have heavily affected the perceptions and subsequent quantifications which they then 
place upon natural assets. This heterogeneity means that any given view could, at one 
extreme, represent a completely ill-informed and uncertain belief or at the other a genuine 
and well-grounded moral or social preference.  As with the majority of decision-making, the 
trust and confidence one has in their preferences is widely determined by these personal 
levels of awareness.  For environmental economics, the fact that so much conflicting 
evidence and uncertainty exists around important phenomena like climate change and 
environmental damage means that society can often feel unable to cast solid and consistent 
opinion.  Educating the population through clear environmental information is no less 
relevant when applied to local-scale natural resources.  This implies that key bodies need to 
provide sound, well-founded advice on such environmental situations if the associated 
public are to then make well-informed choices on how they act or react.  In relation to our 
specific studies, this could to pertain to bird trusts giving advice on when and what to feed 
birds in order to maximise their welfare and abundance, or forest managers providing a 
simple yet informative explanation of why they intend to conduct a particular deer 
population reduction regime, and why this chosen course of action is one which is projected 
to create the maximised social benefits.      
This thesis contributes to the field by its wish to use new and unusual approaches to 
uncover the worth people hold for wildlife.  The cleanest way to test the robustness of 
inferences made here will be to apply the idea behind warden-style nature connectivity to a 
broader set of applicable environmental settings, or to reapply them to those scenarios 
considered here.  Whatever the outcome, this work has served as a pioneering first attempt 
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to combine interdisciplinary approaches in order to explore and reveal the exact nature of 
people’s value for the natural world around them.  If local animals and plants really can 
deliver mankind with a separate and real level of happiness then this should be embraced.  
The relationship between humans and ‘everyday wildlife’ appears mutually beneficial, 
allowing the former to achieve a guardian type of wellbeing whilst simultaneously 
facilitating the latter to flourish and thrive at sustainable and socially desirable thresholds.  
To maximise the potential for each party to prosper from this co-existence, the over-arching 
goal of the thesis has been that it has identified why the local environment should receive a 
real and appropriate weighting, and that this can be reflected in subsequent decision-
making and policy arenas.     
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 2.1: RANKINGS OF THE RSPB BIG GARDEN BIRD WATCH (BGBW) SURVEY 2012 
 
Species Average/Garden Rank % of Gardens Rank Rank  
Blackbird 3.649 1 96.64 1 1    
Blue Tit 2.628 4 84.28 3 2    
Woodpigeon 2.546 5 77.47 4 3    
House Sparrow 3.498 2 57.75 9 4    
Collared Dove 2.162 7 73.62 5 5    
Robin 1.394 10 85.13 2 5    
Starling 3.032 3 48.95 10 7    
Chaffinch 2.245 6 63.53 7 7   Bird  
Great Tit 1.664 9 65.15 6 9   Selected for 
Goldfinch 2.013 8 42.36 11 10   This Study 
Dunnock 1.326 11 61.78 8 10    
Greenfinch 1.193 12 36.46 12 12    
Long tailed tit 1.135 13 30.82 14 13    
Coal Tit 0.584 14 32.56 13 13    
Feral pigeon 0.552 15 17.44 17 15    
Magpie 0.461 16 26.16 16 15    
Wren 0.350 20 29.17 15 17    
Jackdaw 0.425 17 13.92 19 18    
Pheasant 0.369 19 17.18 18 19    
Common gull 0.404 18 7.60 24 20    
Carrion crow 0.336 21 11.73 21 20    
Song Thrush 0.165 24 13.01 20 22    
Black headed gull 0.270 22 5.29 25 23    
Jay 0.143 26 10.11 22 24    
Rook 0.200 23 4.15 27 25    
Great spotted woodpecker 0.107 28 9.38 23 26    
Moorhen 0.088 29 4.32 26 27    
Fieldfare 0.151 25 2.57 34 28    
Redwing 0.116 27 2.41 35 29    
Nuthatch 0.056 33 4.03 29 29    
Green woodpecker 0.043 35 4.07 28 31    
Bullfinch 0.060 32 3.50 32 32    
Pied wagtail 0.053 34 3.79 30 32    
Tree sparrow 0.085 30 2.31 36 34    
Mallard 0.085 31 2.05 38 35    
Sparrowhawk 0.037 38 3.57 31 35    
Siskin 0.042 36 2.05 38 37    
Marsh tit 0.033 41 2.59 33 37    
Stock dove 0.036 39 2.25 37 39    
Red legged partridge 0.040 37 1.97 40 40    
Redpoll 0.033 40 1.30 47 41    
Blackcap 0.020 46 1.72 41 41    
Reed bunting 0.027 42 1.34 46 43    
Goldcrest 0.019 47 1.58 42 44    
Red Kite 0.024 43 1.26 49 45    
Grey heron 0.016 49 1.42 43 45    
Mistle thrush 0.015 50 1.42 43 47    
Treecreeper 0.015 51 1.38 45 48    
Herring gull 0.024 44 0.89 53 49    
Yellowhammer 0.023 45 0.99 52 49    
Brambling 0.017 48 1.26 49 49    
Barn owl 0.012 52 1.30 47 52    
Kestrel 0.010 54 1.11 51 53    
Willow tit 0.010 53 0.89 53 54    
Lesser spotted woodpecker 0.009 55 0.79 55 55    
Grey wagtail 0.008 56 0.77 56 56    
Buzzard 0.008 57 0.53 57 57    
Grey partridge 0.004 59 0.53 57 58    
Linnet 0.005 58 0.39 59 59    
Chiffchaff 0.004 60 0.36 60 60    
Tawny owl 0.002 61 0.26 61 61    
Little owl 0.001 62 0.20 62 62    
Lapwing 0.001 63 0.14 64 63    
Great black backed gull 0.000 64 0.16 63 63    
Lesser black backed gull 0.000 65 0.12 66 65    
Waxwing 0.000 68 0.14 64 66    
Corn bunting 0.000 66 0.08 67 67    
Raven 0.000 66 0.06 68 68    
Skylark 0.000 69 0.06 68 69    
Meadow pipit 0.000 70 0.02 70 70    
Black redstart 0.000 70 0.00 71 71    
Hooded crow 0.000 70 0.00 71 71    
Ring necked parakeet 0.000 70 0.00 71 71    
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APPENDIX 2.2:  SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS KEY 
You will need to use this to understand the cases you are presented with  
Species 
Cases will indicate the type and frequency of species that may come to your garden.  
Frequency estimations are described in the table below: 
 
 
This is the frequency estimation for each time the food is dispensed.  The average 
person would expect to obtain20 feeding opportunities from each bag. 
 
Visibility 
If instead of being shown in full colour, a bird is shown faded, this will mean these 
birds will feed in your garden from the food you have dispensed, but you will not see 
them.  An example illustrates this below.  Here, whilst 2-5 of these birds will feed in 
your garden, you will only actually see one of them. 
 
 
Rating Description
This species will not come to your 
garden
Expect 1 bird of this species to come to 
your garden
Expect an average of between 2 and 5 
birds of this species to come to your 
garden
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Nutrition 
Each option has a rating.  These act like ‘Hotel ratings’, ranging from one-star to 
three-star categories.  A one-star option will provide basic nourishment, and options 
with more stars will provide a greater level of nutrition to each bird which is fed.   
Price and Donations 
The price of an option represents the amount you would have to pay to obtain that 
seed bag[Please remember no actual purchases will be made as part of this survey]. 
In some cases, this price includes a donation.  This donation contributes toward 
habitat restoration which aims to raise the population of the Bittern in East Anglia.   
 
 
The Bittern 
 
The Bittern is a very rare and elusive 
species, and over two thirds of its remaining 
UK population live among East Anglian 
reedbeds currently.  If a donation is being 
made, this will be clearly indicated on the 
choice case. 
Here are the six different species 
that may be seen as a consequence 
of dispensing bird food.  The 
species appear below in their 
natural plumage (colouring) and 
will always appear in the same 
position on a choice card if 
present. 
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APPENDIX 2.3: BIRD QUIZ SHEET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible Bird Names Letter 
Chaffinch  
Robin  
Grey Heron  
Lesser-Spotted Woodpecker  
Blue Tit  
Woodpigeon  
Blackbird  
Bullfinch  
Song Thrush  
Kestrel  
Collared Dove  
Dunnock  
Mallard  
Tree Sparrow  
House Sparrow 
 
 
Great Tit  
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APPENDIX 2.4: TEMPLATE OF RESPONDENT SURVEY 
Respondent Survey 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Number:  
1.   Which of these best describes the garden space at the place where you live?   
No Garden   
  Small Private Garden (area less than a tennis court) 
  Large Private Garden (area larger than a tennis court)   
  Farmland / Fields 
  Communal Gardens   
 
2.   Which of these describe the food you put out for the birds (Tick all that apply)?   
I do not feed the birds     Leftover food  
  Bird food      Other (please specify)   
 
3.   If you do feed them, at what times of year do you do so and how often?   
  
 Never Occasionally Regularly 
Winter    
Spring    
Summer    
Autumn    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.   In the last 12 months, have you contributed to an environmental charity?  
  Yes       No 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the end of the survey!  Thanks again for your participation; both your responses and 
time have been invaluable and essential to the research. 
6.  Gender:       Male 
       Female 
7.   Age:   18-25yrs  26-35yrs 
    36- 45yrs  46- 55yrs 
    56 - 65yrs  65yrs + 
 
5.   Please rate each of the options below, which represent your reasons, if any, for feeding birds:
 (1 = Not important to me; 5 = Very important to me) 
Enjoyment from looking at them 
   
I feel they need the extra food  
 
Help towards bird populations 
   
It makes me feel good to think I am helping 
 
Throwing leftover food in the bin is a waste 
 
8.    What is your approximate annual (monthly) post-tax household income?   
  Below £20,000 (Below £1,667)                                £60,000 - £69,999 (£5,000- £5,833) 
  £20,000- £29,999 (£1,668 - £2,499)    £70,000 - £79,999 (£5,834 - £6,666) 
  £30,000 - £39,999 (£2,500 - £3,333)                      £80,000 - £89,999 (£6,667 - £7,499) 
  £40,000 - £49,999 (£3,334 - £4,166)                       Above £90,000 (Above £7,500) 
  £50,000 - £59,999 (£4,167 - £4,999)                       Prefer not to disclose 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX 2.5: CONDITIONAL LOGIT REGRESSIONS: 
 
Model (1) 
 
 
Model (2) 
 
 
                                                                              
       price     -.001226   .0003284    -3.73   0.000    -.0018697   -.0005823
      nutnum    -.0553717   .0124918    -4.43   0.000    -.0798552   -.0308883
    Donation    -.0016471   .0006635    -2.48   0.013    -.0029474   -.0003468
   nutrition      .574958   .0849568     6.77   0.000     .4084458    .7414702
  bullfinch1     .5039966   .0763845     6.60   0.000     .3542858    .6537074
 ebullfinch1     .4042217   .1062565     3.80   0.000     .1959627    .6124807
      robin1     .6668358   .0955411     6.98   0.000     .4795788    .8540928
 woodpigeon1    -.1259185   .0943639    -1.33   0.182    -.3108682    .0590313
ewoodpigeon1    -.1778065   .0946256    -1.88   0.060    -.3632691    .0076562
        tit2     1.267644   .1337081     9.48   0.000     1.005581    1.529707
        tit1     .3644564   .0603059     6.04   0.000     .2462591    .4826538
    sparrow2       .40951   .0814235     5.03   0.000     .2499228    .5690971
  blackbird2     .3983381   .1048255     3.80   0.000     .1928838    .6037924
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 200 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood =  -4712.006                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1777
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(13)   =     202.53
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      15990
                                                                              
       price    -.0012938   .0004564    -2.83   0.005    -.0021884   -.0003992
      nutnum    -.0484847   .0170833    -2.84   0.005    -.0819674    -.015002
    Donation    -.0007911   .0010116    -0.78   0.434    -.0027738    .0011916
   nutrition     .7705861   .1182932     6.51   0.000     .5387357    1.002436
  bullfinch1     .6555349    .118913     5.51   0.000     .4224696    .8886002
 ebullfinch1     .4179384    .149194     2.80   0.005     .1255235    .7103533
      robin1     .6041995   .1489067     4.06   0.000     .3123477    .8960513
 woodpigeon1    -.3181876   .1364508    -2.33   0.020    -.5856263    -.050749
ewoodpigeon1    -.3401966   .1455245    -2.34   0.019    -.6254193   -.0549739
        tit2     1.412778   .1843523     7.66   0.000     1.051454    1.774101
        tit1     .2751902   .0832376     3.31   0.001     .1120475    .4383329
    sparrow2     .3523063   .1214526     2.90   0.004     .1142637     .590349
  blackbird2     .2550205   .1603763     1.59   0.112    -.0593114    .5693524
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 110 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood = -2376.3008                 Pseudo R2       =     0.2460
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(13)   =     157.97
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =       8794
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Model (3) 
 
 
Model (4) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       price    -.0014955   .0007578    -1.97   0.048    -.0029808   -.0000102
      nutnum     -.076274   .0238117    -3.20   0.001     -.122944    -.029604
    Donation    -.0027573   .0013847    -1.99   0.046    -.0054712   -.0000433
   nutrition     .6117263   .1639323     3.73   0.000     .2904249    .9330278
  bullfinch1     .4039508   .1709416     2.36   0.018     .0689115    .7389901
 ebullfinch1     .5244085   .2432173     2.16   0.031     .0477112    1.001106
      robin1     1.083229   .1937378     5.59   0.000       .70351    1.462948
 woodpigeon1    -.1169137   .2242261    -0.52   0.602    -.5563887    .3225614
ewoodpigeon1    -.4522015   .2166585    -2.09   0.037    -.8768443   -.0275587
        tit2     1.813992     .27298     6.65   0.000     1.278961    2.349023
        tit1     .6019213   .1290822     4.66   0.000     .3489248    .8549177
    sparrow2     .7412322   .1774678     4.18   0.000     .3934017    1.089063
  blackbird2      .715099   .2211667     3.23   0.001     .2816204    1.148578
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 63 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood = -1327.0068                 Pseudo R2       =     0.2647
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(13)   =     158.91
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =       5036
                                                                              
       price    -.0012699   .0005356    -2.37   0.018    -.0023196   -.0002202
      nutnum    -.0576491   .0166544    -3.46   0.001    -.0902912   -.0250071
    Donation    -.0007948   .0009656    -0.82   0.410    -.0026874    .0010977
   nutrition     .6689339   .1177841     5.68   0.000     .4380813    .8997866
  bullfinch1     .6479146   .1105737     5.86   0.000     .4311941     .864635
 ebullfinch1      .145893   .1419158     1.03   0.304    -.1322568    .4240429
      robin1      .750739   .1321144     5.68   0.000     .4917996    1.009678
 woodpigeon1     -.213981   .1259097    -1.70   0.089    -.4607594    .0327974
ewoodpigeon1    -.0221013   .1246058    -0.18   0.859    -.2663242    .2221216
        tit2     1.347074   .1806959     7.45   0.000     .9929169    1.701232
        tit1     .3533329   .0817502     4.32   0.000     .1931055    .5135603
    sparrow2     .4995239   .1140249     4.38   0.000     .2760391    .7230087
  blackbird2     .6012309   .1484305     4.05   0.000     .3103125    .8921493
                                                                              
      choice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 124 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood =  -2665.613                 Pseudo R2       =     0.2497
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(13)   =     157.55
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =       9914
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APPENDIX 2.6:  STATISITCAL TESTS FOR REGRESSION OUTPUTS 
Table 1: Tests of Parameter Differences Across Conditional Logit Models 
  Model 1 
 
Coefficients 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient   𝜒2 value 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 𝜒2 value 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 𝜒2 value 
(p-value) 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.398 0.255 0.79 (0.37) 0.601 1.87 (0.17) 0.715 2.06 (0.15) 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.504 0.656 1.62 (0.2) 0.648 1.69 (0.19) 0.404 0.34 (0.55) 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.404 0.418 0.01 (0.92) 0.146 3.31 (0.07)* 0.524 0.25 (0.62) 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 0.667 0.604 0.18 (0.67) 0.751 0.40 (0.52) 1.083 4.62 (0.03)** 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.410 0.352 0.23 (0.63) 0.500 0.62 (0.43) 0.741 3.48 (0.06)* 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . 0.364 0.275 1.04 (0.3) 0.353 0.01 (0.93) 0.602 3.51(0.06)* 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 1.268 1.413 0.62 (0.43) 1.347 0.19 (0.66) 1.814 4.00 (0.05)** 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.126 -0.318 1.98 (0.15) -0.214 0.49 (0.48) -0.117 0.00 (0.97) 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.178 -0.340 1.24 (0.27) -0.022 1.57 (0.21) -0.452 1.60 (0.20) 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 0.575 0.771 2.73 (0.10)* 0.669 0.64 (0.42) 0.612 0.05 (0.82) 
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . -0.002 -0.001 1.43 (0.23) -0.001 1.56 (0.21) -0.003 0.30 (0.58) 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . -0.055 -0.048 0.15 (0.70) -0.058 0.03 (0.87) -0.076 0.80 (0.37) 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . -0.001 -0.001 0.41 (0.51) -0.001 0.25 (0.61) -0.001 0.43 (0.51) 
*Significant at 10% level (p < 0.1)  ** Significant at 5% level (p < 0.05) 
Table 2:  Testing the Impact of Status Quo Effects 
 
Variable Coefficient Z P>|z| Model 1 
Parameter  
ASC 
Value 
Model 1 
Value 
𝜒2 value (p-value) 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.214 -1.94 0.052 0.398 3.80 8.46 5.61(0.02)** 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.318 4.15 0.000 0.504 10.84 20.55 13.58 (0.00)** 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.200 1.9 0.057 0.404 6.83 16.49 7.10 (0.01)** 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 0.491 5.33 0.000 0.667 16.73 27.20 10.87 (0.00)** 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.248 -2.83 0.005 0.410 4.40 8.70 7.47 (0.01)** 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . -0.050 -0.78 0.437 0.364 -1.70 14.86 56.76 (0.00)** 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.374 2.84 0.004 1.268 7.52 19.18 74.62 (0.00)** 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.437 -4.76 0.000 -0.126 -14.91 -5.14 9.87 (0.00)** 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.604 -6.06 0.000 -0.178 -20.61 -7.25 15.48 (0.00)** 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. -0.304 -2.49 0.013 0.575 -10.35 23.45 65.94 (0.00)** 
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . -0.002 -2.4 0.016 -0.002 -0.05 -0.07 0.29 (0.59) 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . 0.057 4.08 0.000 -0.055 1.96 -2.26 76.82 (0.00)** 
SQ Effect -1.637 -7.43 0.000     
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . -0.001 -4.41 0.000 -0.001   0.00 (0.99) 
** Significant at 5% level (p < 0.05) 
Testing Species WTP Estimate Differences [for Conditional Logit Model (1)] 
Robin – Bullfinch;  𝜒2 = 1.58 (p = 0.21) No difference between Robin and Bullfinch 
Robin – Bullfinch(e)
+
 𝜒2 = 2.76 (p = 0.10)* Robin greater in value than all those except Bullfinch 
Robin – Tit    𝜒2 = 9.41 (p = 0.002)**  
Bullfinch – Tit 𝜒2 = 2.35 (p = 0.12) No difference between Tit and Bullfinch 
Bullfinch – Bullfinch(e)
+
 𝜒2 = 0.77 (p = 0.38) No difference between Bullfinch(e)
+
 and Bullfinch 
Tit – Titmult   𝜒2 = 0.00 (p = 0.96)   Constant marginal value 
Tit – Bullfinch(e)
+
    𝜒2 = 0.16 (p = 0.69) No difference between Bullfinch(e)
+
 and Tit 
Bullfinch - Sparrowmult  𝜒
2 = 19.4 (p = 0.000) **  Bullfinch greater than all those below Sparrow 
Tit - Sparrowmult  𝜒
2 = 14.6 (p = 0.000) ** Tit greater than all those below Sparrow 
Blackbirdmult  - Sparrowmult  𝜒
2 = 0.03 (p = 0.85)            No difference between Blackbirdmult and Sparrowmult 
 
*Significant at 10% level (p < 0.1)  ** Significant at 5% level (p < 0.05) 
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Table 3:  A Comparison of Mixed Logit and Conditional Logit Regression Results 
 Mixed Logit Regression Conditional Logit [Model (1)] 
Regression 
 
Estimate 
Differences?  
𝜒2 value (p-value) Variable Coefficie
nt 
Z P>|z| WTP Value Coefficient WTP Value 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.673 4.77 0.000 6.95 0.398 8.46 1.07(0.31) 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.696 4.60 0.000 13.79 0.504 20.55 5.09(0.02)** 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.524 2.77 0.006 10.40 0.404 16.49 2.63(0.11) 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 1.259 8.39 0.000 24.96 0.667 27.20 0.56(0.45) 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.551 5.32 0.000 5.69 0.410 8.70 7.89(0.01)** 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . 0.352 9.28 0.000 6.98 0.364 14.86 16.25(0.00)** 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 1.681 3.57 0.000 13.72 1.268 19.18 26.15(0.00)** 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.071 -0.48 0.629 -1.41 -0.126 -5.14 1.61(0.20) 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.261 -1.75 0.081 -5.17 -0.178 -7.25 0.49(0.48) 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 1.084 8.16 0.000 21.50 0.575 23.45 0.55(0.46) 
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . -0.001 -1.64 0.101 -0.03 -0.002 -0.07 6.58(0.01)** 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . -0.079 -5.85 0.000 -1.56 -0.055 -2.26 6.96(0.01)** 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . -0.003 -7.43 0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.01 (0.90) 
        
Model Fit (𝜒2) 2230.83  0.000     
Log likelihood Ratio 3456.5887       
*Significant at 10% level (p < 0.1)  ** Significant at 5% level (p < 0.05) 
Table 4:  A Comparison of Latent Class and Conditional Logit Regressions 
 Conditional Logit 
(Model 1)  
Log Likelihood: -
4712.006 
Latent Class Model  
Log Likelihood: -3403.5682 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Variable Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
𝐁𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐛𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.398 8.46 0.253 3.29 1.237 2.93 -0.591 5.13 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡 . 0.504 20.55 0.576 3.01 3.923 9.29 -3.702 32.14 
𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐞)
+
 . 0.404 16.49 0.583 8.13 2.267 10.30 -0.014 0.23 
𝐑𝐨𝐛𝐢𝐧 . 0.667 27.20 1.007 11.88 11.404 21.63 0.468 -4.18 
𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 0.410 8.70 0.231 -18.85 0.973 4.42 -3.736 62.27 
𝐓𝐢𝐭 . 0.364 14.86 0.325 -12.50 0.813 3.70 -2.368 39.47 
𝐓𝐢𝐭𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭 . 1.268 19.18 1.237 25.18 -10.414 -47.34 -0.132 2.20 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧 . -0.126 -5.14 -0.754 14.58 24.355 110.70 -3.796 63.27 
𝐖𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐧(𝐞)
+
 . -0.178 -7.25 -0.5 14.40 15.885 72.20 -34.597 576.62 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 0.575 23.45 0.095 2.38 2.098 9.54 -2.522 42.03 
𝐃𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 . -0.002 -0.07 -0.001 -0.03 0.008 0.04 -0.01 0.17 
𝐍𝐮𝐭𝐧𝐮𝐦 . -0.055 -2.26 -0.003 -0.08 -0.127 -0.58 0.274 -4.57 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 . -0.001  -0.002  -0.011  0.003  
   Membership: 0.137 Membership: 0.716 Membership: 0.146 
Number Correct -0.162 0.299 Ref group 
Age (65+) -1.082 0.255 Ref group 
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APPENDIX 2.7: ESTIMATED BIRD FEEDING PERCENTAGES BASED UPON HABIT AND DIET 
 
Score (from 0-5) of the ‘attractiveness’ of each feed constituent to bird feeding groups. 
It is by compiling this information, plus data and advice from bird-feeding websites and forums such 
as that of the RSPB (www.rspb.org.uk) that best estimates can be made on the typical proportions of 
feeding groups which will be attracted to each of our 16 products below: 
 Bird Feeding Groups (proportion) 
Finches Seed-Eaters Thrushes Tits 
Fat Ball (100) 
0 0 30 70 
Fat Ball (28 x 6) 
0 0 30 70 
Fat Ball (50) 
0 0 30 70 
Berry Bird-Cake 
30 0 50 20 
Mealworm Bird-Cake 
0 30 50 20 
Original Bird-Cake 
40 40 0 20 
Hanging Berry Bird-Cake 
30 0 20 50 
Hanging Mealworm Bird-Cake 
0 40 20 40 
Hanging Original Bird-Cake 
30 30 0 40 
Dried Mealworm  (90g x 6) 
0 0 100 0 
Dried mealworm (200g x5) 
0 0 100 0 
Dried mealworm (600g x1) 
0 0 100 0 
Bird Seed (12.55KG) 
20 80 0 0 
Suet Pellets (10kg) 
0 0 0 100 
Suet Pellets with Mealworms (10kg) 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
10 
 
90 
Sunflower Pellets (10kg) 
10 0 0 90 
 
 
 
 Maize Sunflower Pellets Mealworms Fat Nuts Berries 
Finches 3 1 0 3 4 2 
Seed-Eaters 5 0 0 0 1 0 
Thrushes 0 0 4 2 2 4 
Tits 0 5 0 3 4 1 
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APPENDIX 3.1:  ALGEBRAIC PROOF THAT A CONCAVE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN ‘S’ 
  AND OTHER FEED SOURCES (‘M’ AND ‘Q’) 
 
𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
 [
[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
(1−α)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
]     (3.18) 
Rearranging this can create the following expression: 
 
𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
[𝑀 − 1] [
1
(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄 
] + 
α𝑌
𝑝
𝑄 [
1
(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄 
] 
 
These can then be differentiated with respect to M and Q to give expressions for each. 
 
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑀
 =
α𝑌
𝑝
(1 − α)𝑠∗[(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄]−2  (3.18A) 
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑄
 =
α𝑌
𝑝
(1 − α)𝑠∗[(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄]−2  (3.18B) 
 
Both terms will both be positive.  However, when differentiating each again, we find 
negative second order conditions… 
 
𝜕2𝑠∗
𝜕𝑀2
 = −2
α𝑌
𝑝
(1 − α)𝑠∗[(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄]−3  (3.18A’) 
𝜕2𝑠∗
𝜕𝑄2
 = −2
α𝑌
𝑝
(1 − α)𝑠∗[(1 − α)𝑠∗  + [𝑀 − 1]𝑠 + 𝑄]−3  (3.18B’) 
 
The combination of these two sets of expressions (3.18A & 3.18A’) and (3.18B & 3.18B’) 
show that in each case, a concave relationship exists between the seed dispensation level 
(𝑠∗) of the individual and the level of other feed sources… 
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APPENDIX 3.2: COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS USING IMPLICIT FUNCTION THEORY 
 
(I) FOR THE EXOGENOUS POPULATION MODEL 
 
 
Nash Equilibrium: 𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
 [
[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
(1−α)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
] 
   
 
First-Best Solution:  𝑠𝐹 =  
α𝑌
𝑝
(
 𝑄
(1−α)𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
)   
Comparative Static (with 𝑠 = 𝑠∗) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Comparative Static (with 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐹) Expected 
Sign 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑝
= − (
𝑠⌈𝑠(𝑀 − α) + 𝑄⌉
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α) + Q] − αY(𝑀 − 1) 
)  
 
 
Negative 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑝
= − (
𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + 𝑄⌉
𝑝[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + Q]
)  
 
 
Negative 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
=
𝑃𝑠⌈𝑠(𝑀 − α) + 𝑄⌉
𝑃𝑌[2𝑠(𝑀 − α) + Q] − αY2(𝑀 − 1) 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
=
𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + 𝑄⌉
𝑌[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + Q]
 
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑α
=
𝑃𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄⌉
α𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α) + Q] − α2Y(𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑α
=
𝑠(𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄)
α[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + Q]
 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
=
𝑠(αY − 𝑃𝑠)
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α) + Q] − αY(𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
= − (
𝑠2(1 − α)
2𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + Q
)  
 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
=
αY − 𝑃𝑠
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α) + Q] − αY(𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
=
αY − 𝑃𝑠
𝑝[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α) + Q]
  
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
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(II) FOR THE ENDOGENOUS POPULATION MODEL 
 
 
Nash Equilibrium:    𝑠∗  =
α𝑌
𝑝
 [
𝛽𝑠+ [𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄
(1−α(1−𝛽)𝑠∗ +[𝑀−1]𝑠+𝑄 
]  
   
 
First-Best Solution:    𝑠𝐹 =  α𝑌
𝑝
(
 𝛽𝑀𝑠𝐹+𝑄
(1−α(1−𝛽))𝑀𝑠𝐹 +𝑄
)
    
Comparative Static (with 𝑠 = 𝑠∗) 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Comparative Static (with 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐹) Expected 
Sign 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑝
= −
𝑠⌈𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + 𝑄⌉
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
Negative 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑝
= −
𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + 𝑄⌉
𝑝[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌𝛽𝑀
  
 
 
Negative 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
=
𝑃𝑠⌈𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + 𝑄⌉
𝑃𝑌[2𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − αY2(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1) 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑌
=
𝑃𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + 𝑄⌉
𝑃𝑌[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − αY2𝛽𝑀 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑α
=
𝑃𝑠⌈𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄⌉
α𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α2Y(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
Positive 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑α
=
𝑃𝑠(𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄)
αP[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α2Y𝛽𝑀
 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
=
𝑠⌈αY − 𝑃𝑠⌉
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − αY(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑀
= −
𝑃𝑠2(𝑀𝑠 + 𝑄) − α𝑌𝛽𝑠
P[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌𝛽𝑀
 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
=
αY − 𝑃𝑠
𝑃[2𝑠(𝑀 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − αY(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1) 
  
 
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑄
=
αY − 𝑃𝑠
P[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌𝛽𝑀
  
 
 
 
Positive if 
αY > Ps 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝛽
=
αs(Y − Ps) 
P[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌(𝛽 + 𝑀 − 1)
 
 
 
Positive if 
𝛽 < 1  
 
Negative if 
𝛽 > 1 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝛽
=
αMs(Y − Ps) 
P[2𝑀𝑠(1 − α(1 − 𝛽)) + Q] − α𝑌𝛽𝑀
 
 
 
Positive if 
𝛽 < 1  
 
Negative if 
𝛽 > 1 
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APPENDIX 4.1: AN EXAMPLE CHOICE SET 
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APPENDIX 4.2: ABBREVIATED TUTORIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
  
 
163 
 
APPENDIX 4.3: THE RESPONDENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Respondent Survey 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.   Do you regularly feed birds in your garden?   
  Yes       No 
     
 
 
 
 
Survey Number:  
1.   On average, how often do you visit East Anglia’s Forests?    
At least once per month   
  Once every 2 -3 months  
  Once or twice per year  
  Less than once per year 
  Never (Please move to Question 3)   
 
2.   When visiting these forests, what is normally the reason for your visit? (Tick all that apply)   
Walking or Dog Walking     Cycling / Sport  
  Nature- Watching     Other (please specify)   
 
4.   In the last 12 months, have you donated to or done voluntary work for either of the following:  
(a) An Animal Welfare Charity    Yes   No 
(b) Another Environmental Organisation   Yes      No 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.   Please indicate your view regarding the following:    
 I agree with this action 
Erecting Fences to prevent deer from accessing 
woodlands in East Anglia in order to protect 
forestry  
YES NO Don’t know 
Culling deer in woodlands in East Anglia in order to 
protect forestry 
YES NO Don’t know 
Culling badgers in the UK under the assumption 
that this will prevent the spread of TB in livestock. 
YES NO Don’t know 
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Page 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the end of the survey!  Thanks again for your participation; both your responses and 
time have been invaluable and essential to the research.  
6.   Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:  
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Agree or Disagree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree) 
 
a) Effective Forest Management is Important  
 
b) If deer populations must be reduced, culling  
is a better way than starvation. 
 
c) Educating children about nature and the  
environment is important  
 
 
 
   
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  Gender:       Male 
       Female 
8.   Age:    18-25yrs  26-35yrs 
    36- 45yrs  46- 55yrs 
    56 - 65yrs  65yrs + 
 
9.    What is your approximate annual (monthly) post-tax household income?    
  Below £20,000 (Below £1,667)                                      £60,000 - £69,999 (£5,000- £5,833)  
  £20,000- £29,999 (£1,668 - £2,499)       £70,000 - £79,999 (£5,834 - £6,666) 
  £30,000 - £39,999 (£2,500 - £3,333)                £80,000 - £89,999 (£6,667 - £7,499) 
  £40,000 - £49,999 (£3,334 - £4,166)                 Above £90,000 (Above £7,500) 
  £50,000 - £59,999 (£4,167 - £4,999)                Prefer not to disclose 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
11.   Are you Vegetarian or Vegan?   
     Yes     No 
     
 
 
 
 
 
10.   In the last 12 months, have you participated in either of the following activities?  
(a) Game Hunting or Shooting   Yes   No 
(b) Fishing     Yes      No 
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APPENDIX 4.4: AGGREGATED RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
1. Visit Frequency %  2. Type of Use %  3(a). Attitude to 
Fencing 
%  4(a). Give to 
Animal Welfare 
Charity  
% 
At least Once per 
Month 
54  Walk 75  Yes 62  Yes  42.5 
Every 2-3 months 12.5  Nature-Watching 42  No  25.5  No 57.5 
2-3 times per year 23  Cycle 26  Don’t Know 12.5    
Less than Once per 
year 
7  Other 21       
Never 3.5     3(b). Attitude to 
Deer Culling 
%  4(b). Give to 
Environmental 
Organisation 
% 
      Yes 76.5  Yes 39 
      No  12  No 61 
      Don’t Know 11.5    
           
      3(c). Attitude to 
Badger Culling 
%  5. Feeds Birds? % 
      Yes 26  Yes 63.5 
      No  41  No 36.5 
      Don’t Know 33    
           
6(a). Mean Score 
on Effective forest 
Management 
4.53  7. Gender %  8. Age %  9. Income % 
   Male 45  18-25 11.5  Less the £20,000 27 
6(b). Mean Score 
on Culling better 
than Starvation 
4.34  Female 55  26-35 12.5  £20,000 – 29,999 18.5 
      36-45 13  £30,000 – 39,999 10.5 
6(c). Mean Score 
on Educating 
Children 
4.74     46-55 17.5  £40,000 – 49,999 11.5 
      56-65 22  £50,000 – 59,999 5 
      65+ 23.5  £60,000 – 69,999 4.5 
         £70,000 – 79,999 2.5 
         £80,000 – 89,999 3 
         Above £90,000 2.5 
         Prefer not to 
Disclose 
15 
           
10(a). Partake in 
Hunting 
%  11. Vegetarian or 
Vegan 
%  Location %  Voucher Used % 
Yes 4  Yes 13.5  Norfolk 50  Yes 74.5 
No 96  No 86.5  Suffolk 50  No 25.5 
           
10(b). Partake in 
Fishing 
%     Survey Day %    
Yes 7     Weekday 50    
No 93     Weekend 50    
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APPENDIX 4.5: VALUATIONS MATRIX 
 
 
 Valuations in £0.00 
 QUALITY LARGE SMALL MEAT FC CULL TH CULL N 
MAIN SAMPLE 3.85 3.51 9.46 12.19 0.12 0.01 200 
        
1. VEGETARIANS 4.94 8.76 18.15 17.55 0.15 -0.06 27 
2. WELFARE CHARITY 4.68 4.50 13.56 14.10 0.16 -0.01 85 
3. BIRDFEEDERS 4.37 3.58 10.37 14.20 0.16 0.00 127 
4. MEN 3.42 2.96 6.90 10.94 0.10 0.02 90 
5. NON-VOUCHER USER 4.04 5.73 10.05 9.74 0.09 0.04 51 
6. FREQ USER 3.69 3.50 9.27 15.53 0.14 0.01 108 
7. PRO-BADGER CULLERS 2.75 0.87 4.98 11.20 0.12 0.06 52 
8. CYCLISTS 3.54 2.87 7.65 13.75 0.10 -0.01 52 
9. SUFFOLK 3.30 3.29 7.65 12.92 0.12 0.00 100 
10. YOUNGEST 5.92 9.89 11.34 9.04 0.03 -0.08 23 
11. AGE = 65+ 3.82 3.29 7.09 16.10 0.14 0.00 47 
12. WEEKENDERS 4.12 4.15 11.14 11.86 0.09 -0.02 100 
13. INCOME LOW (< £20K)  5.17 7.36 11.61 22.55 0.12 -0.07 54 
14. INCOME MED (£20-40K) 3.71 3.57 9.04 9.22 0.10 0.03 58 
15. INCOME HIGH (> £40K) 3.44 3.17 8.71 9.76 0.11 0.01 58 
     
  Insignificant 
(p>0.1) 
Weakly Significant 
(p>0.05) 
Statistically different 
from the main sample 
(p<0.1) 
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APPENDIX 4.6: FURTHER STATISTICAL TESTS 
Table 1:  Interacting Quality over Income 
 
Table 2:  Status Quo Effects  
 
Table 3:  The Results of the Latent Class Model 
 Conditional Logit 
(Model 1) 
Log Likelihood:      
-4821.5204 
Latent Class Model  
Log Likelihood: -4421.62 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Variable Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
Coeff WTP 
Value 
Quality Level 0.249 3.85 0.487 5.07 0.325 2.56 0.195 4.24 
Large Deer 0.227 3.51 0.618 6.44 -0.122 -0.96 0.213 4.63 
Small Deer 0.612 9.46 1.593 16.59 0.772 6.08 -0.114 -2.48 
FC Level 0.007 0.12 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.004 0.09 
TH Level 0.000 0.01 -0.016 -0.17 0.014 0.11 0.002 0.04 
Meat 0.789 12.19 0.768 8.00 1.301 10.24 0.488 10.61 
Cost -0.065  -0.096  -0.127  -0.046  
  
 Membership: 0.375 Membership: 0.387 Membership: 0.238 
Animal Welfare +0.849     +0.629  Ref. Group  
Badger Cullers          -0.681     +0.14 Ref. Group 
         
 Coefficient Z P>|z| Model 1 
Parameter  
Interaction 
Model Value 
Model 1 Value 
Quality Level 0.243 12.23 0.000 0.249 3.76 3.85 
Large Deer 0.227 6.27 0.000 0.227 3.51 3.51 
Small Deer 0.612 10.80 0.000 0.612 9.46 9.46 
FC Level 0.007 8.31 0.000 0.007 0.12 0.12 
TH Level 0.000 0.28 0.778 0.000 0.01 0.01 
Meat 0.789 15.72 0.000 0.789 12.19 12.19 
Income*Quality 0.002 0.40 0.692  0.03  
𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭 -0.065 -12.39 0.000 -0.065   
 Coefficient Z P>|z| Model 1 
Parameter  
ASC 
Value 
Model 1 
Value 
Estimate 
Differences?  
𝜒2 value (p-
value) 
SQ effects 
with Model 
(1) cost 
parameter 
Estimate 
Differences?  
𝜒2 value (p-
value) 
Quality Level 0.225 13.91 0.000 0.249 4.77 3.85 7.17 (0.007)** 5.27 2.14 (0.143) 
Large Deer 0.351 9.14 0.000 0.227 7.44 3.51 23.33 (0.000)** 4.81 10.46 (0.001)** 
Small Deer 0.261 4.86 0.000 0.612 5.53 9.46 11.96 (0.001)** 12.97 42.83 (0.000)** 
FC Level 0.007 7.33 0.000 0.007 0.14 0.12 0.97 (0.324)   
TH Level 0.001 1.13 0.260 0.000 0.03 0.01 0.57 (0.449)   
Meat 0.552 11.00 0.000 0.789 11.71 12.19 0.21 (0.651)   
SQ Effects 0.637 8.34 0.000       
𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭 -0.047 -9.71 0.000 -0.065      
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Table 4: Age Interaction (Model 4) 
 
Table 5: Meat Interaction (Model 5) 
 
 
 
                                                                              
        cost    -.0651221   .0052688   -12.36   0.000    -.0754488   -.0547954
        meat     .7909037    .050511    15.66   0.000     .6919039    .8899035
    largeage    -.0848544   .0271396    -3.13   0.002     -.138047   -.0316618
    smallage      .030071   .0331622     0.91   0.365    -.0349258    .0950678
     thlevel     .0003354   .0012943     0.26   0.796    -.0022014    .0028722
     fclevel     .0074436   .0008989     8.28   0.000     .0056819    .0092054
       small     .4939271    .146155     3.38   0.001     .2074686    .7803855
       large     .5664263   .1165519     4.86   0.000     .3379888    .7948639
     quality     .2506024   .0159989    15.66   0.000     .2192452    .2819597
                                                                              
     choice1        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 200 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood = -4809.8227                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1611
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(9)    =     607.79
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      16000
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -4809.8227  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -4809.8227  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -4810.0955  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -4862.2001  
> , cluster(ind) group(  Sets)
. clogit choice1 quality large small fclevel thlevel smallage largeage meat cost
                                                                              
        cost    -.0698278   .0055178   -12.65   0.000    -.0806426   -.0590131
        meat    -.0071354   .1488758    -0.05   0.962    -.2989266    .2846557
      fcmeat     .0185006   .0019952     9.27   0.000       .01459    .0224112
      thmeat    -.0010469   .0025546    -0.41   0.682    -.0060538    .0039601
     thlevel     .0028037   .0017252     1.63   0.104    -.0005776    .0061849
     fclevel     .0001613   .0009679     0.17   0.868    -.0017356    .0020583
       small     .5543545   .0571382     9.70   0.000     .4423657    .6663433
       large     .1665162   .0395247     4.21   0.000     .0890492    .2439832
     quality     .2722683   .0168543    16.15   0.000     .2392345    .3053021
                                                                              
     choice1        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 200 clusters in ind)
Log pseudolikelihood = -4744.5167                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1725
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(9)    =     760.56
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression   Number of obs   =      16000
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -4744.5167  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -4744.5169  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -4745.0854  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -4790.9295  
> uster( ind) group( Sets)
. clogit choice1 quality large small fclevel thlevel thmeat fcmeat meat cost, cl
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